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Abstract of Dissertation
Essays on Financial and Labor Markets with Frictions
by
Feng Dong
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2014
Professor Stephen Williamson, Chair
The dissertation, which consists of three chapters, is devoted to exploring finan-
cial and labor markets with frictions.
Chapter I: Unemployment and Capital Misallocation. The recent
recession was associated not only with a marked disruption in the credit market,
but also a sharp deterioration in labor market conditions, as evidenced by high
unemployment rates and an outward shift in the Beveridge curve. Motivated by such
co-movements of the credit market and the labor market, in this chapter I develop
a tractable dynamic model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, credit constraints,
and labor-search frictions. In this framework, the misallocation of capital across
firms has an adverse effect on the matching efficiency in the labor market. I then
quantify the importance of capital misallocation for understanding the behavior of
unemployment rate. I find that the credit crunch was the key driving force behind
the outward shift in the Beveridge curve during and after the Great Recession. More
vii
broadly, I find that credit market frictions and labor search frictions almost equally
contributed to unemployment over all business cycles between 1951 and 2011.
Chapter II: Asset Exchange with Search Frictions and Costly In-
formation Acquisition. The second chapter presents a model to characterize
conditions under which centralized and decentralized markets (CM/DM) co-exist
for asset trading. The asset payoff and trading motive are the seller’s private infor-
mation. CM is immune to search frictions, but suffers from adverse selection. In
contrast, DM is subject to search frictions, but it is sustainable since buyers acquire
costly information on the asset payoff, and offer a trading menu different from that
posted by uninformed buyers. As matching efficiency in the DM increases and the
information cost decreases, more trade migrates from CM with adverse selection
to DM with search frictions. In the limit, DM with search frictions converges to
CM with complete information. I use the model to address the heterogeneous wel-
fare effect of a government asset purchase programs like the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP).
Chapter III: A Search-Based Theory of The Life-Cycle Pattern
of Asset Holding. The third chapter investigates the implications of search
frictions for a household’s life cycle pattern of asset trading as well as for its size
distribution in the OTC. General types of preferences are considered and the usual
search-theoretic restriction of indivisibility on asset holding is removed. I employ
the birth-and-death process to analytically characterize the non-stationary life-cycle
pattern of asset holding by each cohort. In the presence of search frictions in the
OTC, our paper predicts that the life cycle of asset holding by each cohort conforms
to a geometric distribution while the size distribution of asset holding in each cross-
section follows a logarithmic pattern. In the end, our model yields Gibrat’s law for
asset trading in the OTC.
viii
Chapter 1
Capital Misallocation and
Unemployment
1.1 Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis was accompanied by a marked increase in unemploy-
ment and a serious disruption in credit markets. First, the ratio of external funding
to non-financial assets, a key measure used in the literature to characterize the
functioning of the credit market, shrank significantly, as demonstrated in the right
panel of Figure (1.1).1 Second, as the left panel of Figure (1.1) shows, not only
did the unemployment rate increase significantly over time, but the Beveridge curve
also shifted outward beginning in the last quarter of 2008. Motivated by such co-
movements of the credit market and the labor market, I develop a tractable dynamic
model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, credit constraints, and labor-search fric-
tions. I find that the credit crunch was the key driving force behind the outward shift
in the Beveridge curve during and after the Great Recession. More broadly, I find
that credit market frictions and labor search frictions almost equally contributed to
unemployment over all business cycles between 1951 and 2011.
I employ two layers of frictions to model the relationship between credit and
labor markets. On the one hand, I introduce credit frictions by using a collateral
constraint, which is a powerful tool to characterize credit crunches. On the other
1The measure is considered in Buera and Moll (2013) and Buera, Fattal-Jaef and Shin (2013).
Both non-financial corporate and non-financial non-corporate business in the Flow of Funds Ac-
counts are considered. Details are documented in Appendix A.
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Figure 1.1: Left Panel: Beveridge Curve, Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS); Right Panel: External Funding over Non-Financial Assets of
Non-Financial Business, Flow of Funds Accounts
hand, I use competitive search to model equilibrium unemployment. Recent empir-
ical findings by Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2013) show that job-filling rates
vary significantly across firms. However, a direct implication of random search is
that job-filling rate is independent of firm’s heterogeneous characteristics. As will be
shown in our model, the prediction of competitive search is in line with the empirical
regularity.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in two dimensions, net worth and productivity.
The former is endogenous and the latter is an exogenous stochastic process. There
are three sources of aggregate shocks: i) a credit shock, i.e., the tightening of col-
lateral constraints in the credit market; ii) a matching shock, i.e., the decrease of
matching efficiency in the labor market; and iii) an aggregate productivity shock.
When a credit crunch occurs, the collateral constraint tightens and more capital
would have to be used by relatively unproductive entrepreneurs. The key theoreti-
cal contribution of this paper is that capital misallocation worsens labor misalloca-
tion, even though it is not accompanied by an adverse matching shock that directly
disrupts the labor market.2 Therefore credit imperfections contribute to endoge-
2Since our model involves capital misallocation, it belongs to the recently burgeoning literature
on misallocation, which mainly includes Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
Bartelsman et al. (2012), and a recent discussion by Hopenhayn (2013), among others. Moreover,
there has been extensive discussion on capital misallocation due to financial frictions, such as
2
nous matching efficiency in equilibrium and thus to shifts in the Beveridge curve.
In addition to analytically illustrating the effect of capital misallocation on labor
misallocation, I also show that equilibrium TFP is determined by the interaction
between credit and labor frictions.3
The key transmission mechanism proceeds as follows. Although workers are
homogeneous, the marginal value of being matched with labor increases with an
entrepreneur’s productivity. Therefore, entrepreneurs with heterogeneous produc-
tivity have an incentive to post different wage offers. I use competitive search to
implement this idea. Entrepreneurs with higher productivity tend to post higher
wage positions with more workers queuing for those jobs. Thus the job-filling rate
will be higher for more productive entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, wage dispersion for
homogeneous workers emerges with an endogenous set of segmented labor markets,
as in standard competitive search models.
If there is a negative shock to the credit market, i.e., the collateral constraint
tightens, then capital misallocation worsens, since the interest rate decreases and
more capital is used by relatively unproductive entrepreneurs. Since the job-filling
rate in active sub-labor markets increases with an entrepreneur’s productivity, the
redistribution of capital from high-productivity to low-productivity firms decreases
the total number of matched workers. In addition to the direct effect imposed on
unemployment, capital misallocation also generates an indirect and offsetting ef-
fect in general equilibrium such that workers also move from labor markets with
high productivity to those with lower productivity. Therefore, the job-filling rates
as well as equilibrium wage dispersion in all sub-labor markets responds to credit
crunches in general equilibrium. However, the concavity of the matching function in
each active sub-labor market implies that job destruction by high-productivity en-
trepreneurs will outweigh job creation by low-productivity ones. Therefore those in-
direct general-equilibrium effects are dominated by the direct effect described above.
In sum, this is how credit crunches contribute to the outward shift in the Beveridge
curve.4
Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), Azariadis and Kaas (2012), Moll (2012), Wang and Wen (2012),
Bigio (2013), Buera and Moll (2013), Cui (2013), Khan and Thomas (2013), and Liu and Wang
(2013).
3Lagos (2006) develops a model of TFP with labor search frictions. Our work contributes to
this line of literature by incorporating both credit and labor search frictions into an otherwise
standard RBC model.
4Complementary to our work, Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2012) develop a multi-sector model with
labor search to characterize conditions under which sector-specific shock, such as in the construction
sector, can decreases aggregate matching efficiency and generate an outward shift in the Beveridge
3
In each period, the collateral constraint is not necessarily binding for all het-
erogeneous entrepreneurs. An infinite-horizon model with this setup is potentially
complicated. Moreover, I allow for capital accumulation with both financial fric-
tions in the credit market and search frictions in the labor market. Our model
is highly tractable because of the linearity of individual policy functions, which is
driven by the linearity of the capital revenue in equilibrium. The analytical solution
is beneficial in making transparent the mechanism through which capital and labor
misallocation interact with each other.
The unemployment effect of capital misallocation is not only of theoretical in-
terest, but also offers a new channel for amplification and propagation in our quan-
titative analysis. A negative credit shock not only creates capital misallocation and
works at the intensive margin, but also affects the extensive margin by lowering
matching efficiency. Therefore, even in the absence of the price effect in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), credit frictions have an amplification effect with a new channel
through which capital misallocation worsens labor misallocation. When it comes
to the unemployment effect, credit crunches lower endogenous matching efficiency
in the labor market. Additional, the new amplification effect of credit crunches
dampens capital accumulation and thus further increases unemployment and lowers
output in the next period. This is a dynamic implication of credit crunches for
aggregate variables of interest.
I then move on to quantify the unemployment effect of credit imperfections as
well as that of labor search frictions. In particular, I explore how much credit and
labor frictions explain unemployment. Moreover, does the credit crunch contribute
to the outward shift in the Beveridge curve in the recent financial crisis? Three
insights are gained from the quantitative exercise. First and most importantly, the
counter-factual analysis shows that the credit crunch serves as a driving force behind
the outward shift in the Beveridge curve in the recent financial crisis. I present a
preview in Figure (1.2). The left panel indicates that the Beveridge curve predicted
by our model fit well with the data. The right panel illustrates that, if there had
been no credit crunch in the last quarter of 2008, the predicted unemployment
would continue to rise with the negative shocks to aggregate productivity and to
the matching efficiency in the labor market. However, in the absence of the credit
crunch, the predicted Beveridge curve would not shift outward, but instead would
move along with the original curve prior to the financial crisis.
curve.
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Figure 1.2: Left Panel: Data and Model-Predicted for the Beveridge Curve;
Right Panel: Data and Model-Predicted without the Credit Crunch in 2008
The second finding of our quantitative exercise shows that the shocks to the
credit or labor markets generate a co-movement on output and unemployment. This
prediction is in line with the data prior to the recent three recessions. In contrast, the
shock to aggregate productivity generates a gap between output and unemployment
recovery. This is what happened in the past three recessions. This phenomenon is
called a jobless or sluggish recovery and has spawned a large literature; see Berger
(2012), among others. Most of the literature assumes a frictionless labor market
and only addresses the recovery gap between output and employment numbers.
Therefore previous studies cannot explain the persistently high unemployment rates
of the past recessions.5 Finally, I also find that the shock to the credit market
and the shock to the labor market increases and decreases respectively the power
of credit imperfections in explaining unemployment. Since both credit and labor
shocks are procyclical, the contribution of credit imperfections to unemployment
could be ambiguous in theory. Confronting the model with data after a calibration
to the US economy indicates that the explanatory power of credit imperfections is
procyclical. That is, the labor market itself receives a relatively larger negative shock
in recessions. The decomposition exercise suggests credit imperfections account for
around 46% of unemployment over all cycles.
5Jaimovich and Siu (2013) are an exception. They investigate the empirical relationship between
jobless recoveries and job polarization, and then set up a labor search model with equilibrium
unemployment.
5
In addition to investigating the aggregate implications of three shocks of in-
terest, tractability also offers a transparent discussion on the different micro-level
implications of these shocks. I test the predictions of different shocks with micro-
level empirical findings. Credit shocks are seemingly most essential in explaining
the widening productivity dispersion as well as the disproportional employment loss
of firms with different sizes. I generalize the transmission mechanism through which
capital misallocation worsens labor misallocation. I begin by introducing a general
tax scheme upon capital revenue, which treats the baseline as a special case. I
then put an additional constraint on working capital to our model, which generates
a non-trivial labor wedge in equilibrium. Finally, I show that endogenizing firm’s
search effort amplifies the transmission channel in the baseline.
The recent financial crisis has spawned a large volume of research on the role fi-
nancial shocks play in output fluctuation, following the works of Williamson (1987),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
and Khan and Thomas (2013) are two such recent studies. However, very few pa-
pers connect financial frictions and unemployment.6 Wasmer and Weil (2004) adopt
matching functions with random search to model frictions in both credit and labor
markets.7 They then use the general-equilibrium interaction between these two mar-
kets to illustrate the workings of a financial accelerator. Monacelli, Quadrini and
Trigari (2011) discuss the role of credit frictions in unemployment by introducing
the strategic use of debt by firms with limited enforcement.8 They build the model
to explain why firms lower labor demand after a credit contraction even though
there is no shortage of funds for hiring. Miao, Wang and Xu (2013) integrate an
endogenous credit constraint into a model with random search. They show that the
collapse of the bubble, one of the self-fulfilling equilibria, tightens the credit con-
straint, and in turn decreases labor demand. Liu, Miao and Zha (2013) incorporate
the housing market and the labor market in a DSGE model with credit and search
frictions. They then make a structural analysis of the dynamic relationship between
6Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) were among the first to introduce labor search frictions in
the RBC framework, which admits capital accumulation but is subject to no financial frictions.
See Shimer (2010) for a survey on the recent development of quantitative analysis for labor search.
7A quantitative extension is done by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013), among others.
Meanwhile, see Carrillo-Tudela, Graber, and Waelde (2013) for a recent related theoretical model.
8Garin (2013) and Blanco and Navarro (2013) extend the work of Monacelli, Quadrini and
Trigari (2011) by allowing for capital accumulation and by introducing flexible number of employees
and equilibrium default, respectively.
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land prices and unemployment. All of the aforementioned papers focus on the con-
nection between firm-side credit imperfections and unemployment, while Bethune,
Rocheteau and Rupert (2013) emphasize the relationship between household credit
and unemployment.
Our paper complements the work of Buera, Fattal-Jaef and Shin (2013). Both
papers quantify the effect of a credit crunch on unemployment in a heterogeneous-
entrepreneurs model with credit frictions and employment frictions. However, our
papers differ in several important dimensions. First, their analysis is largely quanti-
tative while the linear property of our model generates tractability and makes trans-
parent the new channel contributed by our paper. Second, we use different modeling
strategies for equilibrium unemployment. They specify a Walrasian labor market
with a unique and publicly displayed price. To sustain equilibrium unemployment,
they assume only a fraction of unemployed workers can enter the centralized hir-
ing market in a given period. I instead use competitive search by following Shimer
(1996) and Moen (1997). Finally, they focus on the recent credit crunch while I take
into account the historical business cycles as well as the recent recession.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 describes the model
setup. Section 3 characterizes general equilibrium. Section 4 presents a quantitative
analysis. Section 5 addresses the disaggregate implications of our model with recent
micro-level empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides the data
definition, description and calculation. Appendix B offers a simplified and static
model. Appendix C considers model extension. Appendix D includes all omitted
proofs.
1.2 Model
This section describes the model setup by introducing agents and specifying frictions
in credit and labor markets.
1.2.1 Demography and Timing
Time is discrete and goes from zero to infinity. There is no information asymme-
try. The economy is populated by three kinds of infinitely lived players: workers,
7
entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries.9
Workers. There is a representative household with measure L of homogeneous
household members. Each worker has one unit of indivisible labor. I assume the
household has access to neither production skills nor the credit market. If a worker is
unemployed, she has no revenue.10 If a worker is matched with an entrepreneur, she
receives labor revenues after production.11 The household distributes consumption
equally to each member by pooling labor revenue at the end of each period. All work-
ers engage in hand-to-mouth consumption. In this paper, the new channel through
which capital misallocation affects unemployment is on the side of labor demand.
To sharpen our transmission mechanism, I assume labor supply is inelastic.12
Entrepreneurs. There is a unit measure of entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs
have access to the credit market as well as to production skills. Entrepreneurs are
heterogeneous in two dimensions: one is net worth a while the other is productivity
x. I assume x is the product of aggregate productivity z and individual component
ϕ, i.e., x = z · ϕ. The distribution of net worth endogenously evolves over time
while that of an idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity shock is exogenous. The
distribution of individual productivity is denoted as F (·) with a bounded support[
ϕ,ϕ
]
. In the next period, individual productivity ϕ is preserved or is re-drawn
from some fixed distribution F˜ (·) with probability ρ and 1− ρ, respectively. When
ρ = 1, it is degenerate to the case with iid productivity shock. For simplicity, I
assume F˜ (·) coincides with F (·) in the first period. Therefore, the distribution of
individual productivity is stationary over time.13 The stochastic process governing
z is not essential for our analysis right now. I will return to it in the quantitative
9Our paper does not consider occupational choice. See Wiczer (2012) and Buera, Fattal-Jaef
and Shin (2013), among others, for a quantitative discussion on unemployment with occupational
choice.
10That is, I assume the replacement ratio is zero throughout this paper. As shown soon, I
assume a fixed labor supply and focus on the demand side for labor. Thus this assumption of no
unemployment compensation does not affect the key channel of our paper. However, as pointed
out in the quantitative analysis by Hobijn and Sahin (2012) and Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii
and Mitman (2013) with a different context of modeling, the extension of unemployment insurance
benefits could be quantitatively important in explaining the worsening labor market in the past
recession.
11There is no constraint on working capital in the baseline model. Appendix C considers the
case in which entrepreneurs need to pay part of wage bill before production.
12Alternatively, I can explicitly specify the household’s utility function as UW =
E
{∑∞
t=0 β
t ·
[
log(Ct)− ξ · L
1+ν
t
1+ν
]}
, where C and L denotes consumption and labor supply re-
spectively. Since the household has a continuum of workers and does not save, I have C = W · L,
where W denotes expected labor revenue.The details of labor search and matching is specified very
soon in the part of labor market. The log-utility setup, alongside with the first order condition of
the intra-period decision on labor supply, implies a fixed labor supply by the household.
13In general, I have Ft+1 (·) = ρ · Ft (·) + (1− ρ) · F˜ (·).
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analysis. For tractability, I assume productivity shock is independent of net worth.
Therefore the joint distribution H(a, ϕ) can be rewritten as the product of F (ϕ)
and G(a), the distribution of individual productivity and that of net worth. An
entrepreneur’s objective function is given by
UE = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt · log(ct)
]
,
where ct denotes consumption.
Financial Intermediary (FI) & Credit Market. The representative finan-
cial intermediary is risk neutral and fully competitive. I assume all borrowing and
lending between entrepreneurs is intermediated by FI. One of the possible elements
to make FI essential is to assume FI can verify an entrepreneur’s individual pro-
ductivity but it is too costly for entrepreneurs themselves if they directly contact
each other. FI herself does not own, produce or use capital.14 I model credit im-
perfections by assuming productive entrepreneurs cannot borrow as much as they
want.
 
 Workers 
She posts the wage scheme 
𝑤(𝜑𝐴) at sub-market 𝜑𝐴. Sub-market 𝜑𝐴 Entrepreneur A: Productivity of every unit of capital is 𝜑𝐴. 
 
Entrepreneur B: 
Productivity of every 
unit of capital is 𝜑𝐵. 
 
 
Sub-market 𝜑𝐵 
She posts the wage scheme 
𝑤(𝜑𝐵) at sub-market 𝜑𝐵. 
Figure 1.3: Wage Posting by Active Entrepreneurs
Labor Market. I use competitive search, which is also called directed search, to
model equilibrium unemployment. As is standard in the literature, the production
function is Leontief: only after one unit of capital from entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) is matched
with one unit of labor can ϕ units of consumption goods be realized. Entrepreneur-
(a, ϕ) could either borrow and produce by posting a wage contract w(ϕ) in sub-market
14Dong and Wen (2013) address a case in which FI not only intermediates borrowing and lending,
but also produces capital goods with a linear transformation technology.
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ϕ, or lend to other entrepreneurs in the credit market.15 The opportunity cost of
running capital is the endogenous interest rate r.16 Therefore, not all entrepreneurs
choose to produce. If a worker goes to sub-market ϕ and gets matched, she obtains
wage w(ϕ). Workers self-select into active sub-markets ϕ ∈ ΦA ⊆ Φ. See Figure (1.3).
Only matched workers receive revenues. The household pools all the labor income
together and distributes it equally to all members. Each household member engages
in hand-to-mouth-consumption. The borrower entrepreneurs receive capital revenue,
part of which they pay back to lender entrepreneurs via the financial intermediary.
All entrepreneurs make decisions about consumption and saving.
State Variables and Timing. I assume all matched relationships between
firms and workers are terminated as the end of every period. This assumption
simplifies our analysis. If I use a long-term contract, then entrepreneurs would
be heterogeneous in three dimensions in each period: net worth, productivity, and
numbers of employed workers. In turn, the theoretical analysis would be deprived of
tractability.17 Therefore I make the above assumption.18 Consequently, the idiosyn-
cratic state variable is two dimensional, (a, ϕ), the net worth and productivity. The
aggregate state is denoted as X = (z, λ, η,H (a, ϕ)), where z is aggregate productiv-
ity shock, λ is the shock to the credit market, η is the matching efficiency in every
sub-labor market, and H (a, ϕ) is the joint distribution of net worth and productiv-
ity. Given our assumption about the productivity shock, the aggregate state can be
rewritten as X = (λ, η, F (x) , G (a)), where F (ϕ) and G (a) denote the distribution of
productivity and that of net worth, respectively, and the product yields their joint
distribution. Finally, I present the time-line in Figure (1.4).
1.2.2 Labor Market
As is standard in the literature, the matching function m (v (ϕ) , l (ϕ)) in all sub-
markets ϕ ∈ Φ is homogeneous of degree one, and increases with both arguments,
15The framework of competitive search implies w(ϕ) has nothing to with productivity distribu-
tion. This in turn helps preserve model tractability.
16Since there is no entry and exit, I assume for simplicity that there is no explicit cost of wage
posting.
17Schaal (2012) characterizes and quantifies a search model with heterogeneity in productivity
and labor use. However, there is heterogeneity in net worth since there is no capital use and capital
accumulation. As noted at the end of Schaal (2012), it is promising and challenging to consider
financial frictions after introducing capital accumulation. Complementary to his work, our paper
considers heterogeneity in productivity and capital.
18However, this assumption immediately implies the ratio of job destruction to total employment
is 100%. To solve this problem, I use the net flow to measure job destruction and job creation. See
more details in Section 4.
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Figure 1.4: Time-line
where v (ϕ) and l (ϕ) denote, respectively, the measure of capital and labor with
market tightness θ (ϕ) ≡ l (ϕ) /v (ϕ). Then the job-filling rate and job finding rate,
q (θ (ϕ)) and p (θ (ϕ)), have the following property: q′ > 0, q′′ < 0, p′ < 0 and p′′ > 0,
where
q (θ (ϕ)) ≡ m (v (ϕ) , l (ϕ))
v (ϕ)
= m (1, θ (ϕ))
p (θ (ϕ)) ≡ m (v (ϕ) , l (ϕ))
l (ϕ)
= m
(
1
θ (ϕ)
, 1
)
=
q (θ (ϕ))
θ (ϕ)
.
I assume throughout the paper that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas,
i.e., m (v (ϕ) , l (ϕ)) = η · v (ϕ)γ · l (ϕ)1−γ with γ ∈ (0, 1), where η denotes matching
efficiency and is exogenously given.19 Due to search frictions and heterogeneity
in capital productivity, there exists no unique wage such that labor supply equals
demand. Instead, I only have the following constraint on labor supply.
ˆ
Φ
l (ϕ) · dϕ = L. (1.1)
I formulate pi (ϕ,W ), the expected revenue of one unit of capital in sub market-ϕ,
as below.
pi (ϕ,W ) ≡ max
{θ(ϕ,W ),w(ϕ,W )}
{q (θ (ϕ,W )) · (ϕ− w (ϕ,W ))} , (1.2)
subject to
p (θ (ϕ,W )) · w (ϕ,W ) = W, (1.3)
where W (ϕ) = W (ϕ′) ≡ W denotes the expected wage revenue by going to
sub-market ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ ΦA ⊆ Φ, where ΦA denotes the set of entrepreneurs active in
production. I characterize ΦA in Section 2.4, and right now treat it as given. I now
characterize the endogenous wage offer in active sub markets ΦA.
19Motivated by recent empirical findings, Appendix C endogenizes firms’ recruiting efforts, which
amplifies the transmission mechanism in the baseline.
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Proposition 1. (Wage Scheme)
1. Given W , the market tightness in any active sub-market ϕ ∈ ΦA is determined
by
q′ (θ (ϕ)) =
W
ϕ
. (1.4)
2. The wage scheme and expected capital revenue obtained from sub-market ϕ ∈
ΦA is given by
w (ϕ,W ) =
W
p (θ (ϕ))
(1.5)
pi (ϕ,W ) = [q (θ (ϕ))− θq′ (θ (ϕ))] · ϕ.
3. Comparative statics:
∂pi (ϕ,W )
∂ϕ
> 0,
∂pi (ϕ,W )
∂W
< 0,
∂θ (ϕ,W )
∂ϕ
> 0,
∂θ (ϕ,W )
∂W
< 0,
∂q (θ (ϕ,W ))
∂ϕ
> 0,
∂q (θ (ϕ,W ))
∂W
< 0.
The marginal value of being matched with labor increases with the productiv-
ity. Therefore, the wage scheme increases with productivity. In turn, entrepreneurs
with higher productivity enjoy a higher job-filling rate. Thus, high-productivity
entrepreneurs are more efficient in both extensive and intensive margins. This ob-
servation is the key to understanding the general-equilibrium effect of capital mis-
allocation on unemployment in the next section. Finally, Proposition 1 shows the
expected capital revenue increases with productivity. This property, like that in
Melitz (2003), delivers a cut-off point for active entrepreneurs and greatly simplifies
our analysis in Section 2.4.
1.2.3 Entrepreneur
At the beginning of each period, entrepreneurs rely on two pieces of public infor-
mation to decide whether or not to be active in production. One is the individual
state variable, which includes net worth a and productivity ϕ. The other one is
the aggregate state variable X = (λ, η, z, F (ϕ) , G (a)). Assume some entrepreneur
uses k units of capital for production. Then I use b ≡ k − a to denote the external
funding. That b < 0 means net lending. Since the production function is Leontief,
active entrepreneurs posts their wage scheme w (ϕ) for every unit of capital at sub
market ϕ ∈ ΦA. For notational ease, I replace pi(ϕ,W ) with pi (ϕ) in the rest of
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the paper. Assume the law of large numbers holds here. Then the total capital
revenue is Π(k, ϕ) = pi(ϕ) · k for the entrepreneur with productivity ϕ and using k
units of capital for production. I model credit frictions with the simplest collateral
constraint, i.e., k ≤ λ · a, where k and a denotes the total capital available and own
net worth, respectively, and λ the exogenous financial shock to the credit market.
If λ = 1, the credit market collapses and entrepreneurs are in autarky. If λ = ∞,
the credit market is complete since the collateral constraint would never be binding.
Finally, the constrained optimization of entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) is formulated as below.
V (a, ϕ;X) = max {log(c) + β · E [V (a′, ϕ′;X ′) |X]} (1.6)
subject to
r · b+ c+ i = Π(k, ϕ) = pi(ϕ) · k (1.7)
a′ = (1− δ) · a+ i (1.8)
b = k − a (1.9)
k ≤ λ · a (1.10)
k ≥ 0 (1.11)
Equation (1.7) is the budget constraint with Π(k, ϕ) being the capital revenue,
r · b the debt repayment, c the consumption and i the investment for next period.
Equation (1.8) is the accounting identity on investment, net worth and the total
capital obtained for production. Equation (1.9) is the definition on external funding
b. Equation (1.10) is a collateral constraint, in which the maximum available capital
is proportional to the entrepreneur’s own net worth. The collateral constraint k ≤
λ · a implies the leverage ratio is the same across heterogeneous entrepreneurs, and
has nothing to do with the interest rate r. This is purely for tractability.20 As
emphasized by Moll (2012), it is the linearity of collateral constraint that guarantees
tractability. Equation (1.11) denotes a no-short-selling constraint.
I use the simplest form of collateral constraint. Unlike Kiyotaki-Moore (1997), I
eliminate the price effect. As shown in Section 3, this simplification will illustrate
the unemployment effect of capital misallocation in a transparent way. Moreover,
I can anticipate that the additional consideration of price effect would strengthen
the new channel proposed there. Second, credit imperfections are characterized by
the above collateral constraint in a reduced-form way. There are several alternatives
20I also tried a complicated version in which the collateral constraint is related to interest rate
and productivity heterogeneity. The result is still tractable at both micro and aggregate levels. It
is available upon request.
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with micro-foundation to support the linear form of collateral constraint. In addition
to the limited liability proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), I can also obtain the
linearity by considering costly state verification by Williamson (1987) and Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), or moral hazard by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Finally, our
baseline only takes into account credit frictions and labor search frictions. This
helps us focus on the unemployment effect of worsening capital misallocation in the
simplest and most clear way.
1.2.4 Credit Market
I use this part to characterize the conditions under which the collateral constraint
is binding for entrepreneurs heterogeneous in net worth and productivity. Denote
Π (k, ϕ) as the capital revenue by entrepreneurs with productivity ϕ and using k
units of capital for production. Based on Proposition 1 and assuming the law of
large number applies, I know the capital revenue is linear in k, and
Π (k, ϕ) = pi (ϕ) · k = kq (ϕ)ϕ− kθ (ϕ)W, (1.12)
Then the constrained optimization by entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) can be simplified as
below.
V (a, ϕ;X) = max {log(c) + β · E [V (a′, ϕ′;X ′) |X]}
subject to
c+ a′ = [r + (1− δ)] · a+max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0} · k
k ∈ [0, λ · a] , λ ∈ (1,∞)
The entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) can always receive the capital revenue [r + (1− δ)] · a
by making a deposit to the financial intermediary. Additionally, if the entrepreneur
uses k units of capital for production, then the net gain is pi(ϕ) − r, where pi(ϕ)
and r denotes the expected revenue and the opportunity cost of using one unit of
capital for production. Therefore, the option value for each unit of capital held by an
entrepreneur with productivity ϕ is max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0}. In turn, I follow Buera and
Moll (2013) to define the return premium as RP ≡ E [max (pi (ϕ)− r, 0)]. If there
is no credit friction or no productivity heterogeneity, then the return premium is
simply zero. Given the individual capital demand k (ϕ, a), the clearing condition in
the credit market is then obtained by
ˆ ˆ
k(ϕ, a) · h(ϕ, a)dϕda =
ˆ ˆ
a · h(ϕ, a)dϕda. (1.13)
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I then use the following lemma to characterize the individual capital demand.
Lemma 1. (Capital Demand and Cash Holding) Capital demand by entrepreneur-
(a, ϕ) conforms to a corner solution, i.e.,
k(ϕ, a) =
0 if ϕ ∈
[
ϕ, ϕ̂
]
λ · a if ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
,
where the cut-off value ϕ̂ is determined by
pi (ϕ̂) = r, (1.14)
and the ratio of cash holding to assets is λ · [1− q (ϕ)].
Denote the aggregate net worth as K ≡ ´ a · dG (a). The above lemma suggests
the measure of capital in sub market ϕ is
v (ϕ) =
[ˆ
k (ϕ, a) dG (a)
]
· f (ϕ) · 1{ϕ≥ϕ̂} = λKf (ϕ) · 1{ϕ≥ϕ̂}. (1.15)
Entrepreneurs with high enough productivity produce and hit a binding collateral
constraint. The rest prefer lending in the credit market. The property of choosing
corner solutions is due to the linearity of capital gains. Besides, this lemma imme-
diately reveals that the set of active entrepreneurs is ΦA = {ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕ̂}. It is worth
noting that, although active entrepreneurs want to borrow as much as they want with
a binding collateral constraint, the equilibrium leverage ratio used for production is
λ · q (ϕ) rather than λ in the presence of labor search frictions. Consequently, cash
holding emerges in equilibrium. The ratio of cashing hold to assets decreases with
productivity. This is determined by the use of capital with labor search frictions,
which is illustrated as follows.
Corollary 1. (Double Selection on Capital Use) The productivity distribution
of active entrepreneurs and that of matched entrepreneurs are
FA(ϕ) =
F (ϕ)− F (ϕ̂)
1− F (ϕ̂) , F
M (ϕ) =
´ ϕ
ϕ̂
q(ϕ′) · dF (ϕ′)´ ϕ
ϕ̂
q(ϕ′) · dF (ϕ′)
,
and FM (ϕ) < FA(ϕ) < F (ϕ).
It is worth noting that the equilibrium productivity distribution is FM (ϕ) rather
than FA(ϕ). The latter is the truncated distribution in the first step. As proved in
15
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Figure 1.5: Double Selection of Capital Use
Proposition 1, the job-filling rate of active entrepreneurs increases their individual
productivity. As a result, the equilibrium productivity distribution is obtained after
the selection in the second step, which reflects in the weight q(ϕ) in the above
equation of FM (ϕ). I illustrate the relationship of these three distributions in Figure
(1.5). In the end, I obtain the policy function of entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) in partial
equilibrium.
Corollary 2. (Individual Policy Function) Given the aggregate state variable
X, the consumption and saving by entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) is linear with her own net
worth.
at+1 (at, ϕt) = β ·Ψt (ϕ) · at
ct (at, ϕt) = Ψt (ϕ) · at − at+1 (at, ϕt) ,
where Ψt (ϕ) ≡ λt ·max {pit (ϕ)− rt, 0}+ [rt + (1− δ)].
The linearity of policy function admits a tractable aggregation.21 Therefore, I
can keep track of the endogenous evolution of the distribution without resorting to
purely numerical work like Krusell and Smith (1998). The linear property of policy
function makes it easy for us to connect with recent literature on credit frictions.
For example, Wang and Wen (2012) develop an incomplete credit market model
with heterogeneity in investment efficiency as well as with partial irreversibility
such that a′ ≥ λI · (1− δ) · a. Notice that λI = 0 and λI = 1 denote the cases
with perfect reversibility and complete irreversibility, respectively. Based on the
above corollary, the individual policy function is still tractable with the additional
21In the presence of partial irreversibility, the policy function is adjusted as at+1 (at, ϕt) =
max {β ·Ψt (ϕ) , λI,t · (1− δ)} · at. Thus the linearity property is preserved.
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constraint of partial investment irreversibility upon our framework. In this scenario,
the intertemporal decision would be adjusted as
at+1 (at, ϕt) = max {β ·Ψt (ϕ) , λI · (1− δ)} · at.
1.3 Equilibrium
I have so far addressed the decisions of all agents in partial equilibrium. I summarize
the key results in Figure (1.6).
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Figure 1.6: Decision Rules of All Agents
This section is devoted to exploring the general equilibrium of our model with
heterogeneous entrepreneurs, and with credit and labor search frictions. I charac-
terize not only the equilibrium in each period, but also the transition dynamics. I
start with defining the recursive competitive equilibrium as below.
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Definition 1. (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) A recursive competitive
equilibrium consists of
1. labor supply l(ϕ), capital v(ϕ) and market tightness θ(ϕ) at active sub-market
ϕ ∈ ΦA,
2. a set of price functions, including the interest rate r, the wage scheme w(ϕ) and
the expected labor gain from sub-market W (ϕ) in active sub-market ϕ ∈ ΦA ,
3. a set of individual policy functions, including consumption c, debt b, and net
worth for next period a′,
4. the value function V (a, ϕ),
5. the law of motion for the aggregate state variable X = (z, λ, η, F (ϕ), G(a)),
such that,
• given X and W the market tightness θ(ϕ) = l(ϕ)/v(ϕ) is determined by Equa-
tion (1.4), v(ϕ) by Equation (1.15) and wage w(ϕ) by Equation (1.5),
• givenX, the cut-off point, ϕ̂, the interest rate r, and the expected wage revenue
W are jointly determined by Equations (1.14), (1.13), and (1.1),
• c(a,X) and a′(a,X) is the solution to the entrepreneur’s dynamic optimization,
and the value function V (a,X) is obtained with c(a,X) and a′(a,X),
• the credit market clears as in Equation (1.13).
1.3.1 Equilibrium Wedges
I first address the social planner’s problem. More specially, there is only labor search
friction in the benchmark. Then the problem is formulated as below.
Y ∗ = max
{v(ϕ),l(ϕ)}
ˆ
Φ
z · ϕ ·m(v(ϕ), l(ϕ))dϕ
18
subject to
ˆ
Φ
v(ϕ)dϕ ≤ K ≡
ˆ ˆ
a · h(ϕ, a)dϕda
ˆ
Φ
l(ϕ)dϕ ≤ L
v(ϕ), l(ϕ) ≥ 0,
where v (ϕ) and l (ϕ) denotes the measure of capital and labor in sub-labor market
ϕ. I summarize the key results below.
Lemma 2. (Benchmark) If the matching function is constant return to scale,
the most efficient allocation is that all capital and labor are assigned to the most
productive entrepreneurs, i.e., v∗(ϕ) = K·1{ϕ=ϕ}, l∗(ϕ) = L·1{ϕ=ϕ}, Y ∗ = z·ϕ·m (K,L),
N∗ = m (K,L), u = 1− NL
∗
, and ALP ∗ ≡ Y ∗N∗ = z · ϕ.
First, the efficient allocation can be realized if all firms have to post a unique
wage. The Bertrand competition would then drive up the wage to z ·ϕ. Second, the
benchmark results on allocation have a caveat. If I use the span-of-control model
by Lucas (1978), then it is not necessarily true that all resources should be used by
the most productive firms.
In the rest of this section, I characterize the equilibrium allocation of the decen-
tralized economy. To start with, I make the below assumption.
Assumption 1. Υ (ϕ˜) ≡
EF
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ˜,ϕ]
)
[
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ˜,ϕ]
)]1−γ strictly increases with ϕ˜ ∈ (ϕ,ϕ) for
γ ∈ (0, 1)
This assumption is reasonable in the sense that it is held with Uniform distri-
bution, Power distribution, and Upper Truncated Pareto distribution, all of which
are frequently used in the literature.22 As emphasized in Section 2, I assume the
upper bound of productivity distribution is less than infinity. I did not consider
Pareto distribution in the theoretical or quantitative parts of our paper. On the one
hand, the boundedness of ϕ is of theoretical importance. When the credit market
is complete, i.e., λ → ∞, only the most productive entrepreneurs would take over
22As shown in Appendix D, the above assumption is equivalent to assuming, for all ϕ˜ ∈ (ϕ,ϕ),
we have
EF
[(
ϕ
ϕ˜
) 1
γ
|ϕ ∈ (ϕ˜, ϕ)
]
·
{
1−
(
1
γ
)
·
[
1− F (ϕ˜)
ϕ˜ · f (ϕ˜)
]}
≤ 1.
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the production. Models with a Pareto distribution would not be well defined in
the extreme scenario, as emphasized by Moll (2012) and Wang and Wen (2013),
who address heterogeneity in productivity and investment efficiency, respectively,
with an incomplete financial market. On the other hand, our key channel through
which credit imperfections affect unemployment would heavily depend on the above
assumption. However Υ (ϕ˜) would be purely constant if I adopt a Pareto distri-
bution, and thus the transmission mechanism would be shut down in equilibrium.
Therefore, I instead use a Power distribution with a normalized support [0, 1] in the
coming quantitative analysis.23
Following the literature on business cycle accounting, such as Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2007), I characterize allocation and wedges of the decentralized economy
in general equilibrium as below.
Proposition 2. (Wedges in General Equilibrium) Given the aggregate state
variable X,
1. the cut-off point ϕ̂ increases with λ such that lim
λ→1
ϕ̂ = ϕ and lim
λ→∞
ϕ̂ = ϕ.
2. the aggregate output and the total matched workers are
Y = (1− τy) · Y ∗ = (1− τy) · ϕ ·m (K,L)
N = (1− τn) ·N∗ = (1− τn) ·m(K,L)
where
1− τy = Λ (λ) ≡ EF
[(
ϕ
ϕ
) 1
γ
|ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
]γ
∈ (0, 1)
1− τn = Ω (λ) ≡
EF
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)
[
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)]1−γ ∈ (0, 1) .
both of which increases with λ, and lim
λ→∞
τy = lim
λ→∞
τn = 0.
23Uniform distribution is a special case of Power distribution. I use uniform distribution as
an example in our theoretical analysis since it is a perfect candidate to exercise mean preserving
spread. I then calibrate the parameters of Power distribution in the quantitative part. I also tried
the Upper Truncated Pareto distribution.
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3. the average labor productivity, ALP ≡ YN , and unemployment, u ≡ 1− NL , is24
ALP = (1− τalp) ·ALP ∗ = EFM (ϕ)
u ≡ (1 + τu) · u∗ = u∗ + τn · (1− u∗) (1.16)
where
1− τalp = 1− τy
1− τn = Υ (λ) ≡
EF i
[
ϕ
1
γ
i |ϕi ∈ [ϕ̂i, ϕi]
]
EF i
[(
ϕi
ϕi
)
· ϕ
1
γ
i |ϕi ∈ [ϕ̂i, ϕi]
] ∈ (0, 1)
1 + τu = 1 + τn ·
(
1− u∗
u∗
)
∈ (1,∞) .
4. the wedge to the expected labor revenue is zero, i.e., W = ∂Y∂L while the wedge
to the interest rate is
r = (1− τr) ·
(
∂Y
∂K
)
where 1− τr ≡ 1
EFi
[
(ϕi/ϕ̂i)
1
γ |ϕi∈[ϕ̂i,ϕi]
] , which increases with λ, and lim
λ→∞
τr = 0.
5. the equilibrium labor supply and the corresponding wage offer in sub market
ϕ is
l (ϕ)
L
=
[
ϕ
Λ (λ)
] 1
γ
·
[
v (ϕ)
Kf (ϕ)
]
w (ϕ) = (1− γ) · ϕ · 1{ϕ≥ϕ̂(λ)},
and the cumulative distribution is Fw (ω) ≡ Pr {w ≤ ω} = FM
(
ω
1−γ
)
, where
FM (·) denotes the equilibrium productivity distribution of the capital they are
matched with labor.
First, both ALP and N increase with λ. Therefore, credit imperfections affect the
output not only through lowering capital misallocation, i.e., the decrease of ALP, but
also by alleviating labor misallocation, i.e., the increase of employment. The former
24I use λ = ∞ as the limit case for our theoretical analysis. If I use some λ < ∞ instead as
the limit scenario, then the formula between u and u∗ is adjusted as u = u+
[
1− Ω(λ)
Ω(λ)
]
· (1− u),
where u ≡ 1− Ω (λ) ·m (KL , 1).
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and latter denote the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. Therefore our
model offers a new channel through which a credit crunch generates an amplification
effect on output. I further illustrate this result in the quantitative exercise in Section
4.
Second, given ϕ ≥ ϕ̂, both v (ϕ) and l (ϕ) increases with λ. However, as shown in
the above proposition, l (ϕ) does not increase as much as v (ϕ) does. Therefore, the
market tightness θ (ϕ) ≡ l (ϕ) /v (ϕ) and the associated job-filling rate q (ϕ) decreases
with λ in general equilibrium. That is, as more capital is concentrated at the top
end, the market tightness tends to be less favorable to firms.
Third, Proposition 2 provides a micro-foundation for the Cobb-Douglas aggre-
gation. In turn, equilibrium TFP is defined as
TFP (λ, η, z) ≡ Y
KγL1−γ
= [ALP (λ, z)] · [Ω (λ) · η] , (1.17)
which is determined by aggregate productivity and frictions to credit and labor
markets. Therefore, credit imperfections affect equilibrium TFP at intensive mar-
gin (capital misallocation) as well as extensive margin (employment). I can also
characterize TFP wedge as TFP ≡ (1− τtfp) · TFP ∗ and thus τtfp = τy. Moreover,
following Lagos (2006), I can alternatively use the finally matched capital and labor,
i.e., LM = KM = N to measure equilibrium TFP. Then I have T˜FP ≡ Y
KγML
1−γ
M
=
Y
N = ALP , which is affected by both z and λ. However, it is independent of η since
matching efficiency only affects matched capital and labor.
I have characterized at the end of Section 2 the intertemporal decision of indi-
vidual entrepreneurs. I close this part by characterizing the aggregate transition
dynamics.
Corollary 3. (Aggregate Transition Dynamics)
Kt = β · [γ · Yt + (1− δ) ·Kt] .
Gt+1(a) =
ˆ
Gt
(
a
β ·Ψt (ϕ)
)
· dFt(ϕ).
The evolution of aggregate capital stock behaves like a Solow model in which
output is subject to a tax rate (1− γ) and the saving rate is constant. On the one
hand, the Cobb-Douglas matching function in all sub-labor markets suggests a fixed
split of output between entrepreneurs and workers. Since I assume workers cannot
have access to the credit market, only entrepreneurs make intertemporal decisions.
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On the other hand, I use log-utility, which exactly cancels income and substitution
effects and implies a fixed saving rate.
1.3.2 The Unemployment Effect of Credit Imperfections
The key theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that a credit crunch, i.e., a
decrease in λ, lowers aggregate matching efficiency. I use this section to present the
details of this new transmission mechanism. As shown in the proof of Proposition
2, equilibrium employment can be formulated as
N = EF [q(ϕ)|ϕ ≥ ϕ̂] ·K, (1.18)
where K denotes the aggregate capital supply and q (ϕ) the job-filling rate in sub-
labor market ϕ. In turn I obtain the employment effect of credit imperfections as
below.
∂N
∂λ
=
{(
∂EF [q(ϕ)|ϕ ≥ ϕ̂]
∂ϕ̂
)
·
(
∂ϕ̂
∂λ
)
+ EF
[
∂q(ϕ)
∂λ
|ϕ ≥ ϕ̂
]}
·K ≥ 0 (1.19)
First, the increase of λ drives up the interest rate r and thus the cut-off value
ϕ̂. Then more capital is redistributed from low-productivity to high-productivity
entrepreneurs. As proved in Section 2.2, the entrepreneur’s job-filling rate q (ϕ)
increases with ϕ. Therefore, the direct effect, which is shown in the first item of
the right hand of Equation (1.19), is that the employment increases. I call it the
selection effect. However, holding everything else unchanged, when more capital is
concentrated in the hands of high-productivity entrepreneurs, the job-filling rate of
all active entrepreneurs tends to decrease. Although labor supply responds to the
increase of λ, the concavity of the matching function suggests l (ϕ) does not change
as much as v (ϕ) and thus q (ϕ) decreases with λ in general equilibrium. This can
be verified from the above proposition. This indirect general equilibrium effect is
labeled as the congestion effect, which is shown in the second item of the right hand
of Equation (1.19). As proved in Appendix D, the selection effect dominates the
congestion effect under Assumption 1.
As suggested by Equation (1.16), productivity heterogeneity with an incomplete
credit market does matter for matching efficiency in the labor market. Such an
effect cannot be obtained in a standard framework with a representative firm and
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Figure 1.7: Left Panel: (Ω, λ); Right Panel:
(
Ω, σµ
)
; ϕ
U∼ [µ− σ, µ+ σ].
worker. For example, the seminal work by Wasmer and Weil (2004) introduces
credit frictions into an otherwise standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.
They model credit frictions with a matching function between a representative firm
and bank. When credit frictions worsen, which could be driven by the decrease of
matching efficiency between firms and banks, this affects equilibrium unemployment
in the steady state. However, unlike our heterogeneity model, the Beveridge curve
in their work does not move with such kind of disruption in the credit market.
Finally, endogenous matching efficiency contributed by credit imperfections, Ω,
is affected not only by λ, but also by the productivity distribution. Given any
distribution F (·), I have shown Ω increases with λ. I close this section by addressing
the implications of an MPS (mean preserving spread) of F (·) for Ω. The general
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. I instead use a special case to illustrate
the idea by assuming F (·) is a Uniform distribution with support [µ− σ, µ+ σ] and
σ ∈ [0, µ]. I use a uniform distribution since it is a perfect candidate to perform
MPS. More specifically, given any λ, I can check the effect of σ
µ
on Ω. The right
panel of Figure (1.7) implies an MPS increases unemployment. Our exercise with
MPS is related to the recent literature on the relationship between adverse selection
and output fluctuation; see Kurlat (2012) and Bigio (2013), among others. I show
that an MPS depresses the output. There are mainly two key differences. First,
information asymmetry is indispensable in their work while I perform the MPS
using complete information. Second, they assume a frictionless labor market while
I assume labor search frictions and an MPS drives up unemployment.
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1.3.3 Unemployment Decomposition
Motivated by the channel through which credit imperfections affect the labor market,
I make a theoretical decomposition for unemployment in this section. In particular,
I explore how much credit imperfections and the classic labor search frictions add
to unemployment.
Steady State
Using Corollary 3 reaches steady-state unemployment as below.
uss = 1− [Ω (λss) · ηss]
1
1−γ ·
[
γ ·ALP (λss, zss)
1/β − 1 + δ
] γ
1−γ
, (1.20)
As indicated by Equation (1.20), the credit friction λ plays two roles in determining
unemployment in the steady state. On the one hand, the increase of λ contributes
to a higher TFP, which in turn suggests a higher capital stock in the steady state.
Therefore, unemployment tends to decrease. On the other hand, given any level
of capital stock, the endogenous matching efficiency would also increase with λ and
thus lower unemployment. In the end, I reach the general equilibrium effect of credit
imperfections on unemployment in the steady state as below.
(uss − u∗ss) = (uss − u˜) + (u˜− u∗ss) ,
where uss and u
∗
ss denote, respectively, the steady state unemployment with a
steady state λ and with a “high enough” λ. The difference between uss and u
∗
ss is
defined as unemployment contributed by credit imperfections in the steady state.
Furthermore, u˜ is denoted as unemployment implied by a higher λ, but the matching
efficiency is held constant. That is, u˜ is the steady state unemployment with a higher
capital stock implied by an improvement of capital reallocation, but the efficiency
of labor reallocation is held unchanged. I have formulated uss in Equation (1.20).
In turn, u∗ss and u˜ are given as below.
u∗ss ≡ 1− [Ω (λ∗) · ηss]
1
1−γ ·
[
γ ·ALP (λ∗, zss)
1/β − 1 + δ
] γ
1−γ
u˜ ≡ 1− [Ω (λss) · ηss]
1
1−γ ·
[
γ ·ALP (λ∗, zss)
1/β − 1 + δ
] γ
1−γ
,
where λ∗ denotes a “high” financial development. I have two alternative can-
didates for λ∗, one is ∞ while the other one is max {λt}. The former is mainly
of theoretical interest. As proved in Proposition 2, endogenous matching efficiency
by credit imperfections would converge to the maximum level when λ∗ approaches
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infinity. The latter is instead used for the quantitative analysis presented below.
Non-Steady State
In every period I have u = 1−Ω(λ) ·m (KL , 1). That is, the total matching efficiency
is the product of that contributed by financial friction and that by labor search
frictions, i.e., η̂ = Ω(λ) · η. Then I have
u = u∗∗ +
(
lim
λ→λ∗
u− u∗∗
)
+
(
u− lim
λ→λ∗
u
)
≡ u∗∗ + uη + uλ,
where u∗∗ = max
{
1− KL , 0
}
and lim
λ→λ∗
u = 1−Ω (λ∗) ·m (KL , 1) denote, respectively,
the efficient unemployment and the unemployment without credit imperfections.
First, data on KL suggest u
∗∗ = 0. Then I break down unemployment into two
parts: one is due to the classic search friction while the other is due to credit
imperfections. I denote them as uη and uλ, respectively. In turn, I define the
explanatory power of credit imperfections on unemployment as χ ≡ uλu . Given K,
aggregate productivity shock z does not directly affect unemployment since z has
nothing to do with the equilibrium aggregate matching efficiency. Therefore, the
decomposition exercise does not involve z. However, z exerts a dynamic effect on
unemployment because aggregate productivity shock plays a role in equilibrium
TFP, which in turn influences the speed of capital accumulation.
Finally, I get that ∂χ∂λ < 0,
∂χ
∂η > 0,
∂2χ
∂λ∂η < 0 and
∂χ
∂λ∗ > 0. The increase of λ suggests
an amelioration of capital misallocation, and thus the role of credit imperfections
in explaining unemployment decreases. As a duality, I have ∂(1−χ)
∂η
< 0, which
immediately translates into ∂χ
∂η
> 0. Furthermore, there exists an interaction effect.
These properties turn out to be helpful in interpreting the results, mainly Figure
(1.14), in Section 4.3. I illustrate the key results on χ in Figure (1.8).
1.3.4 The Relationship to A Model with Only Credit Fric-
tions
I have finished the specification and characterization of our model with credit and
labor-search frictions. Comparing the equilibrium of the decentralized economy
with the benchmark with only search frictions delivers Proposition 2. I address the
wedges to productivity, employment, average labor productivity, unemployment rate
and factor prices there.
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Figure 1.8: Explanatory Power of Credit Imperfections for Unemployment
I use this section to propose an alternative benchmark in which there is no labor
search friction but just credit friction. More specifically, I compare our model with
Moll (2013). I establish the connection as below.
Proposition 3. (Comparison with a Model with Only Credit Frictions)
The heterogeneous-entrepreneurs model with both search frictions in the labor mar-
ket with matching function m(l(ϕ), v(ϕ)) = η · v(ϕ)γl(ϕ)1−γ , and credit frictions in
the form of a collateral constraint k ≤ λ · a delivers the same output aggregation
and transition dynamics on F (ϕ), G(a) and K with the model with the following
characteristics:
1. The production function by entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) is y(ϕ, a) = ϕ·m(k(ϕ, a), l(ϕ, a)).
2. The labor market is frictionless in each period, i.e., there exists a unique and
publicly displayed wage w such that labor supply equals demand. Unemploy-
ment is then zero by definition.
3. The credit market is subject to a collateral constraint, i.e., k ≤ λ · a.
Moreover, I use the model with only financial friction to recover unemployment in
the model with dual frictions as u = 1− YL·EFM (ϕ) .
The key message from this proposition is that, our model with two layers of fric-
tions behaves as if there exist only credit imperfections, and the Leontief production
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function is replaced by the Cobb-Douglas. On the other hand, I interpret the het-
erogeneous model with only credit frictions as a model with both credit and labor
search frictions, and the Cobb-Douglas production function is decomposed into a
Leontief production and an associated Cobb-Douglas matching function.
1.3.5 Job Destruction and Firm Growth
I have assumed throughout the paper that all matched relationships between firms
and workers are terminated after production. This assumption greatly simplifies
our analysis since entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in only two dimensions. The
associated cost is that, the ratio of job destruction to total employment is 100% at
the end of each period. To partially fix this problem, I redefine job destruction in
terms of net flow.
Nt+1 = Nt − JDt+1 + JCt+1, (1.21)
where
Nt ≡
ˆ ˆ
l˜tht(ϕ, a)dϕda = Ω(λt) ·mt(Kt, Lt)
JDt+1 ≡
ˆ ˆ
max
{
l˜t − l˜t+1, 0
}
ht(ϕ, a)dϕda
JCt+1 ≡
ˆ ˆ
max
{
l˜t+1 − l˜t, 0
}
ht(ϕ, a)dϕda
and l˜t denotes the finally matched workers, and h (ϕ, a) the joint distribution of
productivity and net worth. Given Nt,Nt+1 and JDt+1, I can then calculate JCt+1
from Equation (1.21). Moreover, in each period, given the aggregate state vari-
able Xt, I can pin down Nt. Therefore, it remains for us to characterize JDt+1. I
summarize the key results below.
Corollary 4. (Job Creation and Destruction) In each period, job destruction
can be formulated as
JDt+1 =
[ˆ
max (∆t,t+1 (ϕt) , 0) · dF (ϕt)
]
·Kt+1.
where
∆t,t+1 (ϕt) ≡ λt·1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t}qt (ϕt)−λt+1βΨt (ϕt)·
[
ρ · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t+1}qt+1(ϕt) + (1− ρ) ·
ˆ
Φ
1{ϕ≥ϕ̂t+1}qt+1(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
]
.
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Using the corollary immediately suggests that job creation and job destruction
in the steady state is
JD = JC =
[ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
max
{
1− βΨ(ϕ) ·
[
ρ · q(ϕ) + (1− ρ) ·
(
N
λK
)]
, 0
}
dF (ϕ)
]
· λK.
where K and N in the steady state are
K =
[
γ · TFP (λ, η, z)
1/β − (1− δ)
] 1
1−γ
· L
N = Ω(λ) ·m(K,L).
I close the theoretical section with a discussion on the implications of this model
for firm-level growth.
Corollary 5. (Firm Size and Growth Rate)
1. The firm size of entrepreneur-(a, ϕ), measured by capital holding k and em-
ployee numbers n, are
k(a, ϕ) = λa · 1{ϕ≥ϕ̂}
n(a, ϕ) = λq(ϕ)a · 1{ϕ≥ϕ̂}.
2. The growth rate of capital and employment is,
E
[
kt+1
kt
|(kt, ϕt;Xt)
]
= β ·
(
Ψt(ϕt)
λt
)
· E{[ρ · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t+1} + (1− ρ) · (1− F (ϕ̂t+1))] · λt+1|(ϕt, Xt)}
E
[
nt+1
nt
|(nt, ϕt;Xt)
]
= β ·Ψt(ϕt)
(
λt+1
λt
)ρ · (qt+1(ϕt)
qt(ϕt)
)
+ (1− ρ) ·
´ ϕϕ̂t+1 q(ϕt+1)dF (ϕt+1)
qt(ϕt)
 .
Our model predicts that the growth rate has nothing to do with capital or em-
ployment itself. This is purely because of the linearity of the policy function of
individual entrepreneurs. Moreover, the heterogeneous growth rate connects our
paper with the empirical and theoretical works on the volatility of firm growth rate,
such as that by Wang and Wen (2013).
29
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I confront the model with data by quantifying the unemployment
effect of capital misallocation due to credit imperfections. I calibrate the model on
US economy and then recover the realization of three pieces of aggregate shocks.
Then I estimate the stochastic process of these three shocks and do the impulse re-
sponse exercise. Furthermore, I decompose unemployment into two parts, one which
is due to credit imperfections and the other which is due to the classic labor search
frictions. Unemployment decomposition is considered not only for the business cy-
cles between 1951Q4 and 2011Q4, but also for the recent financial crisis. Finally, I
discuss which shocks are most essential in terms of their aggregate and disaggregate
implications.
1.4.1 Calibration
Data are of quarterly frequency. Details on the criterion of data use, data description
and calculation are documented in Appendix A. The date horizon ranges between
1951Q4 to 2011Q4.25
Calibration
Assume the individual productivity component follows a Power distribution, i.e.,
F (ϕ) = ϕ
1
ε with the support
[
ϕ,ϕ
]
= [0, 1] and ε > 0. Notice that the lower bound
is truncated at zero since productivity is non-negative by definition. Besides, I
normalize the upper bound by one.26 The empirical literature reveals the probability
density of the function of the productivity distribution decreases at the right tail.
Therefore, I should have 1
ε
< 1. The calibration in the following Table (1.1) confirms
the empirical regularity.
25The data start with 1951Q4 since it is the earliest date in the Flow of Funds Account such that
the data on external funding on non-financial assets are available. The date ends with 2011Q4 since
this is the last date in which the quarterly data on non-financial private investment are obtainable.
Although the annual data on capital are available until 2012, I have to use both the annual data
on capital and the quarterly data on investment to recover the quarterly data on capital.
26In general, I can specify the distribution as F (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ)
1
ε . In this case, I can show that ϕ̂ is
homogeneous of degree one with respect to ϕ. Therefore, without loss of generality, I can normalize
ϕ ≡ 1.
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Parameter Note
β = 0.99 discount factor
δ = 0.025 depreciation rate[
ϕ,ϕ
]
= [0, 1] support of the Power distribution
γ = 0.28 matching elasticity and revenue share of capital
η = 0.61 matching efficiency of labor market
λ = 1.4 collateral constraint
ρ = 0.91 persistence of individual productivity
z = 6.4 aggregate productivity
ε = 1.68 parameter in the Power distribution
Table 1.1: Calibration
I target the annual interest rate as 4% by setting the quarterly discount factor
as β = 0.99. As suggested in Bigio (2013), the combination of β = 0.99 and log
utility function are quantitatively similar to that of β = 0.97 and the coefficient of
risk aversion being 2. Therefore, I use β = 0.97 throughout the quantitative analysis.
As standard in the literature, I set the depreciation rate as 2.5%. TFP is defined
as Y/
(
Kγ · L1−γ). In turn, TFPss is a function of γ. Moreover, as shown in Section
3.3, the capital per capita in the steady state is
(
γ·TFPss
1/β−1+δ
) 1
1−γ
, which is also related
to γ. I therefore recover γ = 0.281 from the average capital per capita. On the
one hand, γ denotes the elasticity of the matching function, which was estimated
between 0.28 by Shimer (2005) and 0.5 by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). On
the other hand, γ stands for the revenue share of capital, which was set as 0.25 by
Cui (2013), 0.28 by Gomme and Rupert (2007), and 0.33 by Buera, Fattal-Jaef and
Shin (2013), among others. Our estimation γ = 0.28 falls into the intervals of values
used by previous research.
Using data from JOLTS, I construct quarterly data on job-filling rates and market
tightness. I follow Michaillat (2012) to use OLS to estimate η. I get the steady state
λ by averaging the ratio of external funding over non-financial assets and using
the relationship that DK = 1 − 1λ . In turn, I obtain ρ, the persistence coefficient
of individual productivity, by using 10%, the annual exit rate of establishment as
below. On the one hand, by definition I have 1−{ρ+ (1− ρ) · [1− F (ϕ̂)]}4 = 0.1. On
the other hand, the clearing condition in the credit market suggests λ·[1− F (ϕ̂)] = 1.
Therefore, I get ρ as ρ =
(
0.9
1
4 − 1λ
)
/
(
1− 1λ
)
= 0.91. Alternatively, I can use JD
N
,
the ratio of job destruction to total employment, to pin down ρ. The data on JD
and N are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which suggest JD
N
= 1.5%
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on average. In turn, I have ρ = 0.99.27
When it comes to the estimation on the distribution parameter ε, I can first
construct the series of average labor productivity (ALP ) by dividing the output by
the employment. Additionally, using the theoretical results in Section 3 suggests
that Ω = TFP/ (ALP · η), which delivers the steady state of matching efficiency by
credit imperfections. Meanwhile, notice that Ω is a function of the distribution
parameter ε and that of the steady-state λ. Thus I recover ε = 1.684, which suggests
that 1/ε < 1. Therefore, the pdf decreases with productivity and thus is in line with
empirical regularity. Finally, I reach the steady-state value of z from TFP .
Backing Out Shocks
There are three aggregate shocks in our model, {λt, ηt, zt}, which are not directly
observable from the data. I recover these shocks from certain observable time series
by following Michaillat (2012). On the one hand, I have data on i) DtKt , the external
funding over non-financial assets, ii) ALPt, the average labor productivity, and iii)
TFPt. On the other hand, all three variables of interest are functions of {λt, ηt, zt}
in our model, i.e.,
D
K
≡
´∞
0
´ ϕ
ϕ
max {k(ϕ, a)− a, 0}h(ϕ, a)dϕda
K
=
(
D
K
)
(z, λ, η)
ALP ≡ Y
N
= ALP (z, λ, η)
TFP ≡ Y
KγL1−γ
= TFP (z, λ, η).
Furthermore, I can verify the diagonal property holds such that i) DK =
(
D
K
)
(λ),
ii) ALP = ALP (z, λ), and iii) TFP = TFP (η, z, λ).28 Therefore, in each period I can
first use
(
D
K
)
t
to recover λt. Then zt could be inferred by jointly using ALPt and the
already recovered λt. Finally, I use TFPt alongside the pairwise estimated value on
(λt, zt) to retrieve ηt. In turn, I obtain their corresponding HP filter in Figure (1.9).
27Since the entrepreneur may lose her productivity with probability (1− ρ) and then may redraw
a very low productivity, she may stop hiring then. Consequently, JDN is a function of ρ in steady
state.
28Notice that the ratio of external funding to non-financial asset can be simplified as
D
K = 1− 1λ .
32
H
P 
D
e
v
.
 
o
f L
o
g( λ
)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
H
P 
D
e
v
.
 
o
f L
o
g( η
)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.02
0
0.02
Date (Quarterly)
H
P 
D
e
v
.
 
o
f L
o
g(z
)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.02
0
0.02
Figure 1.9: HP Deviation of Three Shocks
All these shocks are procyclical in general.29 First, all three aggregate shocks
were significantly negative in the recent financial crisis, especially for λ, the shock
to the credit market. Moreover, both λ and η decreases in recessions over the cycles.
Notice that I have adopted in a reduced-form way to model the credit and labor
search frictions. On the one hand, as discussed in Section 2.3, the decrease of λ
in recessions may originate from a worsening condition in adverse selection, moral
hazard, costly state verification or limited enforcement. On the other hand, the
negative shock to η may be due to the decrease of aggregate matching efficiency,
which is in turn caused by some sector-specific shocks, as shown by Mehrotra and
Sergeyev (2012). Alternatively, the decrease in η may stem from the job polarization
proposed by Jaimovich and Siu (2013). The results are mixed when it comes to the
cyclicality of z, aggregate productivity shock. The shocks to z were also negative
in the past three recessions, but just opposite for the previous recessions. Our
quantitative exercise is in line with their findings. It is worth noting that, although
aggregate productivity z increased in some recessions, it is not necessarily true that
equilibrium TFP also increased correspondingly. As shown in Figure (1.10), TFP is
procyclical with a correlation of 0.91 with the output.30
29The correlation between output and (λ, η, z), after HP filtering, is 0.44, 0.64 and 0.21, respec-
tively. Besides, after HP filtering, corr (λ, η) = 0.21, corr (λ, z) = −0.16 and corr (η, z) = −0.52.
30There is seemingly no consensus on the movement of TFP for the recent recession. Petrosky-
Nadeau (2012) proposes a model to explain why TFP increased in this recession. However, as
shown in our calculation, TFP, along with the output, suffered a significant decrease in the past
financial recession. This may be due to different measurement methods.
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Figure 1.10: HP Deviation of TFP
1.4.2 Impulse Response Exercise and Jobless Recovery
Now I investigate the implications of the aggregate shocks for output and unemploy-
ment. I also address their effects on unemployment decomposition.
Impulse Response without Correlation or Persistence
I assume these three shocks decrease 1%, but with no persistence or correlation. I
summarize the impulse response of output and unemployment in the first row of
each panel in Figure (1.11). On the one hand, the path of output driven by different
shocks shares a similar pattern. On the other hand, the implications of the shocks are
different when it comes to unemployment. The credit and the labor market shocks
exerts a large and immediate response for unemployment. On the contrary, aggregate
productivity affects unemployment one period later and generates a relatively slow
recovery.
Since I mainly focus on the connection between credit and labor markets, I devote
more analysis in this line. As illustrated in Section 3.2, credit imperfections lowers
aggregate matching efficiency. In the upper panel of Figure (1.11), I compare the
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Figure 1.11: Impulse Response of Shocks (1%) without Correlation or Persis-
tence
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effect of credit crunches in two scenarios, one with endogenous matching efficiency
and the other with exogenous matching efficiency. As shown in the upper panel,
endogenous matching efficiency due to credit imperfections amplifies the effect of a
credit crunch for output as well as for unemployment. Moreover, the amplification
is quantitatively important.
Now I address the implications of the shocks for unemployment decomposition(
uλ, uη
)
in the second row of each panel in Figure (1.11).31 First, although credit and
labor shocks have similarity in their effect on output and unemployment, their pre-
dictions on χ, the explanatory power of credit imperfections on unemployment, are
opposite. These results corroborate the theoretical predictions in Section 3.3, i.e.,
∂χ
∂λ
< 0 and ∂χ
∂η
> 0. On the one hand, a negative credit shock, i.e., a credit crunch,
boosts the importance of credit imperfections in explaining the associated increas-
ing unemployment. On the other hand, a negative labor shock, i.e., the matching
efficiency decreases, puts more emphasis on the responsibility of the labor market
itself in worsening unemployment. Moreover, these two shocks exert a qualitatively
asymmetric effect on
(
uλ, uη
)
. The former increases both unemployment composi-
tions while the latter increases uη while decreases with uλ. Finally, as predicted by
Section 3.4, aggregate productivity shock does not directly affect unemployment in
the current period. It works through capital accumulation and thus affects unem-
ployment in the next period. The decrease of capital stock in turn attenuates the
importance of credit imperfects while increases the importance of labor search fric-
tions in explaining the rising unemployment. However, relative to the previously two
shocks, aggregate productivity shock does not affect χ significantly when it comes
to the quantitative concern.
VAR Estimation and Jobless Recovery
I have so far demonstrated the effects of the various shocks. Using the HP deviations
of these three shocks delivers the estimation of the VAR process on (λt, ηt, zt). I
document the estimated coefficient and variance matrix as below,
31The theory formulated in Section 3.3 proposes an unemployment decomposition, i.e., u =
uη + uλ, where uη ≡ lim
λ→max{λt}
u and uλ denotes unemployment contributed by the labor search
frictions and credit imperfections respectively. In turn, I define the explanatory power by credit
imperfections to unemployment as χ ≡ uλ/u.
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
βλλ βλη βλz
βηλ βηη βηz
βzλ βzη βzz
 =

0.894 0.147 0.054
−0.120 0.905 −0.004
−0.009 −0.003 0.865
 , Σ =

σ2λ ρλz · σλσz ρλη · σλση
ρλz · σλσz σ2z ρzη · σzση
ρλη · σλση ρzη · σzση σ2η
 ,
where βij denotes the effect of shock-j on shock-i, and
σλ = 0.0032 ση = 0.0041 σz = 0.0051
ρλz = −0.0644 ρλη = 0.0899 ρzη = −0.4322
Based on {βij} and Σ, I revisit the impulse response exercise with correlations
on the shocks. In each exercise, the level of the initial shock is set as σi with
i ∈ {λ, η, z}. Then the shocks proceed with the VAR matrix {βij}. I document the
key results in Figure (1.12). As illustrated in the upper and the middle panel, the
shocks to the credit and labor markets generates co-movement of the recovery on
output and employment. Therefore
(
yt−yss
yss
, ut − uss
)
is characterized with a perfectly
negatively relationship in the associated figures. In contrast, the shock to aggregate
productivity produces a gap (4 quarters) between the recovery of output and that
of employment, which is demonstrated in the lower panel.
When it comes to recessions before the 1990s, the recovery on output and em-
ployment/unemployment occurred at the same pace. However, as shown in Figure
(1.13), there exist gaps between output and employment/unemployment recovery
in the past three recessions. It is typically labeled as jobless or sluggish recovery
in the literature. The key message from Figure (1.12) is that the aggregate pro-
ductivity shock is more likely to generate recovery gaps and thus more responsible
for explaining the jobless or sluggish recovery in the recent three recessions. The
shocks to the credit and labor markets, on the contrary, synchronize the recovery of
output and employment/unemployment, and are in line with recessions prior to the
1990s. The intuition is, λ and η affect TFP and the equilibrium matching efficiency
at the same time, which in turn determines output and unemployment. However, z
only exerts an influence on TFP , but does not directly relate to the labor market.
Consequently, the recovery of z immediately improves output while it alleviates un-
employment only through increasing capital in the next few periods. In turn the
z-shock produces a gap between output and employment recovery.
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(a) IRF by λ-shock , with innovation magnitude σλ
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(c) IRF by z-shock , with innovation magnitudeσz
Figure 1.12: Impulse Response of Shocks with Correlations
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Figure 1.13: Real GDP, Non-farm Private Employment and Unemployment
Rate. Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics
In the end, taking into account the correlation between shocks still confirms
the key insights obtained from the previous exercise on impulse response. That is,
the shocks to the credit and labor markets increase and decrease the importance
of credit imperfections in explaining a rising unemployment. The aggregate pro-
ductivity shock exerts a lagged influence on unemployment compositions and helps
emphasize the role of labor search frictions themselves in affecting unemployment.
The patterns are more non-linear purely because of the correlations and persistence
of these shocks.
1.4.3 Unemployment Decomposition over the Cycles
Now I initiate the unemployment decomposition. This subsection presents an analy-
sis over all cycles between 1951Q4 and 2011Q4. The next part engages in a discussion
for the recent financial crisis.
Regressions
In the spirit of Fujita and Ramey (2010) and Hobijn et al. (2012), I start our analysis
with regressions. On the one hand, I have data on unemployment ut. On the other
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hand, I have recovered data on the shocks (λt, ηt, zt). I summarize the results in
Table (1.2).
ut log (ut) log
(
u
predicted
t
)
log(λt) −0.213∗∗ −4.122∗∗ −5.204∗∗
log(ηt) −0.551∗∗ −11.048∗∗ −13.696∗∗
log(zt) −0.179∗∗ −3.615∗∗ −4.525∗∗
Adjusted−R2 0.901 0.875 0.886
∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01; constant is controlled.
Table 1.2: OLS Regression of Unemployment on Three Shocks
The first and second columns use u and log(u) as the dependent variables, re-
spectively. Thus the regression results denote the semi-elasticity and the elasticity of
the shocks to unemployment, respectively. First, both regressions suggest a negative
relationship between unemployment and the shocks. For example, the 1% increase
of λ decreases unemployment by 0.0021, or by 4.1%. Second, the coefficient of η
is largest since it directly relates to the matching efficiency in the labor market by
definition. The effect of λ is larger than that of z since the former directly affects
the matching efficiency while the latter does not. I return to the results in the third
column after finishing the decomposition over the cycles in the next section.
Decomposition over the Cycles
The negative correlation between u and λ in Table (1.2) offers us a quick glimpse
of contribution by credit imperfections to unemployment. To sharpen the analysis,
I further explore the relationship between χ and the shocks. As already shown
in the impulse response, I can recover unemployment compositions
{
uλt , u
η
t
}
and
thus obtain χt ≡ uλt /ut. In turn I reach Figure (1.14), a scatter plot immediately
suggesting a negative and positive relationship between χ and (λ, η) respectively.
Moreover, χ is negatively related to z, but not as significantly as with λ. This
observation is consistent with the impulse response in the lower panels of Figures
(1.11) and (1.12).
Moreover, like the regressions in Table (1.2), I obtain Table (1.3) by regressing
χ on these shocks. The contribution of credit imperfections to unemployment rate
does increase with η while it decreases with λ. This is true and is always statistically
significant under all the robustness checks in the table. The findings are in line with
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the theoretical predictions in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. However, the coefficient of z is
not robust, as shown in the third and the fifth columns. What is reassuring is the
effect of z on χ is relatively small, which is also consistent with the impulse response
exercise in the previous parts.
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Figure 1.14: Log-explanation of Credit Imperfections log(χ) Versus Shocks
In sum, the negative shock to the credit market increases the role of credit
imperfections in explaining unemployment. It is just the opposite in the presence of a
negative shock to the labor market or to aggregate productivity. Given the back-out
series of (λ, η, z), I demonstrate uλ and χ, respectively, in the left and right panels of
Figure (1.15). As implied in Figure (1.9), all the shocks are procyclical, in particular
for λ and η. Consequently, it could be ambiguous whether χ is procyclical or not. I
illustrate this argument in Figure (1.15). In the upper panel, I present the data, the
predicted series and the predicted unemployment without credit imperfections. The
lower panel in turn documents the series of χ over the cycles and suggests that χ
is counter-cyclical with the real data. That is, even though credit crunches tend to
increase χ, the simultaneous worsening labor market itself in recessions dampens the
competing explanatory power of credit imperfections. Finally, averaging {χt} over
the cycles suggests credit imperfections and the labor search frictions contribute
around 46% and 54%, respectively, to unemployment.
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log(χt): log-explanation by credit imperfections for unemployment
log(λt) −22.46∗∗ −18.25∗∗ −16.27∗∗
log(ηt) 9.77
∗∗ 5.24∗∗ 10.36∗∗
log(zt) −2.92∗∗ 2.59∗∗
Adjusted−R2 0.710 0.433 0.156 0.810 0.833
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗ : p < 0.01; constant is controlled
Table 1.3: OLS Regression of log (χt) on {log (λt) , log (ηt) , log (zt)}
Decomposition in the Steady State
I have so far engaged in unemployment decomposition for each period over the cycles.
I now move on to decompose unemployment in the steady state. As a review, I list
the theoretical results as below.
uss = 1− [Ω (λss) · ηss]
1
1−γ ·
[
γ ·ALP (λss, zss)
1/β − 1 + δ
] γ
1−γ
u∗ss = 1− [Ω (λ∗) · ηss]
1
1−γ ·
[
γ ·ALP (λ∗, zss)
1/β − 1 + δ
] γ
1−γ
Replacing λss with λ = max {λt} suggests that, the contribution of credit imper-
fections to unemployment, uss−u
∗
ss
uss
, is 52%. I can further decompose the explanatory
power by credit imperfections into the extensive and intensive margins, which are
98% and 2% respectively. Notice the explanatory power in the steady state, 52%, is
larger than the average explanatory power over the cycles mentioned above (46%).
This is due to the fact that I treat capital as given when calculating χt over the cy-
cles while capital accumulation is endogenous and is positively related with λ in the
steady state. If I use ∞ rather than max {λt} as the limit case, then the importance
of credit imperfections in unemployment would be higher.
1.4.4 Unemployment Decomposition in the Recent Finan-
cial Crisis
As shown in the left panel of Figure (1.17), the last quarter of 2008 experienced a
significant credit crunch. I use our model to address the consequence of the credit
crunch for the labor market. More specifically, how much does the credit crunch
add to the outward shift in the Beveridge curve in the recent financial crisis? I
illustrate the controlled experiment in Figure (1.16). The solid lines in these three
panels denote the recovered shocks since the last quarter of 2008. The dashed line
42
U
n
e
m
pl
o
ym
e
n
t R
a
te
 
 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 20100
0.05
0.1
Recessions
Data
Predicted
Predicted w/o Credit Frictions
Date
Ex
pl
a
in
e
d 
by
 
Cr
e
di
t (%
)
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 20100
20
40
60
80
Figure 1.15: Unemployment: Data, the Model-Predicted, and that without
Credit Frictions
in the left panel denotes the counter-factual shock to the credit market, which is
held constant at the level just before the credit crunch. Equivalently, I show the
controlled shock to the credit market in the left panel of Figure (1.17).
Then I simulate the economy with capital accumulation being endogenous, which
is governed by the transition dynamics in Section 3. I summarize the counter-factual
dynamics of unemployment in the middle panel of Figure (1.17). The difference be-
tween the data and the counter-factual is interpreted as unemployment contributed
by the credit crunch. Taking the average yields that the credit crunch contributes
around 26.7% of unemployment in this financial crisis. Notice that the number is
lower than that over the cycles. I have shown ∂χ
∂η
< 0 in Section 3.3. Meanwhile,
the middle panel of Figure (1.16) reveals that in the past recession ηt also decreases,
i.e., the labor market itself has also received a negative shock. It in turn attenuates
the power of negative credit shocks in explaining unemployment in recessions.
Alternatively, I can use the results already established in unemployment decom-
position over the cycles. In particular, I focus on the decomposition since the last
quarter of 2008 in Figure (1.15), which is documented in the right panel of Fig-
ure (1.17). A calculation suggests that credit imperfections accounts for around
27.4% for the recent recession. Notice that the quantitative results are very sim-
ilar to each other. Therefore, I claim that the credit crunch contributes 27%
(=(27.4%+26.7%)/2) for the recent financial crisis.
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Figure 1.17: Counter-factual Analysis for the Recent Financial Crisis
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Finally, I reach Figure (1.18) by combining the model-predicted unemployment
with vacancy data in JOLTS. The left panel suggests that data and the model fit well
with each other. The right panel describes the path of the Beveridge curve if there
was no credit crunch in the past financial recession. Notice that unemployment in
the right panel continues to rise although I unplug the negative shock to the credit
market. Unemployment in the counter-factual analysis is then purely driven by the
negative shocks to the labor market and to aggregate productivity, as indicated by
the middle and right panels of Figure (1.17). The most intriguing finding is that the
counter-factual Beveridge curve does not shift outward, but instead moves alongside
the original curve prior to the financial crisis. Therefore, the credit crunch seems
to be mainly responsible for the outward shift in the Beveridge curve in the recent
financial crisis.
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Figure 1.18: Left Panel: Data and Model-Predicted Beveridge Curve; Right
Panel: Data and Model-Predicted Beveridge without Credit Crunch in 2008
1.5 Which Shocks Are Most Essential
I have so far exclusively addressed the aggregate implications of the model, especially
for the unemployment rate. However, the transmission mechanism works through
the heterogeneous agents at the micro level. Therefore, this section is devoted to
discussing the heterogeneous treatment effect of the aggregate shocks on firms. In
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particular, I confront the disaggregate implications of these three shocks with micro-
level empirical findings.
Employment Distribution
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) suggest that large firms have a more significant
response to employment than do small firms in recessions. In our paper, the share
of employment by firms with individual productivity no smaller than ϕω = xω/z is
given as follows,
where ϕω is denoted as the upper-ω percentile, i.e., 1− F (ϕω) = ω. The employ-
ment share by firms with productivity no smaller than ϕω is illustrated in Figure
(1.19). I can check that Γ(ϕω) has nothing to do with matching efficiency η or aggre-
gate productivity z, but only increases with financial friction λ. I illustrate the effect
of λ on Γ(ϕω) in Figure (1.19). Alternatively, the job-filling rate q (ϕ) increases with
ϕ. Therefore, the employment loss increases with ϕ when a credit crunch occurs.
Γ(ϕω) =
´ ϕ
max{ϕω,ϕ̂} q(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)´ ϕ
ϕ̂
q(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
= 1− FM (ϕω),
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Figure 1.19: Employment Shares
Productivity Dispersion
The empirical research by Kehrig (2011) suggests the productivity dispersion widens
in recessions. Firm productivity in our paper is the product of aggregate productivity
and the individual component, i.e., x = z ·ϕ. I can verify that the shock to the labor
market (η) is related to neither the productivity distribution of the incumbents nor
that of the new-entry firms. Instead, the negative shock to the credit market (λ) and
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that to aggregate productivity (z) widens and shrinks the productivity distribution
of the incumbents and that of the new-entry firms, respectively.
z ↓ η ↓ λ ↓
employment share of productive firms → → ↓
productivity dispersion ↓ → ↑
Table 1.4: Aggregate Implications of These Shocks
I summarize the disaggregate implications of the aggregate shocks in Table (1.4).
It seems the prediction by credit shock coincides with the empirical regularity set
by Kehrig (2011) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012). Moreover, the aggregate
shocks have different aggregate implications, as shown in Table (1.5).32
D/K ALP TFP Y u χ RP
λ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
z ↓ → ↓ ↓ ↓ → → ↓
η ↓ → → ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Table 1.5: Aggregate Implications of These Shocks
1.6 Conclusion
I develop a tractable dynamic model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs to explain the
interaction between credit and labor markets. The model is used to characterize the
implications of capital misallocation due to credit imperfections for unemployment.
The marginal value of being matched with labor increases with an entrepreneur’s
level of productivity. Therefore, high-productivity entrepreneurs offer a higher wage
in equilibrium and thus the job-filling rate increases with their productivity. A credit
crunch worsens capital misallocation by redistributing capital from high-productivity
to low-productivity entrepreneurs. The former group of entrepreneurs is not only
more productive given that capital is matched with labor, but also they are better at
being matched with labor. Consequently, a credit crunch lowers aggregate matching
efficiency in the labor market. This is the key theoretical contribution of this paper.
I then quantify the unemployment effect of credit imperfections after a calibration
to the US economy. First, the exercise on unemployment decomposition reveals that
32As defined in Section 2, the return premium is defined as RP ≡ E [max (pi (ϕ)− r, 0)].
I can rewrite it as RP =
(
τ(λ)
λ
)
· ( ∂Y∂K ) and thus decreases with λ while increases with η and z.
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credit imperfections and the classic labor search frictions contribute around 46% and
54%, respectively, to unemployment over the cycles between 1951 and 2011. Second,
I conduct a counter-factual analysis to show that the credit crunch serves as the key
driving force behind the outward shift in the Beveridge curve in the recent recession.
Another quantitative analysis is to addresses the jobless/sluggish recovery. On
the one hand, the impulse response after VAR implies that the shock to aggregate
productivity is more likely to be a cause for the jobless or sluggish recovery in the
recent three recessions. On the other hand, the shocks to the credit and labor mar-
kets seem more responsible for the simultaneous recovery pattern between output
and unemployment in recessions prior to the 1990s. Finally, I confront the disaggre-
gate prediction of our model with micro-level empirical findings. Credit shocks are
seemingly most essential to explain the widening productivity distribution and the
dis-proportional loss of employment in recessions.
I close with several promising directions for further research. First, as docu-
mented by Hobijn and Sahin (2012), the outward shift in the Beveridge curve since
the Great Recession occurred not only in the US, but also in other OECD countries
like Portugal, Spain, and the UK. Like Hsieh and Klenow (2007), and Restuccia,
Yang and Zhu (2008), it could be interesting to initiate a cross-country analysis for
the quantitative effect of credit crunches on unemployment. Second, I have exclu-
sively focused on the effect of credit imperfections on unemployment. As shown
in Section 3.4, I take a preliminary step related to the implications of an MPS of
the productivity distribution for unemployment. It may be fruitful to combine our
work with that of Bigio (2013). Third, I have used a static wage contract through-
out the paper for tractability. It could be challenging but fruitful to address the
same problem with a dynamic labor contract as well as with credit imperfections
and endogenous capital accumulation. The recent progress on labor search with
heterogeneity by Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011), Schaal (2012) and Kaas and Kircher
(2013) may serve as a reasonable starting point. Finally, the flexible framework of
our paper could offer a tractable tool for us to model and quantify the role of un-
conventional monetary policy in curing the high rate unemployment. See the recent
work by Dong and Wen (2013) for an example.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Appendix A - Data Sources, Definitions and Calcula-
tions
All the data throughout this paper are of quarterly frequency. There are three
sources of data used in Section 1 and Section 4. First, I use financial data from
the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) to construct the ratio of external funding over
non-financial assets. I follow exactly Buera, Fattal-Jaef and Shin (2013) for this
measurement. On the one hand, the external funding corresponds to the credit
market instruments in FFA. It consists of the bank loans of the corporate and non-
corporate sectors, and the commercial papers, corporate bonds and municipal secu-
rities of the corporate business. On the other hand, non-financial assets include real
estate stock, equipment, software and inventories of the corporate and non-financial
non-corporate business.
Second, data on employment, unemployment rate and job creation/destruction
come from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) while data on the Beveridge curve Job
Opening and Labor Turnover (JOLTS). I only consider employment by non-farm
private sectors. I use unemployment rate and employment to recover the total labor
participation numbers in non-farm private sectors. The Beveridge curve with job
opening rate and unemployment rate started with the last of 2000 because that is
the starting point of the data in JOLTS.
Finally, National Income and Product Account (NIPA) documents quarterly data
on output and investment, and annual data on capital. Output is defined as the sum
of private non-durable consumption and private non-residential investment. I use
the quarterly data on investment and the annual data on capital to recover the
quarterly data on capital.
1.7.2 Appendix B - A Static Simplified Model
I use a static and simplified model to illustrate the key mechanism through which
credit misallocation lowers aggregate matching efficiency. Aggregate productivity is
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simply set as z = 1. Each entrepreneur has K units of net worth. The distribution of
individual productivity is a simple Binomial, i.e., ϕ adopts ϕH = µ+σ and ϕL = µ−σ
with equal probability, where σ ∈ [0, µ]. As in the baseline, I model credit and
labor frictions by a collateral constraint and competitive search respectively. I first
characterize the case with only labor search frictions.
Y ∗ = max {ϕH ·m (vH , lH) + ϕL ·m (vL, lL)}
subject to
vH + vL ≤ K
lH + lL ≤ L
vi, li ≥ 0, i ∈ {L,H} ,
where vi and li denotes respectively the measure of capital and labor in sub-
labor market i ∈ {L,H}, and m (·, ·) a matching technology. The efficient allocation
consists of v∗H = K, v
∗
L = 0, l
∗
H = L, and l
∗
L = 0. In turn, aggregate output is
Y ∗ = ϕH ·m (K,L), employment N∗ = m (K,L), average labor productivity ALP ∗ ≡
Y ∗
N∗ = ϕH , and unemployment u
∗ ≡ 1 − NL
∗
. Then I reach the equilibrium allocation
as below.
Corollary 6. (Equilibrium Wedges under a Simple Binomial Distribution)
Denote F˜ as a Binomial distribution such that ϕ adopts ϕH and ϕL with probability
αH (λ) and 1− αH (λ) respectively, where αH(λ) ≡ min
{
λ
2 , 1
}
. Then
1. for i ∈ {L,H}, the total capital used by type-i entrepreneurs is
vH = min
{
λ
2
, 1
}
·K, vL = K − vH .
2. aggregate output and employment is
Y = (1− τy) · Y ∗, N = (1− τn) ·N∗,
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where
1− τy = Λ (λ) ≡
[
EF˜
(
ϕ
1
γ
)]γ
ϕH
=
[
αH(λ) + (1− αH(λ)) ·
(
ϕL
ϕH
) 1
γ
]γ
1− τn = Ω (λ) ≡
EF˜
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ
)
[
EF˜
(
ϕ
1
γ
)]1−γ = αH(λ) + (1− αH(λ)) ·
(
ϕL
ϕH
) 1−γ
γ
[
αH(λ) + (1− αH(λ)) ·
(
ϕL
ϕH
) 1
γ
]1−γ .
both of which increases with λ, decreases with σ
µ
, lim
λ→∞
τy = lim
λ→∞
τn = 0, and
lim
σ
µ
→0
τy = limσ
µ
→0
τn = 0.
Similar to Proposition 2, a credit crunch increases the wedge of output and
employment. Moreover, an MPS of the productivity distribution, i.e., the increase
of σ
µ
, also lowers aggregate matching efficiency. I use Figure 1.20 to illustrate those
findings.
The main merit of using a Binomial distribution is a more clear intuition behind
the transmission mechanism from credit to labor markets. By definition, employ-
ment is N ≡ m (vH , lH) +m (vL, lL) = vH · qH + vL · qL, where qi denotes the job-filling
rate in sub-labor market i. To make the analysis non-trivial, I assume both sub-labor
markets are active, i.e., vH > 0 and vL > 0. Then I have
∂N
∂λ
= (qH − qL) · ∂vH
∂λ
+
(
vH · ∂qH
∂λ
+ vL · ∂qL
∂λ
)
≥ 0.
I have shown that wH > wL, θH > θL, and qH > qL. Then as the above de-
composition suggests, on the one hand, the increase of λ transfers capital from low-
productivity to high-productivity entrepreneurs, which directly implies an increase
of employment. On the other hand, the increase of λ makes the use of capital more
congested and thus the job-filling rate in the active sub-labor markets decrease. How-
ever, the direct effect can be verified to dominate the indirect general-equilibrium
effect.
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Figure 1.20: Left Panel:
(
Ω, σµ
)
; Right Panel: (Ω, λ)
1.7.3 Appendix C - Model Extension
This section consists of three pieces of model extension.33 The first two extensions
consider other possible sources of capital misallocation. One is to introduce tax
on capital revenue while the other is to address the implications of working capital
constraint. For space concern, I omit the discussion on transition dynamics. Finally,
motivated by recent empirical findings, I endogenize firm’s procyclical recruiting
effort, which in turn amplifies the transmission mechanism in our baseline.
Tax on Capital Revenue
Motivated by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), I extend the model with a tax scheme
on capital revenue {τk (ϕ)}ϕ∈Φ.34 The expected capital revenue is then adjusted as
pi (ϕ) = [1− τk (ϕ)] ·pi (ϕ). Meanwhile, the active set is updated as ΦA = {ϕ|pi (ϕ) ≥ r}
with its associated cumulative distribution as FA and the lower bound as ϕ̂ =
inf {ΦA}. In the baseline, I characterize capital misallocation by the decrease of
the cut-off point ϕ̂. I generalize the notion of capital misallocation as follows.
Definition 2. Denote FA and FA′ as two pieces of productivity distribution of active
entrepreneurs. FA′ causes a worse capital misallocation than FA if and only if FA
33For space concern, I remove all the proofs associated with this section. The proofs are available
upon request.
34For simplicity, I assume entrepreneurs with the same productivity share the same tax rate.
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Second-Order Stochastic Dominates (SOSD) FA′ .
The employment in Equation (1.19) is now generalized by
N (FA) = EFA [q (ϕ,W )] ·K =
[ˆ
Φ
q (ϕ,W (FA)) dFA
]
·K (1.22)
where K denotes the aggregate capital supply, q (ϕ) the job-filling rate in sub-
labor market ϕ and W the expected labor revenue. As in the baseline, capital misal-
location generates two competing effects on employment. I illustrate the generalized
version as below.
N (FA)−N (FA′ ) =
{[ˆ
Φ
q (ϕ,W (FA)) · dFA −
ˆ
Φ
q (ϕ,W (FA)) · dFA′
]
+
[ˆ
Φ
q (ϕ,W (FA)) · dFA′ −
ˆ
Φ
q (ϕ,W (FA′ )) · dFA′
]}
·K.
To sharpen the analysis, I make an assumption as below, which delivers the
generalized version of the unemployment effect of capital misallocation.
Assumption 2. The distribution F is specified such that, if the truncated distri-
bution FA SOSD FA′ ,
EFA
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ
)
[
EFA
(
ϕ
1
γ
)]1−γ > EFA′
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ
)
[
EFA′
(
ϕ
1
γ
)]1−γ .
Corollary 7. (Wedges with Capital Revenue Tax) Under Assumption 2, if FA
SOSD FA′ ,
1. the wedges to aggregate output and employment are
1− τy ≡
{
EFA
[
(ϕ/ϕ)
1
γ
]}γ
∈ [0, 1]
1− τn ≡
EFA
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ
)
[
EFA
(
ϕ
1
γ
)]1−γ ∈ [0, 1]
where (τy, τn) are larger with ΦA′ .
2. the wedges to ALP and unemployment are
1− τalp = 1− τy
1− τn =
EFA
(
ϕ
1
γ
)
EFA
[(
ϕ
ϕ
)
· ϕ 1γ
] ∈ [0, 1]
1 + τu = 1 + τn ·
(
1− u∗
u∗
)
∈ (1,∞) ,
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3. the wedge to the expected wage revenue is zero while that to the interest rate
is
1− τr = 1− τk (ϕ̂)
EFA
[(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ
] ∈ [0, 1]
On the one hand, if τK (ϕ) ≡ 0, then the active sets reduces to that in the baseline.
On the other hand, if τK (ϕ) is progressive, taking τK (ϕ) = α ·
[
1−
(
ϕ−ϕ
ϕ−ϕ
) 1
γ
]
with α ∈ [0, 1]
for example, then the active set is ΦA = {ϕ|ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂1, ϕ̂2]}, which is illustrated in Figure
1.21. Moreover, I show that the increase of α widens the active set ΦA and thus
lowers the output and increases unemployment.
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Figure 1.21: Wage Scheme with a Progressive Tax on Capital Revenue (an
example)
Working Capital Constraint
Hosios condition is satisfied in the baseline with competitive search. Therefore the
labor wedge is zero in the baseline. However, the business cycle accounting by Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) suggests the quantitative importance of labor wedge.
This part imposes a working capital constraint upon the baseline to produce a non-
trivial labor wedge. As shown in Section 2, total wage payment is k · θ(ϕ) ·W for
entrepreneurs with productivity ϕ and with k units of capital for production. I
assume entrepreneurs have to pay part of the wage bill before production such that
k · θ(ϕ) ·W ≤ λw · k, or equivalently,
θ(ϕ) ≤ λw
W
. (1.23)
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In contrast to the baseline, the equilibrium wage scheme may be distorted in the
presence of a constraint on working capital. The following proposition characterizes
the equilibrium wedges on productivity, employment, interest rate, and wages, etc
in the presence of the working capital constraint.
Corollary 8. (Equilibrium Wedges with Working Capital Constraint) In
each period,
1. there exist pairwise cut-off values (ϕ̂, ϕ˜) such that
(a) only entrepreneurs with productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ̂ are active in production,
(b) the wage scheme is w (ϕ) = (1− γ) ·min {ϕ, ϕ˜},
2. the solution to the pairwise cut-off values (ϕ̂, ϕ˜) exists and is unique, and
(a) ϕ̂ increases with λ and has nothing to do with other variables,
(b) ϕ˜ increases with λ, and λw,
3. the wedges to aggregate output and employment are
1− τy ≡ Λ (λ, λw) ≡
E
{
max
(
1,
(
ϕ
ϕ˜
))
· [min (ϕ, ϕ˜)] 1γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}
[
E
{
[min (ϕ, ϕ˜)]
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}]1−γ
· ϕ
∈ [0, 1]
1− τn ≡ Ω (λ, λw) ≡
E
{
[min (ϕ, ϕ˜)]
1−γ
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}
[
E
{
[min (ϕ, ϕ˜)]
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}]1−γ ∈ [0, 1]
and (τy, τn) decreases with λw.
4. the wedges to ALP and unemployment are
1− τalp = 1− τy
1− τn =
E
{
max
(
1,
(
ϕ
ϕ˜
))
· [min (ϕ, ϕ˜)] 1γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}
E
{
[min (ϕ, ϕ˜)]
1−γ
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}
· ϕ
∈ [0, 1]
1 + τu = 1 + τn ·
(
1− u∗
u∗
)
∈ (1,∞) .
and (τalp, τu) decreases with λw.
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5. the wedges to the interest rate and to the wage are
1− τr = = 1
E
{
min
((
ϕ
ϕ̂
)
1
γ ,
(
ϕ˜
ϕ̂
) 1
γ ·
(
ϕ
ϕ˜
))
|ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
} ∈ [0, 1] .
1− τw =
E
{
[min (ϕ, ϕ˜)]
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
}
E
{
max
(
1,
(
ϕ
ϕ˜
))
· [min (ϕ, ϕ˜)] 1γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
} ∈ [0, 1] .
and (τr, τw) decreases with λw.
If λw is high enough, then ϕ˜ > ϕ and I am back to the baseline model. Otherwise,
as indicated in the above corollary, the optimal wage scheme becomes flattened for
ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ˜]. The wage scheme with a binding working capital constraint provides
a micro foundation for equilibrium wage rigidity, i.e., entrepreneurs choose not to
adjust their wage scheme if their productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ˜]. I illustrate it in Figure
1.22.
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Figure 1.22: Wage Scheme with Working Capital Constraint
The possibility of non-trivial labor wedge is the main insight gained from the
working capital constraint. The marginal value of being matched with labor increases
with entrepreneur’s productivity. Thus wage scheme and job-filling rate increase
with productivity. However, due to the working capital constraint, high-productivity
entrepreneurs would have to cut down the otherwise high wage, which in turn lowers
employment and labor expenditure.
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Endogenous Recruiting Effort
The recent empirical findings by Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2012) suggest
that, in addition to posting vacancies, firm’s recruiting effort also includes “increase
advertising or search intensity per vacancy, screen applicants more quickly, relax
hiring standards, improve working conditions, and offer more attractive compen-
sation to prospective employees”.35 Furthermore, they show that firm’s recruiting
effort is procyclical. To this end, I follow Pissarides (2000) and Bai, R´ıos-Rull and
Storesletten (2012) to endogenize firm’s search effort.
For simplicity, I assume firm’s search effort is made after observing the aggre-
gate state variable, but before the realization of their own productivity level. En-
trepreneurs use worker’s labor input to increase their own search effort s, which
may include advertising and screening effort.36 More specifically, σ ∈ (0, 1) of capi-
tal revenue is pledgeable to workers. Matching function is m (v (ϕ) e (s) , l (ϕ)), where
s denotes the average recruiting effort. Each entrepreneur treats s as given. In
equilibrium, I have s = s. Denote the modified market tightness as θ (ϕ) ≡ l(ϕ)v(ϕ)e(s) .
The job-filling rate and job finding rate are modified as below.
q (θ (ϕ) , s) =
m (v (ϕ) e (s) , l (ϕ))
v (ϕ) e (s)
· e (s) = m (1, θ (ϕ)) · e (s)
p (θ (ϕ) , s) =
m (v (ϕ) e (s) , l (ϕ))
l(ϕ)
= m
(
1
θ (ϕ)
, 1
)
=
q (θ (ϕ) , s)
θ (ϕ) · e (s) .
Corollary 9. In equilibrium s = s. Moreover, given s, aggregate output and un-
employment is adjusted as
Y = z · Λ (λ) ·m (e (s) ·K,L)
u = 1− Ω (λ) ·m
(
e (s) ·K
L
, 1
)
,
and the aggregate matching efficiency is η̂ = Ω (λ) · η · e (s).
It remains for us to characterize the choice of recruiting effort s. First, given
35The recent work by Mukoyama, Patterson and Sahin (2013) complements to Davis, Faberman
and Haltiwanger (2012) by focusing on the job search intensity of worker side. Our paper focuses
on the endogenous search effort by the firm side.
36I also tried an alternative setup to endogenize firm’s recruiting effort. It is the entrepreneurs
who incur non-pecuniary disutility for recruiting effort. The alternative extension is available upon
request.
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(s, s), the decision by active entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) is formulated as below.
pi (ϕ, s) ≡ max
s.t. p(θ(ϕ),s)·w(ϕ)=W
{q (θ (ϕ) , s) · (ϕ− w (ϕ))}
The modified market tightness θ(ϕ) is pinned down by the FOC ∂m(θ(ϕ),1)∂θ(ϕ) =
W
ϕ .
Second, given s, the individual decision rule on lending or borrowing depends on
ϕ̂(s), where pi(ϕ̂(s), s) = r. Therefore s is determined by
max {(1− σ) · {λ [1− F (ϕ̂(s))] · E [(pi(ϕ, s)− r) |ϕ ≥ ϕ̂(s)] + r} − c(s)} ,
where λ [1− F (ϕ̂(s))]E [(pi(ϕ, s)− r) |ϕ ≥ ϕ̂(s)] + r denotes the expected capital
revenue with search effort s by workers, and σ proportion can be pledgeable to
them, and c(s) denotes the effort cost. I assume e (0) = sL > 0. That is, if none
of the entrepreneurs exert positive search effort, I am back to the baseline model.
Besides, I assume e′ (s) > 0, e′′ (s) < 0, c (0) = 0, c′ (s) > 0, and c′′ (s) ≥ 0. FOC
upon the above equation delivers the endogenous choice of recruiting effort. First,
the equilibrium search effort s increases with (z, η, λ). That is, these shocks will be
amplified through the search effort. In particular, since η̂ = Ω (λ) · η · e (s (z, λ, η)),
the decrease of either λ or η lowers aggregate matching efficiency in both direct and
indirect way. I illustrate the amplification in Figure (1.23).
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Figure 1.23: Unemployment Effect of Capital Reallocation with Endogenous
Recruiting Effort
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1.7.4 Appendix D - Proofs
Proof on Proposition 1
Proof. Substituting the participation constraint p(θ(ϕ))w(ϕ) = W into the objective func-
tion and using the fact that p(θ(ϕ)) = q(θ(ϕ))θ(ϕ) yields
pi(ϕ,W ) = max {q(θ(ϕ))ϕ− θ(ϕ)W} ,
and thus the FOC is q′(θ(ϕ)) = Wϕ , which pins down the market tightness θ(ϕ) in active
submarket-ϕ ∈ ΦA. Using Implicit Function Theorem and the concavity of q(·) suggests
that θ(ϕ) increases with ϕ and decreases with W . In turn, I recover the wage scheme
as w(ϕ) = Wp(θ(ϕ)) . Since p(θ(ϕ)) decreases with θ(ϕ), we know that w(ϕ) increases with
ϕ. Finally, using Envelope Theorem reveals that pi(ϕ,W ) increases with ϕ and decreases
with W .
Proof on Lemma 1
Proof. The net revenue by entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) is
max
k∈[0,λ·a]
{pi(ϕ,W ) · k − r · (k − a) + (1− δ) · a},
where pi(ϕ,W ) · k denotes the capital revenue and b = k − a is the debt if positive
and the loan if negative. The above problem can be rewritten as max
k∈[0,λ·a]
[pi(ϕ,W )− r] ·
k + [r + (1− δ)] · a. Since the net revenue is linear k, and k ∈ [0, λ · a], only corner
solutions, i.e., k = λa or k = 0, will be considered. On the one hand, if pi(ϕ,W ) > r, the
entrepreneurs not only want to engage in production, but also want to borrow as much
as they can. On the other hand, if pi(ϕ,W ) < r, then the entrepreneurs prefer to lending
to others. Since pi(ϕ,W ) increases with ϕ, if I define the cut-off point ϕ̂ as pi(ϕ̂,W ) = r,
then entrepreneurs choose to be active in production with a binding borrowing constraint
if and only if ϕ > ϕ̂.
Proof on Corollary 1
Proof. First, as shown in Lemma 1, the active set is ΦA ≡ {ϕ|ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]} = {ϕi|ϕi ∈ [ϕ̂i, ϕi]}.
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Therefore, the truncated distribution of productivity by active entrepreneurs is
FA(ϕ) =
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
f(ϕ|ϕ ≥ ϕ̂)dϕ = F (ϕ)− F (ϕ̂)
1− F (ϕ̂) .
Second, according to Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, wage scheme w(ϕ) increases with ϕ
and entrepreneurs with higher individual productivity, q(ϕ), is more likely to be matched
with workers. Therefore, the productivity distribution of finally matched capital is
FM (ϕ) =
´∞
0
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ k(ϕ
′, a) · q(ϕ′) · h(ϕ, a)dϕda´ ϕ
ϕ̂ k(ϕ
′, a) · q(ϕ′) · dF (ϕ′)
=
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ q(ϕ
′) · dF (ϕ′)´ ϕ
ϕ̂ q(ϕ
′) · dF (ϕ′)
.
Finally, I use the following lemma to prove FM (ϕ) < FA(ϕ) < F (ϕ).
Lemma 3. Assume (ϕ) > 0 for ϕ ∈ [ϕ,ϕ]. Given any ϕ̂ ∈ [ϕ,ϕ], define
F1 (ϕ) ≡
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)dϕ′´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)dϕ′
, F2 (ϕ) ≡
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)ϑ(ϕ′)dϕ′´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)ϑ(ϕ′)dϕ′
,
where ϑ(ϕ) increases with ϕ and is bounded by [0, 1]. Then F1 (ϕ) ≤ F2 (ϕ).
I leave the proof of this lemma at the end of this part. Now use this lemma to prove
FM (ϕ) < FA (ϕ) < F (ϕ) . First, we can rewrite FA (ϕ) and FM (ϕ) as below.
FA (ϕ) =
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ f(ϕ
′)dϕ′´ ϕ
ϕ̂ f(ϕ
′)dϕ′
, FM (ϕ) =
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ f(ϕ
′)q(ϕ′)dϕ′´ ϕ
ϕ̂ f(ϕ
′)q(ϕ′)dϕ′
.
Therefore, if we treat  (ϕ) as f (ϕ), and ϑ (ϕ) as q (ϕ), which has been proved to
increase with ϕ in Proposition 1, then using the above lemma immediately suggests
FM (ϕ) ≤ FA (ϕ), i.e., FM (ϕ) first-order stochastic dominates (FOSD) FA (ϕ). More-
over, we can rewrite FA (ϕ) as below.
FA (ϕ) =
´ ϕ
ϕ f(ϕ
′) · 1{ϕ′≥ϕ̂}dϕ′´ ϕ
ϕ f(ϕ
′) · 1{ϕ′≥ϕ̂}dϕ′
.
If we treat ϑ(ϕ) as 1{ϕ≥ϕ̂}, which increases with ϕ and bounded by [0, 1] in this
scenario, then immediately the above lemma implies FA(ϕ) ≤ F (ϕ). I close this part by
proving the aforementioned lemma. Define F3 (ϕ) ≡ F2 (ϕ)− F1 (ϕ). Then we have
F ′3(ϕ) = F
′
2 (ϕ)− F ′1 (ϕ)
=
(ϕ)ϑ(ϕ)´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)ϑ(ϕ′)dϕ′
− (ϕ)´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)dϕ′
= (ϕ)
[
ϑ(ϕ)
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)dϕ′ − ´ ϕϕ̂ (ϕ′)ϑ(ϕ′)dϕ′
]
· (ϕ)[´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)ϑ(ϕ′)dϕ′
]
·
[´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)dϕ′
] .
Now I define F4 (ϕ) ≡ ϑ(ϕ)
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ (ϕ
′)dϕ′ − ´ ϕϕ̂ (ϕ′)ϑ(ϕ′)dϕ′. Then we immediately
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know that, since ϑ(ϕ) is an increasing function in ϕ, so is F4 (ϕ). Moreover, notice that
F4 (ϕ̂) < 0 and F4 (ϕ) > 0, and thus there exists a cut-off ϕˇ ∈ (ϕ̂, ϕ)such that F4 (ϕ) < 0
when ϕ ∈ (ϕ̂, ϕˇ) and F4 (ϕ) > 0 when ϕ ∈ (ϕˇ, ϕ). In turn, we know that,
F ′3 (ϕ)
< 0 if ϕ ∈ (ϕ̂, ϕˇ)> 0 if ϕ ∈ (ϕˇ, ϕ) .
Besides, since F3 (ϕ) = F3 (ϕ) = 0, we know that F3 (ϕ) ≡ F2 (ϕ) − F1 (ϕ) ≤ 0 is
always satisfied.
Proof on Corollary 2
Proof. First, using the result on capital demand mentioned above, the constrained opti-
mization by entrepreneur-(a, ϕ) can be rewritten as
V (a, ϕ;X) = max {log(c) + β · E [V (a′, ϕ′;X ′) |X]} ,
subject to c + a′ = Ψ(ϕ) · a, where Ψ(ϕ) = max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0} · λ + [r + (1− δ)]. Then I
substitute the capital demand of Lemma 1 into the budget constraint and thus reach the
simplified version of the constrained optimization problem by entrepreneur-(a, ϕ).
Second, I address the policy function. Guess the value function is linear with own net
worth, i.e., V (a, ϕ) = C(ϕ) +D · log(a), then we have
V (a, ϕ) = C(ϕ) +D · log(a) = max
a′∈(0,Ψ(ϕ)·a)
{
log(Ψ(ϕ) · a− a′) + β · E [C(ϕ′) +D · log(a′)|ϕ]} ,
where Ψ(ϕ) = max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0}·λ+[r + (1− δ)] . FOC suggests a′ =
(
βD
1+βD
)
·Ψ(ϕ)·a.
In turn, the above Bellman equation can be rewritten as
C(ϕ) +D · log(a) = log
[(
1
1 + βD
)
·Ψ(ϕ) · a
]
+ β ·
{
E
[
C(ϕ′)|ϕ]+D · log [( βD
1 + βD
)
·Ψ(ϕ) · a
]}
.
Therefore D = 11−β , and thus a
′ = β · Ψ(ϕ) · a. In turn, d = Ψ(ϕ) · a − a′ = (1− β) ·
Ψ(ϕ) · a.
Proof on Lemma 2
Proof. Denote Φ∗ as the efficient set of active capital and labor, i.e., Φ∗ = {ϕ| l(ϕ) > 0, v(ϕ) > 0}.
Assume the measure of Φ∗ contains at least two types of productivity ϕ, then for ϕi ∈ Φ∗,
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the FOC suggests
ϕi ·mv(v(ϕi), l(ϕi)) = µK
ϕi ·ml(v(ϕi), l(ϕi)) = µL,
where µK and µL denotes the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraints on capital and
labor respectively. Then we have
mv(v(ϕi), l(ϕi))
ml(v(ϕi), l(ϕi))
=
mv(1, θ(ϕi))
ml(1, θ(ϕi))
=
µK
µL
,
where the first equation uses the fact that mv and ml are homogeneous of degree one.
Immediately we know θ(ϕi) is constant for ϕi ∈ Φ∗. Then we know that
ϕi ·mv(, θ(ϕi)) = µK .
Therefore ϕi is unique and is determined by µK and µL. Thus there is only one element
in Φ∗. It then goes without say that Φ∗ = {ϕ}. In turn,
Y ∗ =
ˆ
Φ
ϕm(v∗(ϕ), l∗(ϕ))dϕ = ϕ ·m(K,L).
Proof on Proposition 2
Proof. First, the clearing condition could be further simplified as λ·[1− F (ϕ̂)] = 1. Using
Implicit Function Theorem immediately suggests that ϕ̂ increases with λ, and lim
λ→1
ϕ̂ = ϕ
and lim
λ→∞
ϕ̂ = ϕ.
Second, The aggregate output is defined as Y =
´∞
0
´ ϕ
ϕ ϕv(ϕ, a)q(ϕ)dϕda. Since
v(ϕ, a) = k(ϕ, a)h(ϕ, a) = λaf(ϕ)g(a) · 1ϕ∈ΦA , the output can be rewritten as
Y =
[ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ · q(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
]
· λK.
When the matching function in sub-labor market ϕ is m(l(ϕ), v(ϕ)) = η · l(ϕ)1−γv(ϕ)γ ,
then the matching probability by entrepreneur-ϕ is q(ϕ) = m(l(ϕ),v(ϕ))v(ϕ) = η · θ(ϕ)1−γ . In
turn, the FOC is simplified as q′(ϕ) = η · (1 − γ) · θ(ϕ)−γ = Wϕ , and thus θ(ϕ,W ) =
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[
η(1−γ)ϕ
W
]
1
γ . As a result, we have
q(ϕ,W ) = η ·
[
η(1− γ)
W
]
1−γ
γ · ϕ
1−γ
γ
p(ϕ,W ) =
W
(1− γ) · ϕ
pi(ϕ,W ) = η
1
γ γ(1− γ) 1γ−1W 1− 1γ · ϕ 1γ
and thus, for ϕ ∈ ΦA, the optimal wage scheme is as w(ϕ,W ) = Wp(ϕ,W ) = (1− γ) · ϕ.
Moreover, the labor resource constraint can be rewritten as
λK
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
θ(ϕ,W )dF (ϕ) =
[
η(1− γ)
W
]
1
γ ·K ·
[
λ
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
]
= L.
Since λ
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ) = λ [1− F (ϕ̂)] ·
( ´ ϕ
ϕ̂ ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
1−F (ϕ̂)
)
= EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)
, we have
[
η(1− γ)
W
]
1
γ =
L
K · EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
) .
Therefore the aggregate output can be further rewritten.
Y =
ˆ ˆ ϕmax
ϕ̂
z · ϕv(ϕ)q(ϕ)dϕdG(a).
= zη ·
[
η(1− γ)
W
]
1−γ
γ ·K
[
λ
ˆ ϕmax
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
]
=
{
zη
(
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
))γ}
·KγL1−γ
= z ·
(
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
))γ
·m(K,L).
which can be immediately verified by using change of variables. Then equilibrium TFP
is obtained as below.
TFP ≡ Y
KγL1−γ
= z · η ·
(
E
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
))γ
.
Now I characterize unemployment. By definition, the total matched labor (and capital)
can be formulated as below.
N ≡
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
v(ϕ, a)q(ϕ)dϕda =
[ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
q(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
]
· λK = N = EF [q(ϕ)|ϕ ≥ ϕ̂] ·K.
Moreover, I have
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N ≡
[ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
q(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
]
· λK =
[
η
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
[
η(1− γ)ϕ
W
]
1−γ
γ · dF (ϕ)
]
· λK
= η
(ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1−γ
γ · dF (ϕ)
) L
K · EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)

1−γ
λK = Ω(λ) ·m(K,L),
where Ω(λ) ≡
EF
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ̂,ϕ]
)
[
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ̂,ϕ]
)]1−γ . Since γ ∈ (0, 1), Jensen’s inequality suggests
EF
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)
<
[
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)]1−γ
and thus N < m(K,L) = N∗. Conse-
quently, unemployment is
u ≡ 1− N
L
= 1−

EF
(
ϕ
1−γ
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)
[
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)]1−γ .
 · η ·
(
K
L
)γ
.
Therefore, u decreases with η, but has nothing to do with z.
Now I address the factor price in labor and credit markets in turn. On the one hand,[
η(1−γ)
W
]
1
γ = L
K·EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ̂,ϕ]
) , we know that
W = η(1− γ)
[(
K
L
)
· EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)]γ
.
On the other hand, I already prove that
Y =
{
η
(
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
))γ}
·KγL1−γ .
Immediately we have W = ∂Y∂L . Then I need to pin down the interest rate in the credit
market. Since pi(ϕ̂,W ) = r and
pi(ϕ,W ) = q(ϕ,W )(ϕ− w(ϕ)) = η (θ(ϕ,W ))1−γ γϕ,
the market tightness can be rewritten as θ(ϕ,W ) =
(
r
ηγϕ̂
) 1
1−γ ·
(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ
. In turn, the
labor resource constraint can be re-formulated as
λK
(
r
ηγϕ̂
) 1
1−γ
·
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ
dF (ϕ) = L.
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Therefore, the interest rate can be rewritten as
r
∂Y/∂K
=
ϕ̂
1
γ
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
) = ϕ̂ 1γi
EF i
(
ϕ
1
γ
i |ϕi ∈ [ϕ̂i, ϕi]
) ≡ 1− τK .
Since EF
[(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
]
decreases ϕ̂ and ϕ̂ increases with λ, we know that r∂Y/∂K =
1
EF
[(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ̂,ϕ]
] , which increases with λ. Moreover, we have
lim
λ→∞
r
∂Y/∂K
= lim
α→0
r
∂Y/∂K
= 1, lim
ϕi→∞
r
∂Y/∂K
= 1− α
γ
.
Finally, I show why Ω (λ) increases with λ. It is immediately done by using Assumption
1. Furthermore, I make further characterization on Ω (λ). Notice that we can rewrite Ω (λ)
as Ω(λ) =
λγ ·´ ϕϕ̂ ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)[´ ϕ
ϕ̂ ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
]1−γ . Denote A(λ) = ´ ϕϕ̂ ϕ 1−γγ dF (ϕ) and B(λ) = ´ ϕϕ̂ ϕ 1γ dF (ϕ), then
after some algebraic manipulation, we have
Ω′(λ) =
λγ
B(λ)1−γ
{(γ
λ
)
A(λ) +A′(λ)
[
1− (1− γ)
(
A(λ)
B(λ)
)
ϕ̂(λ)
]}
,
where
A′(λ) = − (ϕ̂(λ)) 1−γγ ·f(ϕ̂(λ)) · ϕ̂′(λ) = − (ϕ̂(λ)) 1−γγ ·f(ϕ̂(λ)) ·
[
1
λ2
· 1
f(ϕ̂)
]
= − (ϕ̂(λ)) 1−γγ ·
(
1
λ2
)
.
Therefore, Ω′(λ) > 0 if and only if
(
γ
λ
)
A(λ)+A
′
(λ)
[
1− (1− γ)
(
A(λ)
B(λ)
)
ϕ̂(λ)
]
=
(
1
λ
)γ
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)−
(
1
λ
)
(ϕ̂(λ))
1−γ
γ
1− (1− γ)

´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
 ϕ̂(λ)

 > 0,
or, equivalently, Ω′(λ) > 0 if and only if
γ >
(
1
λ
)
·
 (ϕ̂(λ)) 1−γγ´ ϕ
ϕ̂ ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
 ·
1− (1− γ)
 ´ ϕϕ̂ ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
´ ϕ
ϕ̂ ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
 ϕ̂(λ)
 .
Notice that
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(
1
λ
)
·
 (ϕ̂(λ))
1−γ
γ
´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
 ·
1− (1− γ)

´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
 ϕ̂(λ)
 = ( 1λ
)
·

(ϕ̂(λ))
1−γ
γ
´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
− (1− γ) · (ϕ̂(λ))
1
γ
´ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)

=
(
1
λ
)
·

1
´ϕ
ϕ̂
(
ϕ
ϕ̂(λ)
) 1−γ
γ dF (ϕ)
− 1− γ´ϕ
ϕ̂
(
ϕ
ϕ̂(λ)
) 1
γ dF (ϕ)
 .
Therefore Ω′(λ) > 0, or Assumption 1 is held, if and only if
EF
[(
ϕ
ϕ˜
) 1
γ
|ϕ ∈ (ϕ˜, ϕ)
]
·
{
1−
(
1
γ
)
·
[
1− F (ϕ˜)
ϕ˜ · f (ϕ˜)
]}
≤ 1.
Proof on Corollary 3
Proof. There are at least two ways to prove this result. On the the one hand, we can verify
this claim by the following reasoning. Since I have proved that the optimal wage scheme in
active sub-labor markets is w(ϕ) = (1− γ)ϕ, we know that all active entrepreneurs gets
γ proportion of realized output. Then by definition, the aggregate accumulated wealth by
entrepreneurs,
{´
Ψ(ϕ)dF (ϕ)
} · K, should equal to the capital stock after depreciation,
(1 − δ) · K, plus γ proportion of the aggregate output, γY . On the other hand, we
can prove the result by straightforward calculation as below. As defined in the context,
Ψ(ϕ) = λ ·max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0}+ r + (1− δ). Then we have
ˆ
Ψ(ϕ)dF (ϕ) =
ˆ
[λ ·max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0}+ r + (1− δ)] dF (ϕ)
= λ ·
ˆ
max {pi(ϕ)− r, 0} dF (ϕ) + r + (1− δ)
=
{
λ ·
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
[(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ − 1
]
+ 1
}
· r + (1− δ).
Then using the clearing condition in credit market, i.e., λ = 1/ [1− F (ϕ̂)], then we
have
{ˆ
Ψ(ϕ)dF (ϕ)
}
·K =
{
λ ·
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
[(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ − 1
]
+ 1
}
· rK + (1− δ)K
=
{
EF
[(
ϕ
ϕ̂
) 1
γ − 1|ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
]
+ 1
}
· (1− τ) ·
(
∂Y
∂K
·K
)
+ (1− δ)K
= γY + (1− δ)K.
Therefore the aggregate transition dynamics is obtained as below.
Kt+1 = β ·
[ˆ
Φ
Ψt(ϕ)dFt(ϕ)
]
·Kt = β · [γYt + (1− δ)Kt] .
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Proof on Proposition 3
Proof. Given w, the active entrepreneur’s decision is
pi(ϕ) · k = max
l
{
ηϕkγ l1−γ − wl} .
FOC suggests l = (ηϕ)
1
γ
(
1−α
w
) 1
γ k, which in turn implies
pi(ϕ) = γ (ηϕ)
1
γ
(
1− α
w
) 1−γ
γ
.
Since pi(ϕ) increases with ϕ, the cut-off point ϕ̂ is determined by pi(ϕ̂, w) = r. The
capital and labor demand then is obtained as below.
k(ϕ, a) =
λ · a if ϕ ≥ ϕ̂0 if ϕ < ϕ̂
l(ϕ, a) = (ηϕ)
1
γ
(
1− α
w
) 1
γ
k(ϕ, a).
In turn, the clearing conditions in credit market,
´∞
0
´ ϕ
ϕ̂
k(ϕ, a)h(ϕ, a)dϕda = K, can be
simplified as λ · [1− F (ϕ̂)] = 1. Meanwhile, the resource constraint in the labor market,´∞
0
´ ϕ
ϕ̂
l(ϕ, a)h(ϕ, a)dϕda = L, can be rewritten as below.
[
η(1− α)
w
] 1
γ
(
λK
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
)
= L.
Since λ · [1− F (ϕ̂)] = 1, we have λ ´ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ) = EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
)
, and therefore[
η(1−α)
w
] 1
γ
= L
K·EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ∈[ϕ̂,ϕ]
) .
By definition, aggregate output is
Y =
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
y(ϕ, a)h(ϕ, a)dϕda
=
ˆ ∞
0
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
(
pi(ϕ,w)k(ϕ, a)
γ
)
h(ϕ, a)dϕda
=
[
η(1− α)
w
] 1−γ
γ
(
λK
ˆ ϕ
ϕ̂
ϕ
1
γ dF (ϕ)
)
=
{
η
(
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
))γ}
·KγL1−γ ,
and thus TFP ≡ YKγL1−γ = ηz
(
EF
(
ϕ
1
γ |ϕ ∈ [ϕ̂, ϕ]
))γ
.
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Proof on Corollary 4
Proof. By definition, we have
lt − lt+1 = kt(ϕt, at)qt(ϕt)− E [kt+1(ϕt+1, at+1) · qt+1(ϕt+1)]
= λtat · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t}qt(ϕt)− Eϕt+1
[
λt+1at+1 · 1{ϕt+1≥ϕ̂t+1}qt+1(ϕt+1)
]
= λtat · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t}qt(ϕt)− λt+1at+1
[
ρ · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t+1}qt+1(ϕt) + (1− ρ) ·
ˆ
Φ
1{ϕ≥ϕ̂t+1}qt+1(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
]
= at ·
{
λt · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t}qt(ϕt)− λt+1βΨ(ϕt) ·
[
ρ · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t}qt+1(ϕt) + (1− ρ) ·
ˆ
Φ
1{ϕ≥ϕ̂t+1}qt+1(ϕ) · dF (ϕ)
]}
≡ at ·∆t,t+1(ϕt).
Proof on Corollary 5
Proof. The first part is obvious. When it comes to growth rate, by definition and using
the results of the first part, we have
E
[
kt+1
kt
|(kt, ϕt;Xt)
]
= β ·
(
Ψt(ϕt)
λt
)
· E [1{ϕ′≥ϕ̂(X′)} · λt+1|(ϕt, Xt)]
= β ·
(
Ψt(ϕt)
λt
)
· E{[ρ · 1{ϕt≥ϕ̂t+1} + (1− ρ) · (1− F (ϕ̂t+1))] · λt+1|(ϕt, Xt)} .
Meanwhile,
E
[
nt+1
nt
|(nt, ϕt;Xt)
]
=
E
[
kt(ϕ
′
t+1, at+1)qt+1(ϕ
′
t+1)
]
kt(ϕt, at)qt(ϕt)
= β ·Ψt(ϕt)
(
λt+1
λt
)ρ · (qt+1(ϕt)
qt(ϕt)
)
+ (1− ρ) ·
´ ϕϕ̂t+1 q(ϕt+1)dF (ϕt+1)
qt(ϕt)
 .
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Chapter 2
Asset Exchange with Search
Frictions and Costly Information
Acquisition
2.1 Introduction
A large number of financial assets, such as derivatives, futures, swaps, corporate
bonds and equity, are traded in both decentralized and centralized markets.1 A de-
centralized market (DM), for example an over-the-counter market, is mainly char-
acterized by search frictions and bilateral trade; see Duffie (2012). A centralized
market (CM), for example the New York stock exchange, has terms of trade publicly
displayed and search frictions are not important. Motivated by these phenomena on
co-existence of markets with quite different structures, we raise the following ques-
tions. Since trading parties could enjoy a publicly displayed price without search
frictions in CM, why do some agents bother to trade in DM? When could CM and
DM co-exist for asset trading? What is the implication of market co-existence for
asset liquidity?2
This paper develops a tractable model to address the above positive and norma-
tive questions, in particular conditions under which centralized and decentralized
1See Harris (2003) and Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011b).
2Market liquidity, as emphasized by Chang (2012), consists of two-dimensional measurement.
One is on the price while the other one is on the trading speed for trading assets in secondary
market. Our paper takes into account both kind of indicators.
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markets (CM/DM) co-exist for asset trading. Our paper is definitely not the first
one to consider market co-existence for asset exchange.3 For theory, see Hall and
Rust (2003), Miao (2006) and Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011b) among oth-
ers. For empirics, Biais and Green (2007) clearly document the secular migration of
corporate-bond trading from CM to DM in the past century. Moreover, as shown in
Harris (2003), equity trading has also recently become less centralized.
This paper adds value to the literature in two ways. First we illustrate a novel
interaction of information frictions and search frictions and their roles in explaining
endogenous market co-existence. Secondly, which illustrating the determinants of
the migration of asset trading, the model lends insight into the heterogeneous welfare
effect of a government asset purchase program.
In the benchmark case, i.e., if there is no information asymmetry on asset payoffs,
CM is shown to always dominate DM for asset trading in equilibrium. When asset
payoffs and liquidity shock (discount factor, or called trading motive) are private
information, there also exists a self-fulfilling equilibrium in which trading parties
concentrate in CM.45 A more intriguing case is whether the equilibrium with market
co-existence can be supported. On the one hand, the seller’s liquidity shock is always
private information. One the other hand, buyers could always stay uninformed
about asset payoffs. Then buyers could post a publicly displayed price in CM, at
which demand equals supply. Alternatively, buyers can acquire costly information
to avoid adverse selection in CM. The informed buyers could then propose a trading
menu different from the unique price posted by uninformed buyers in CM. When
sellers with high-quality assets self-select into the contracts offered by informed
buyers, search frictions may emerge due to coordination failure. That is, information
investment and search frictions are two aspects in DM.
Due to strategic complementarity between sellers and buyers on the choice of
trading venues, there always exists an equilibrium in which only CM survives for
asset exchange. Market co-existence is shown to be sustainable only when adverse
selection in CM is severe, matching efficiency in DM is high, and the information
cost is low enough. That is, we have multiple equilibria in latter case. To ease
3Our paper focus on the endogenous co-existence of centralized and decentralized market. Pag-
notta and Phillipon (2011) also explore market co-existence, but they are engaged in the market
fragmentation on trading in organized exchanges with different trading speed.
4In Section 2, we fully characterize three alternative cases, in which either of them is private
information and both of them are private information.
5Sometimes asset payoffs and liquidity shock are named the common value and private value of
assets respectively. See Chang (2012) for example.
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the analysis of comparative statics, we always pick up the equilibrium with markets
co-existence whenever it can be supported. Then we conclude that, as matching
efficiency in DM increases and the information cost decreases, more trade migrates
from CM with adverse selection to DM with search frictions. In the limit, DM with
search frictions converges to CM with complete information.
Information investment serves as buyer’s natural response to alleviate adverse
selection. However, if we aggregate the revenues by all sellers, then immediately
we know that information acquisition is purely a resource waste in our exchange
economy.6 In addition to information investment, the unmatched trading in DM
also contributes to the deadweight loss. However, since sellers are heterogeneous in
their asset payoff and trading motives, closing DM is not Pareto improvement. Based
on this observation, we move on to address the heterogeneous effect of a government
asset purchase program, for example Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). We are
particularly interested in the following question. If government is assumed to have
access to a lower information cost, or a more efficient matching technology, will all
sellers be better off with government intervention? We show that, when government
steps in with a self-financing scheme, sellers with high-quality assets are better off
while the others are worse off. Therefore, even though in our simple exchange
model, which is free of incentive effect in production, a self-financing government
asset purchase program does not necessarily makes everyone better off.
As emphasized by Levine (2005), liquid provision and resources reallocation in
secondary market is one of the key functions of financial industry. Asset owners
could enjoy market liquidity by transferring claims if secondary market functions
well. However, adverse selection may dampen potential trade. To address informa-
tion frictions, we introduce both adverse selection and costly state verification into
our model. That is, in addition to posting a pooling price in CM, buyers could also
choose to acquire costly information on asset payoffs. Then they can propose an op-
timal contract with bilateral trading in DM. Therefore, in addition to the literature
on market co-existence, our paper is also related to the literature on the liquidity
effect of information frictions. Earlier theory include Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
Kyle (1985) and Williamson and Wright (1994) among others. Recent literature
mainly consists of Eisfeldt (2004), Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011a), Mal-
herbe (2012), Kurlat (2012) and Tirole (2012). All of these papers assume a unique
6Buyers are assumed to be fully competitive and thus their gain is irrelevant for calculating the
social welfare.
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price in a competitive centralized market with adverse selection. Moreover, Guerreri,
Shimer and Wright (2010), Guerrieri and Shimer (2012a,b), Chang (2012), Chiu and
Koeppl (2011) address the effect of information asymmetry on asset trading with
search frictions. Alternatively, Tirole and Farhi (2012) and Andolfatto, Berentsen
and Waller (2013) adopt costly information acquisition to address the information
asymmetry between a single seller and a single buyer. Similar to classic literature on
security design, these two papers suggests information investment could be undue
diligence under certain conditions.7
Our paper is most related to the independent works by Guerrieri and Shimer
(2012b) and Chang (2012). All the three papers consider two-dimensional private
information for asset trading, one is asset payoff while the other is trading motive.8
Guerrieri and Shimer (2012b) show when only asset quality is private information,
there exists a unique separating equilibrium. Market illiquidity serves as the sepa-
rating device. However, when both asset quality and the desire to sell are private
information, the economy would be characterized by a unique partial pooling equi-
librium. Chang (2012), which also considers private information on asset quality
and trading motives with the framework of directed search, delivers similar con-
clusions. There are several key differences. First of all, our paper adopt different
modeling strategy to address private information. Guerrieri and Shimer (2012b) use
market illiquidity as a signaling device while we adopt costly information acquisi-
tion. In our model, CM is subject to adverse selection due to private information
on asset’s common and private values. Meanwhile, buyers could reduce information
asymmetry from two to one dimension and then launch optimal contract to sell-
ers self-selecting into DM. Secondly, the sub-markets with competitive search share
very similar market structure in their papers. In contrast, our model offers a frame-
work with endogenous co-existence of CM and DM, two kinds of markets with quite
different characteristics.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a stylized model and
analyzes agent’s choice of trading venues between CM and DM in partial equilibrium.
Section 3 closes the model in general equilibrium. Section 4 uses the model to
examine the heterogeneous effect of government asset purchase program. Section 5
7Security design is a burgeoning field with lots of interesting papers, say, DeMarzo and Duffie
(1999), DeMarzo (2005) and Dang, Gorton and Holmstro¨m (2010) etc. Since our focus is not on
security design, we would not give this field a fair treatment for the literature review. Instead, we
only focus on information investment, which is also a key issue in this field.
8See Guerrieri and Shimer (2012)b for the comparison between their paper and Chang (2012).
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concludes. The Appendix A pools proofs omitted in the context. The Appendix B
documents several pieces of model extension.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by two kinds of risk-neutral agents and lasts for two
periods. First, there is unit measure of asset sellers. Each of them is endowed with
one unit of indivisible Lucas tree at the beginning of t = 1. Seller’s utility function
is US(x, δ) = c1 + δ · c2, where c1 ≥ 0 and c2 ≥ 0 denotes consumption at t = 1 and
t = 2, and x and δ the idiosyncratic asset payoff and discount factor respectively.
Therefore sellers are heterogeneous in both common value and private value. For
notational ease, we label them as seller-(x, δ). For simplicity, we assume these two
distributions are independent of each other. On one hand, asset payoff is drawn
from a continuous distribution F (x) with support [xL, xH ]. Discount factor, on the
other hand, conforms to a distribution G(δ) with support [0, 1]. Trees only deliver
consumption goods at t = 2. We assume sellers cannot produce. Therefore maturity
mismatch may emerge if some sellers want to sell their trees to consume in t = 1.
This is in particular true for sellers with δ = 0.
Secondly, we assume there is a continuum of asset buyers. For simplicity, we as-
sume no occupational choice between buyers and sellers ex ante.9 Buyers have access
to a linear production technology with labor input at t = 1. There is no aggregate
shock to this economy. However, we assume it is not feasible for sellers to issue con-
tingent claims. Besides, no credit is assumed to be enforceable. Additionally, the
limited commitment makes it impossible for sellers to signal in secondary market.
Consequently, assets serve as medium of exchange, i.e., sellers could transfer asset
ownership to buyers for consumption at t = 1. In turn buyers would have to produce
consumption goods to purchase the trees at t = 1, and consume the fruits at t = 2.
Therefore when talking about liquidity, we exclusively mean market liquidity rather
than funding liquidity.10
9Bolton et al (2011b) discusses the endogenous choice between financial service and real business.
10See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for the details on market and funding liquidity.
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In addition to staying uninformed, buyers can also acquire costly information.
More specifically, buyers could pay information cost κ with their labor disutility.
Then they could perfectly detect the payoff of any asset. The action of information
investment is publicly observed. Each information investment can only verify the
quality of one-unit asset. We denote buyer’s utility function as UB = −lB1 − κ ·
1{Info−invest} + E
(
cB2
)
, where lB1 denotes the disutility from producing l
B
1 units of
goods, and cB2 denotes the consumption goods at t = 2 from the trees the buyer
purchase at t = 1.11 Buyers are fully competitive so that they would earn zero profit
from asset trading in equilibrium.
To fully characterize the expected revenue E
(
cB2
)
, we need to specify the details
on how assets are traded between sellers and buyers. On one hand, if certain buyer
does not incur information cost, she would have no idea on the exact quality of
assets. Thus she can only buy asset with a publicly displayed price p at which
demand equals supply in equilibrium. On the other hand, if some buyer acquires
costly information, she could follow uninformed buyers to post a publicly displayed
price p. Alternatively, she could propose a trading menu for sellers self-selecting
into the contract. Notice that informed buyers could detect the asset payoff x, but
they still cannot directly observe δ, the discount factor of asset sellers. Without loss
of generality, informed buyers uses direct mechanism {q(x, δ), τ(x, δ)}. When sellers
with asset payoff x report their type as δ, q(x, δ) is the probability that an asset
transferred to buyers while τ(x, δ) is the consumption paid to sellers.
Now it is time for us to be clear on our definition of centralized and decentralized
markets (CM/DM). The former is a market where assets are traded at a publicly
displayed price p. That is, sellers could always successfully sell their assets in CM
at p without any search frictions. In contrast, as noted by Duffie (2012), DM is
characterized by search and matching. That is, it takes time for sellers and buyers
to find their trading partners. Since we assume each information investment can
only verify the quality of one unit of asset, sellers and informed buyers will take
bilateral trading. Therefore DM emerges in the bilateral trading since sellers may
fail to coordinate with each other about which buyers to resort to. It is true whether
it be random search or competitive (directed) search. We use random search in the
11Some asset trading is dealer-intermediated in our real life, with corporate bonds just being
a case. We assume away the intermediation in this paper. It contributes to great tractability
for our focus on equilibrium choice. Or, a cheap interpretation is that we combine the roles of
dealers and buyers and is exclusively engaged in the trading frictions due to private information on
heterogeneity of seller side. The price of assuming way dealers in DM is that there is no room to use
our model to discuss the bid-ask spread and other important dealer-related financial phenomenon.
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baseline model and make robust check with competitive search in the Appendix
B. We assume matching technology m(b, s) in DM is exogenously given, increases
with both augments, is homogeneous of degree one, m(b, 0) = m(0, s) = 0, and
m(b, s) ≤ min{b, s}, where b and s denote the measure of buyers and sellers in DM.
Buyers and sellers move simultaneously. Buyers make their choice on information
investment or not. Sellers decides whether and where to trade. For sellers who choose
to go to DM but are not successfully matched, we assume they can no longer try CM
and instead go directly to next period.12 In our benchmark, we model liquidity shock
in the simplest way as by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We assume δ conforms to
binomial distribution with δ ∈ {0, 1}, Pr{δ = 0} = pi ∈ (0, 1) and Pr{δ = 1} = 1−pi.13
In the end, we use Figure 2.1 to summarize the time-line.
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Figure 2.1: Raw Time-line with All Possible Paths
12We also consider an alternative scenario in which DM and CM are connected. That is, sellers
have no commitment and are allowed to put their order at both markets. If sellers are not matched
in DM, they still have the opportunity to liquidate their assets in CM if want to. Most of the
qualitative conclusions in the context still hold.
13
We address in the Appendix B the general case in which δ is continuously distributed over [0, 1].
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2.2.2 Seller’s Problem
As suggested above, buyers can incur fixed evaluation cost κ and then choose to go
to the DM for asset trading. Then buyers would have no information disadvantage
on x in DM. The terms of trade in DM for seller-(x, δ) is then determined by Nash
bargaining under complete information. By complete information, we mean both
asset payoff x and liquidity shock δ are publicly observable without any cost. It is
worth noting that seller’s outside option crucially depends on δ. Since we assume
sellers cannot trade in CM and DM in the same time, even though two markets
co-exist, the outside option of seller-(x, δ) going to DM is x · 1{δ=1}. For sellers with
δ = 0, given
For those with δ = 0, the terms of trade is determined by max
ω
{ωη · (x− ω)1−η},
which delivers ω(x) = η·x for x. When bargaining with buyers in DM, seller-(x, δ = 0)
and seller-(x, δ = 1) have different outside option. The outside option is zero and x
for the former and latter respectively. Thus strictly speaking, the bargaining setting
max
ω
{ω ·(x−ω)1−η} is a reasonable for the former but not for the latter group of asset
sellers. Fortunately, this subtle observation does not overthrow our analysis to come.
Even though the “bargaining power” of seller with δ = 1 could be higher than that
of seller with δ = 0, they would never try DM. This claim is immediately obtained
by the following argument. Buyers in DM would charge at least something from the
trading surplus. As a result, the best possible terms of trade for seller-(x, δ = 1)
would always be strictly lower than x. For those sellers, they could always gain x by
waiting until t = 2. Thus they would never try DM, even though the rule of splitting
trading surplus for them is different from that for sellers with δ = 0. Consequently,
even though liquidity shock is always unobservable, buyers can infer it from seller’s
choice of trading venues.
For those with δ = 1, there is no trading surplus in DM. As a result, although
buyers cannot directly detect δ, they could infer that only sellers with δ = 0 would
show up in DM. Without loss of generality, we assume buyers always propose the
contract as {q(x, δ) = 1, τ(x, δ) = ηx} after paying information cost κ. Then the
objective function of seller-(x, δ) is formulated as below.
US(x, δ) = max
{CM,DM,Delay}
{c1 + δ · c2}
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where
a =
1 sell the asset at t = 10 keep it until t = 2
c1 = max{DM,CM}
{
m(b, s)
s
· ηx, p(x)
}
· a
c2 = a · 1{m(b,s)
s
·ηx>p(x)} ·
[
1− m(b, s)
s
]
· x+ (1− a) · x
and b and s denote the measure of buyers and that of sellers in DM respectively,
and p(x) the price of asset-x in CM. Notice that we employ random search in the
benchmark. Thus (b, s) does not differentiate the measure of trading parties in
certain sub-markets. For sellers-(x, δ = 0), they have to sell their asset at t = 1.
Thus their discrete choice is reduced to max
{DM,CM}
{m(b,s)s ηx, p(x)}. For sellers-(x, δ =
1), in addition to participating in either DM or CM at either t = 1, they could also
exercise the option of waiting until the dividend is delivered at t = 2. Thus their
target is formulated as max
{DM,CM,Delay}
{m(b,s)s ηx+ [1− m(b,s)s ]x, p(x), x}.
2.2.3 Choice of Trading Venues
This part analyzes the choice of trading venues under both complete and incomplete
information. For complete information, we mean both asset payoffs x and liquidity
shock δ, i.e., trading motives, are publicly observable.
Complete Information
Denote p(x) as the price of asset-x in CM. Since buyers are fully competitive, buyer’s
profit x − p(x) from buying asset-x should be zero. As a result, p(x) = x for all x
with complete information. Then we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 4. (Market Participation under Complete Information) When
there is no information asymmetry,
1. Any seller-(x, δ = 0) would prefer CM to DM for asset trading at t = 1.
2. Any seller-(x, δ = 1) would never try DM. They are indifferent between trading
in CM at t = 1 and waiting to consume at t = 2 .
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3. None of buyers incur information investment. Instead, all of them concentrate
in CM in t = 1.
The key message of this proposition is, when there is no information asymmetry
on asset payoffs, the CM is preferred to search frictions and bargaining in DM. We
move on to the discussion with information asymmetry in the rest of this section.
Incomplete Information
When (x, δ) are private information of sellers, p(x) is the same for sellers self-selecting
to pool in CM at t = 1. Denote p(x) = p in this case. Then we have the following
result on choice of trading venues in partial equilibrium.
Proposition 5. (Market Participation under Two-dimensional Informa-
tion Asymmetry) When both asset payoff and liquidity shock are seller’s pri-
vate information, market participation is a choice function of seller-(x, δ) from
X ×∆ = [xL, xH ]× {0, 1} to {CM, DM, Autarky} such that,
1. For sellers with δ = 0, there exists a cut-off point x˜ ∈ [xL, xH ] such that if
x ≥ x˜, they would self-select into DM, and enter CM otherwise at t = 1.
2. For sellers with δ = 1, if x < p, they would choose CM, and if x ≥ p, they
would participate in neither DM nor CM at t = 1, but instead wait to consume
at t = 2.
3. Given (x˜, p), the utility function of seller-(x, δ) is refined as below.
Us(x, δ) = max
{
x
p+ (x˜− p) · 1{δ=0} , 1
}
· p
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Figure 2.2: Choice of trading venues by seller-(x, δ)
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The main message of this proposition is, when sellers are subject to preference
shock, those with high-quality assets tend to sell at DM while the others pool into
CM. However, for those without preference shock, since they have the outside option
as waiting and consuming by themselves, they would never try DM with search and
bargaining. Meanwhile, they would take advantage of CM if their asset’s quality is
low. For illustration concern, I summarize the choice of trading venues by seller-(x, δ)
and associated gain U s(x, δ) in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
Figure 2.2 immediately implies the measure of sellers in DM is
s = pi · [1− F (x˜)] , (2.1)
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Figure 2.3: Expected gain of seller-(x, δ)
Finally, based on Proposition 2, we show the results on market participation
when either x or δ is private information.
Corollary 10. (Market participation with only one-dimensional informa-
tion asymmetry) When either asset payoff and liquidity shock is seller’s private
information, market participation of sellers is as below.
1. (When only trading motive is private information) In this case, the
result is the same as that with complete information on (x, δ) in Proposition
1. That is,
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(a) Any seller-(x, δ = 0) would always prefer CM to DM for asset trading at
t = 1.
(b) Any seller-(x, δ = 1) would never try DM. They are indifferent between
trading in CM at t = 1 and waiting to consume at t = 2 .
(c) None of buyers incur information investment. Instead, all of them con-
centrate in CM in t = 1.
2. (When only asset payoff is private information) In this case, the result
is very similar to the that of Proposition 2, but with pi = 1.
(a) For sellers with δ = 0, there exists a cut-off point x˜∗ ∈ [xL, xH ] such that
if x ≥ x˜∗, they would self-select into DM, and enter CM otherwise at
t = 1.
(b) For sellers with δ = 1, if x < p, they would choose CM, and if x ≥ p,
they would participate in neither DM or CM at t = 1, but instead wait
to consume at t = 2.
(c) Buyers who are posting price p in CM would never accept sellers with δ =
1. Thus the equilibrium result would perform as if all sellers transferring
their assets are δ = 0, i.e., pi ≡ Pr(δ = 0) = 1.
That is, if only δ or x serves as private information, seller’s choice of trad-
ing venues is reduced to the case with complete information and that with two-
dimensional informational asymmetry in Proposition 1 and 2 respectively. As a
result, this corollary justifies why we stick to the general case with both x and δ
as being seller’s private information when departing from the case with complete
information. Moreover, we would rely on this corollary to simply our argument in
Section 4 on welfare analysis by assuming only asset payoff is private information.
2.2.4 Asset Price in Centralized Market
There are two key variables in our partial-equilibrium analysis. One is p, the price
in CM while the other one is x˜, the cut-off point of choice between CM and DM. We
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use this section and the next one to reach two equations to determine (p, x˜). Since
buyers are assumed to be competitive in CM, none of them make positive profits in
equilibrium. Thus the price in CM is determined as below.
p =
piF (x˜)E(x|x ≤ x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)E(x|x ≤ p)
piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p) (2.2)
The LHS of Eq. (2.2) is buyer’s cost for one unit of asset. The RHS is the
average value of assets pooling in CM. Buyers are uninformed of the true value of
each asset in CM. However, as implied in the above proposition, buyers have rational
expectation of FCM(x), the true (truncated) distribution of asset payoffs in CM. One
source is from those sellers with (x ≤ x˜, δ = 0) while the other one from those with
(x ≤ p, δ = 1). The numerator and the denominator of Eq. (2.2) are the total value
and total measure of assets in CM respectively.
Lemma 4. (Asset Price in CM) Given any (x˜, pi), Eq. (2.1) has a unique solution
as p = PAS(x˜, pi).
1. For the general case, we have
(a) ∂PAS/∂x˜ > 0 and ∂PAS/∂pi > 0.
(b) xL = PAS(x˜ = xL, pi) ≤ p ≤ PAS(x˜, pi = 1) = E(x|x ≤ x˜) ≤ min{x˜, µ}.
(c) PAS(x˜, pi = 0) = xL. Thus CM completely collapses when pi = 0.
2. When x
U∼ X = [xL, xH ], we have
p = PAS(x˜, pi) = ϕ(pi) · x˜+ [1− ϕ(pi)] · xL, (2.3)
where ϕ(pi) ≡
√
pi√
pi+1
and Pr{δ = 0} = pi ∈ [0, 1].
Several comments are made here. First of all, when pi = 1, i.e., all sellers would
be hit by liquidity shock at t = 1, then p = PAS(x˜, pi = 1) = E(x|x ≤ x˜), a classic
problem on adverse selection. Secondly, when pi = 0, i.e., all sellers pooling in CM
is simply due to selling lemons rather than liquidating for liquidity need, then CM
simply collapses because of severe adverse selection.
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2.2.5 Free Entry of Information Investment
To make the analysis on market co-existence non-trivial, we have to assume buyer’s
information investment κ is small relative to the average asset quality. Otherwise,
buyers would have no incentive to pay the cost and trade in the DM. In anticipating
this scenario, both sellers and buyers would always concentrate in CM. Buyer’s free
entry condition in DM is then formulated as below.
[
m(b, s)
b
(1− η)E(x|x ≥ x˜)− κ
]
· b = 0,
m(b, s)
b
(1− η)E(x|x ≥ x˜)− κ ≤ 0, b ≥ 0,
where s = pi[1 − F (x˜)]. Assume DM exists, i.e., b > 0 and s > 0, and denote the
market tightness as α ≡ sb , then we have
m(1, α)(1− η)r(x˜) = κ. (2.4)
Since r(x˜) ≡ E(x|x ≥ x˜) increases with x˜ and m(1, α) increases with α, applying
Implicit Function Theorem to the above equation immediately suggests a negative
relationship between α and x˜. I denote it as α = α(x˜), a decreasing function of x˜.
In turn, when x˜ ∈ (xL, xH), by definition it is characterized by m(b,s)s ηx˜ = p, which
can be further refined as below.
p = PFE(x˜) ≡ m
(
1
α(x˜)
, 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ext. margin
· ηx˜︸︷︷︸
int.
(2.5)
Since α(x˜) decreases with x˜, the LHS of Eq. (2.3) delivers a positive relationship
between x˜ and p. We denote is as p = PFE(x˜). It is worth noting that, since
m(1, α) < λ, to guarantee that α(x˜) always exists, we must have E(x|x ≥ x˜) > κλ(1−η) .
A sufficient condition is E(x|x ≥ xL) = µ > κλ(1−η) . If E(x|x ≥ x˜) ≤ κλ(1−η) holds for
some x˜, then we have a corner solution as b = α(x˜) = 0. An extreme case is that, if
xH = E(x|x ≥ xH) ≤ κλ(1−η) , then α(x˜) = 0 for all x ∈ X ≡ [xL, xH ]. Another comment
is, when x˜ = xH , we have s = 0 and thus we always have b = 0 in this case.
Lemma 5. (Buyer’s Free Entry Condition on Information Investment)
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1. Given any p, there exists a unique x˜ which satisfies Eq. (2.3) and is denoted
as x˜ = XFE(p;λ, κ, η). XFE and PFE have the following property.
∂XFE/∂p > 0, ∂XFE/∂κ > 0, ∂XFE/∂η < 0, PFE(xL) < xL.
2. When m(b, s) = λ ·min{b, s} and x U∼ X = [xL, xH ],
(a) Eq. (2.3) is simplified as
λ ·min{1, α}(1− η)r(x˜) = κ, (2.6)
where α ≡ sb and r(x˜) ≡ E(x|x ≥ x˜) = x˜+xH2 .
(b) The marginal seller between CM and DM is characterized as
λ ·min
{
1
α
, 1
}
· η · x˜ = p. (2.7)
When p increases, terms of trade in CM becomes more favorable for sellers with
δ = 1 and thus more of them switch to CM. In the same spirit, when κ increases,
given any x˜, the market tightness would be more tough for sellers and thus some of
them would then pool into CM. Moreover, when η increases, the terms of trade in
DM looks more attractive and thus sellers in CM would then switch to DM.
In this subsection, we have so far focused on the scenario of market co-existence.
That is, we implicitly assume that x˜ ∈ (xL, xH) and s, b > 0. When x˜ = xH , i.e.,
only CM exists, then s = 0 by Eq. (2.1). In turn, the free entry condition implies
that b = 0. In this case, we have
x˜ = XFE(p;λ, κ, η) = xH , (2.8)
which holds for all p ≥ 0. However, another polar case with x˜ = xL can never be
possible. Here is the reasoning. Since the lower bound of asset payoff is xL > 0 and
the competitive buyers would offer p ≥ xL, for sellers with x = xL, they would always
prefer the immediacy of CM to the search and bargaining in CM. By continuity, for
sellers with x being close to x = xL would always choose CM over DM. Therefore it
could never be that CM is totally replaced by DM unless xL = 0.
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2.3 Equilibrium Choice of Trading Venues
2.3.1 General Equilibrium
Combining AS and FE condition solves (p, x˜), which is illustrated in Figure (2.4).
Then we reach the general equilibrium choice of trading venues as below.
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Figure 2.4: (p, x˜) are jointly determined by the intersection AS-curve and FE-
curve.
Definition. The equilibrium consists of (i) p, price in CM, x˜, the cut-off point of the
choice of trading venues, b, the measure of buyers making information investment
and entering DM, s, the measure of sellers self-selecting into DM, α, the market
tightness of DM at t = 1; (ii) seller’s choice of trading venues at t = 1, such that
1. Given (p, x˜), seller’s choice of trading venues is characterized by Figure 2.2.
2. (p, x˜) are jointly determined by Eq. 2.3, Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.8).
3. Given p and x˜, s is given by (2.1) α by Eq. (2.4) and b in turn by b = s/α.14
We use the following proposition to fully characterize the equilibrium choice of trad-
ing venues.
Proposition 6. (Equilibrium Choice of Trading Venues) Assume x
U∼ X =
[xL, xH ] and m(b, s) = λ · min{b, s}. Denote κ ≡ λ(1−η)2
[
( 1−ϕλη−ϕ)xL + xH
]
and κ ≡
λ(1− η)xH .
14If x˜ = xH in equilibrium, we have b = s = 0 and then the market tightness α = s/b is not
well-defined, but it would not bother our analysis then.
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1. When λη > ϕ and σ > σˆ ≡ ( 1−λη1+λη−2ϕ)µ (i.e., λη > ϕ + (1 − ϕ) xLxH ), where
ϕ = ϕ(pi) ≡
√
pi√
pi+1
, we have κ > κ and
x˜ = min
{
xH , max
{
(
1− ϕ
λη − ϕ )xL,
2κ
λ(1− η) − xH
}}
=

xH if κ > κ
2κ
λ(1−η) − xH if κ < κ ≤ κ
( 1−ϕλη−ϕ )xL if κ ≤ κ
.
x˜ = xH can be also supported in this case, but it is not stable.
2. When λη ≤ ϕ or σ ≤ σˆ (i.e., λη ≤ ϕ+ (1−ϕ) xLxH ), we have x˜ = xH for all κ ∈ R+.
We use Figure 2.5 to illustrate the above proposition. Intuitively, when κ is large
enough, i.e., κ > κ, even though matching efficiency is high in DM and adverse
selection is low in CM, only CM would survive for asset trading. When κ decreases,
it is not only more likely that market co-existence could emerge, but also more
trading would switch to DM given the co-existence is sustained. The upper panel
of Figure 2.5 treat other exogenous variables as given and focus on the effect of
information cost κ on equilibrium choice of trading venues.
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Figure 2.5: Equilibrium Choice of Trading Venues (λη > ϕ and σ > σˆ ≡
( 1−λη1+λη−2ϕ)µ).
Based on Figure 2.5, given any κ, we use the upper panel to of Figure (2.6)
demonstrate the implication of the increase of matching efficiency in DM for choice
85
of trading venues. It is clearly shown that, holding κ constant, both extensive-margin
and intensive-margin changes with λ. The second panel suggests that x˜ increases
with pi. The intuition is, when pi decreases, the adverse selection tends to be more
severe in CM and thus DM looks more attractive for high-quality sellers and thus
x˜ decreases. The first three panels illustrates the monotone relationship between
x˜ and (κ, λ, pi) respectively. In contrast, the lower panel suggests the relationship
between (η, x˜) is not monotone. When seller’s bargaining power η increase, which
may be due to the increasing competition of buyers in DM, the direct effect is that
x˜ would decreases since the terms of trade in DM looks more attractive. Meanwhile,
when η increases, the proportion of what buyers could get from trading in DM
would decrease and thus they have less incentive to enter. In turn, seller’s matched
probability in DM would decreases, which would discourage sellers from choosing
DM over CM. That is, x˜ would increases in response to the second effect. The lower
panel implies that the first effect is dominant when information cost κ is low enough
while just opposite when κ is high.
2.3.2 Trading Share and Distribution of Asset Payoff
After obtaining the equilibrium values on (p, x˜), we obtain the determinants of
trading share in both markets. Moreover, we characterize the distribution of asset
payoffs in CM and DM.
Trading Share in CM and DM
According to Figure 2.2, the measure of sellers participating in either CM or DM at
t = 1 is ω = pi + (1 − pi)F (p). As a result, conditioning on trade exercised at t = 1
and using Eq. (2.9), the (truncated) trading share in CM is
ρCM =
piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)
pi + (1− pi)F (p) =
pix˜+ (1− pi)p− xL
pixH + (1− pi)p− xL , (2.9)
First of all, if λη ≤ ϕ or σ ≤ σˆ, as implied by Proposition 5, we always have
ρCM = 1. Secondly, if λη > ϕ(pi), we have
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Figure 2.6: Top: when λ increases; middle: when pi decreases; bottom: when η
increases.
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ρCM =

1 if κ > κ
2[pi+ϕ(1−pi)]
λ(1−η) κ−2ϕ(1−pi)µ−2piµ
2ϕ(1−pi)
λ(1−η) κ−2ϕ(1−pi)µ
if κ < κ ≤ κ
[pi+(1−pi)λη]( 1−ϕλη−ϕ )−1
pi( µ+σµ−σ )+(1−pi)λη( 1−ϕλη−ϕ )−1
if κ ≤ κ
, (2.10)
Therefore, in the presence of market co-existence, we have the following compar-
ative statics.
∂ρCM
∂µ
≥ 0 ∂ρCM
∂σ
≤ 0 ∂ρCM
∂κ
≥ 0 ∂ρCM
∂λ
≤ 0 ∂ρCM
∂η
? 0 ∂ρ
CM
∂pi
≥ 0
As implied in Eq. (2.9), the effect of λ, η, etc. on ρCM is through their impact on
x˜, which in turn works on ρCM . First of all, when the adverse selection is alleviated,
i.e., σ
µ
decreases, the trading share in CM increases. Secondly, when λ increases,
say, due to IT improvement, the DM tends to be more attractive for sellers and
thus the trading share in CM shrinks. The same logic applies to the argument on
the effect of pi on ρCM . Thirdly, when pi increases, the proportion of sellers with
preference shock rather than selling lemons increases. The average quality of assets
in CM increases and thus more sellers would trade in CM, which boosts ρCM . Finally
and again, since the information cost κ has no role in neither x˜ nor p due to the
specification on matching function, it does not affect ρCM provided κ is low enough.
In general, when κ decreases, due to financial deregulation or IT improvement, DM
tends to absorb more sellers, i.e., x˜ would decrease and low ρCM . In sum, the
exercise of comparative statics ρCM lends us insight on the secular migration of
bond trading in the past century, which is well documented by Biais and Green
(2007). However, it is worth noting that the sign of ∂ρ
CM
∂η
is ambiguous. Here is the
intuition. On one hand, when η increases, the terms of trade in the intensive margin
looks more attractive to sellers. On the other hand, the increase of η discourages
buyers from making information investment in the extensive margin. In turn, it
would be less likely for sellers to be matched with buyers in DM. It is the trade-off
between intensive and extensive margin by η that makes ρCM not monotone with η.
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Distribution of Asset Payoffs
First, given market co-existence, the truncated distributions of asset quality in DM
and that in CM are given respectively as below.
FDM (x) =

1 whenx ∈ (xH ,+∞)
F (x)−F (x˜)
1−F (x˜) whenx ∈ (x˜, xH ]
0 whenx ∈ (−∞, x˜]
FCM (x) =

1 whenx ∈ (x˜,+∞)
piF (x)+(1−pi)F (p)
piF (x˜)+(1−pi)F (p) whenx ∈ (p, x˜]
F (x)
piF (x˜)+(1−pi)F (p) whenx ∈ (xL, p]
0 whenx ∈ (−∞, xL]
,
(2.11)
and thus FDM (x) ≤ F (x) ≤ FCM (x). That is, in the presence of adverse selection,
high-quality assets tend to be sold in DM while low-quality ones prefer the immedi-
acy of CM. Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011b) document a similar theoretical
finding. However, it is worth mentioning that, as argued in the literature review,
the information structure differs in our papers and the co-existence of CM and DM
is endogenous.
Secondly, when only CM exists for asset trading, x˜ = xH and thus FDM (x) is
degenerate. FCM (x) is modified as below.
FCM (x) =

1 whenx ∈ (xH ,+∞)
piF (x)+(1−pi)F (p)
pi+(1−pi)F (p) whenx ∈ (p, xH ]
F (x)
pi+(1−pi)F (p) whenx ∈ (xL, p]
0 whenx ∈ (−∞, xL]
. (2.12)
2.3.3 Aggregation with Information Investment
We close this section with a remark on information use. Since our model only
considers an exchange economy, the aggregate asset payoffs are fixed. The aggre-
gation with every sellers having the same weight simply suggests that information
investment by buyers is a waste of social resources. Following this line of argument,
forbidding trade in DM is seemingly socially desirable. Moreover, we can reply on
Proposition 3 to obtain the equilibrium values on p, the price in CM, as well as
q, the weighted revenue. We illustrate both of them in Figure (2.7). That is, the
emergence of DM with costly information acquisition dampens both the liquidity in
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CM and the average asset revenues.
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Figure 2.7: Price in CM (p) and the Weighted Asset Price (q)
However, since sellers are ex ante heterogeneous in asset payoffs and liquidity
shock, the aforementioned simple weighted calculation is misleading to some ex-
tent. As shown in Proposition 3, market co-existence can be sustained under some
conditions. In this scenario, sellers with high-quality asset, prefer to bear search
friction in DM rather than subsidize low-quality assets in CM. As a result, closing
DM would make those sellers worse off. The discussion on the government asset
purchase program equips us with a further illustration of this observation.
2.4 Government Asset Purchase Program
Prior to the financial recession, MBS was considered to be information insensitive
assets and thus there did not appear to exist an information asymmetry. However,
the outbreak of the financial crisis reminded the market of the potential information
asymmetry within the MBS market. Consequently, financial markets tended to be
illiquid and some markets, such as the federal funds market, were also frozen. See
Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2010) and Gale and Yorulmazer (2013) among
others for the background description and theoretical explanation.
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The US government launched the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to
curb the recent financial crisis. More specifically, the US Treasury implemented
the TARP by purchasing mortgage backed securities (MBS) from the financial in-
stitutions.15 In this section, we use the baseline model to address the implication
of government intervention for the seller’s welfare. We focus on the seller’s welfare
since buyers are assumed to be fully competitive and thus they would make zero
profit in equilibrium. In particular, we raise the following question. Does a self-
financing government intervention make all sellers better off? If not, how would the
heterogeneous treatment effect be related to the seller’s asset quality?
Thanks to Corollary 1, we can concentrate on the simplified case with pi = 1, i.e.,
all sellers are hit by liquidity mismatch and thus have to sell their assets to buyers
before the asset payoffs are realized. Then we can index each seller as seller-x rather
than seller-(x, δ) in the baseline. Due to the free entry condition of information
investment and trading in the decentralized market (DM), if the government has
to incur a higher information cost than do the normal buyers in the baseline, or
if its matching efficiency in the DM is lower, then the government would make a
loss from its intervention. To make the analysis non-trivial, we assume the asset
purchase program is self-financing. In turn we make the following assumption.16
Assumption 3. The government enjoys a lower information cost than buyers, and
market co-existence is always sustainable, i.e., κg < κb < κ ≡ λ(1− η)xH .
To implement the program, the government issues perfectly enforceable debts
to buyers at the beginning of t = 1. Thus the government receives consumption
goods produced by buyers. When government steps into asset markets, it does
not necessarily have an information advantage over the uninformed buyers in the
baseline on asset payoffs. We adopt a more reasonable assumption by treating the
government in a similar position as uninformed buyers. That is, the government
could always set up a pooling price in the CM. Alternatively, the government can
15See the following link for more details of this program:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm.
16Alternatively, we could assume λg > λb, i.e., the government would enjoy a higher match-
ing efficiency in DM after paying the same information cost. Moreover, we can easily relax the
assumption that κb < κ.
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make an information investment and kick off bilateral trade with sellers in the DM.
They can also launch the trade in both markets in the same time.
In sum, with these consumption goods at hand, the government buys seller’s
assets in the CM, and decides whether or not to pay the information cost and buy
assets from DM. At t = 2, the government receives consumption goods from the
pooling assets it purchases from CM (and DM, if it co-exists with CM) at t = 1.
The government clears its liabilities by repaying buyers with the goods. Since buyers
are fully competitive, buyers make zero profit just like the self-financing government
intervention does.
On the one hand, since the information cost of government is lower than that
of the normal buyers, the free entry condition on information investment in DM
suggests that only the government survives in asset exchange in DM with information
investment. On the other hand, since the government is self-financing and buyers are
fully competitive, neither of them gain positive profit from trading in CM. Without
loss of generality, we assume only the government trades with sellers in the CM.
Therefore in the presence of Assumption 1, only the government would trade with
sellers in either markets in equilibrium. We summarize the key findings in the
following proposition.
Proposition 7. (Welfare Effect of Government Asset Purchase Program)
Under Assumption 1, a self-financing government asset purchase program makes
high-quality sellers better off while the low quality sellers worse off. More specifically,
there exists a cutoff point x̂ ∈ (xL, xH) such that,
1. Sellers with x ≥ x̂ are better off. Moreover, the net gain strictly increases with
their asset quality x.
2. Sellers with x < x̂ are worse off. Moreover, the net loss weakly increases with
their asset quality x.
The above proposition states that, with Assumption 1, i.e., even though the
government has an information advantage than the normal buyers, the government
cannot deliver a Pareto improvement for the heterogeneous sellers. The decrease of
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the information cost by the government encourages it to acquire more information
in the DM. As a result, sellers who stay in the DM after the government intervention
enjoy a more favorable extensive margin. Moreover, the favorable market tightness in
general equilibrium drives more sellers to switch from the CM to the DM. Therefore
the average quality of assets in the CM decreases. In turn, the pooling price in the
CM decreases and those who continue to trade in the CM are worse off. Consequently
some sellers are better off while the others are worse off. We illustrate the logic and
the cut-off value of the above proposition in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: When government steps in with a lower information cost (κ′ <
κ).
2.5 Conclusion
Asset exchange with market co-existence is prevalent. To this end, we develop a
simple model to characterize conditions under which co-existence of centralized and
decentralized markets can be sustained and its implication for asset liquidity. There
are two-dimensional private information, one is asset payoff while the other one is
liquidity shock of asset sellers. On one hand, the latter dimension is always un-
observable by others. Buyers can either stay uninformed or choose to acquire costly
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information on the former dimension. If buyers incur no information cost, then they
post a pooling and publicly displayed price at which asset demand equals supply.
This is what we mean by centralized market (CM), which is free of search friction,
but is subject to adverse selection. In contrast, those buyers with costly information
acquisition may propose a trading menu different from the pooling price. Since
we assume each information investment can only be used to detect the quality of
one unit of asset, the bilateral trading between sellers and informed buyers may be
subject to search frictions. This is what we mean by decentralized market (DM),
which is characterized with search friction and bilateral bargaining. That is, the
endogenous information investment delivers the emergence of DM with bilateral
trading.
Due to strategic complementarity between sellers and buyers, there always exists
an equilibrium in which only CM survives for asset exchange. To ease the analysis
comparative statics, we always pick up the equilibrium with markets co-existence
whenever it can be supported. Market co-existence emerges only when the following
three conditions are satisfied: i) the search friction in DM is low enough, ii) the
information friction in CM is severe enough, and iii) the information cost is low
enough. Given market co-existence, the trading share of DM over CM increases
with matching efficiency in DM and severeness of adverse selection in CM, while
decreases with information cost. Then we conclude that, as matching efficiency in
DM increases and the information cost decreases, more trade migrates from CM
with adverse selection to DM with search frictions. In the limit, DM with search
frictions converges to CM with complete information.
Our model with information and search frictions is more than just explaining
conditions under which CM and DM co-exist for asset trading. We also address the
implication of government asset purchase program, such as the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), through the lens of our model. Since sellers are heterogeneous in
asset payoffs, even though the government is better at information cost or matching
efficiency, the treatment effect of self-financing government asset purchase program is
heterogeneous. Moreover, in the presence of government intervention, we show that
sellers with high-quality assets are better off while the others are worse off in general
equilibrium. Therefore even though the government has an information advantage
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than the normal buyers, the government cannot generate a Pareto improvement for
all those heterogeneous sellers.
We close the paper with several possible lines for future research. First, we
assume assets are indivisible. This assumption is innocuous in the paper since
we also assume all agents are risk neutral. Both restrictions contribute greatly
to tractability. It could be interesting to extend the idea into the scenario with
perfect divisible asset. The advancement from indivisibility to divisibility is not a
trivial exercise. As emphasized by Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), “...As a result of the
restrictions they imposed on asset holdings, existing search-based theories neglect
a critical feature of illiquid markets, namely, that market participants can mitigate
trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions to reduce their trading needs...”.
Both Lagos and Wright (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) have contributed a
tractable framework for asset trading with perfectly divisible asset.
Secondly, to neatly model endogenous information acquisition and the emergence
of DM, we assume direct trading between sellers and buyers in a finite-horizon
model. In our real life, however, a large number of asset trading in DM are dealer-
intermediated, say corporate bonds. To better characterize the trading details in
DM, such as bid-ask spread, it may be worthwhile for us to introduce dealer between
sellers and buyers in DM.
Thirdly, it might be desirable for us to integrate the idea in this paper into a dy-
namic general equilibrium model. Eisfeldt (2004) and Kurlat (2012), among others,
are excellent examples of integrating pooling price with adverse selection into RBC
models. As suggested throughout this paper, buyers in our paper undertake endoge-
nous level of information investment to lessen adverse selection. Furthermore, we
have endogenous trading venues for market liquidity. In sum, the RBC model with
our story might deliver additional insights for dynamic decision on real investment
and information investment and their interactions with each other.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Appendix A - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
Proof. Substituting c1 and c2 into the objective function yields
US(x, δ) = max
a∈{0,1}
{max {m(b, s)
s
ηx, p(x)} · a+ δ · [a · 1{m(b,s)
s
·ηx>p(x)} · (1−
m(b, s)
s
) · x+ (1− a) · x]}
=

max
a∈{0,1}
{max {m(b,s)
s
ηx, p(x)} · a} when δ = 0
max
a∈{0,1}
{max {m(b,s)
s
ηx, p(x)} · a+ a · 1{m(b,s)
s
·ηx>p(x)} · (1−
m(b,s)
s
) · x+ (1− a) · x} when δ = 1
As a result, when δ = 0, a∗ = 1, i.e., investors with preference shock have to sell
the claim of their projects. Investors with δ = 1, however, could either participate in
centralized or decentralized market (a = 1) or simply wait till t = 2 (a = 0). However,
the above optimization implies that investors would never try centralized market due to
search friction and bargaining.
First of all, competitive buyers set p(x) = x in complete information. In this scenario,
p(x) > m(b,s)s ηx for all sellers-(x, δ = 0) and thus they trade in centralized market. More-
over, sellers-(x, δ = 1) would be indifferent between selling in centralized market at t = 1
and waiting till t = 2.
Secondly, in the presence of information asymmetry, p(x) = p for all sellers pooling
in centralized market. On one hand, for sellers with δ = 0, if decentralized market does
not exist, their only choice is the centralized market. If the decentralized market exists,
however, they would compare m(b,s)s ηx with p. Furthermore, if
m(b,s)
s ηx1 > p, we would
also have m(b,s)s ηx2 > p provided x2 > x1. Thus there may exist a cut-off point x˜ on the
choice of trading venues. If x˜ ∈ (xL, xH), then m(b,s)s ηx˜ = p holds by definition. On the
other hand, for sellers with δ = 1, as argued above, they would never consider trading in
decentralized market even though it would be available. Instead, they simply compare p
and x. As a result, those with x < p would sell their asset claims in the centralized market
at t = 1 while those with x ≥ p would enter either markets and wait till t = 2.
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Finally, based the above two pieces of observation, we have
Us(x, δ) =

p if δ = 0 and x ≤ x˜
x
x˜ · p if δ = 0 and x > x˜
p if δ = 1 and x ≤ p
x if δ = 0 and x ≤ x˜
=
max{
x
x˜ , 1} · p if δ = 0
max{xp , 1} · p if δ = 1
= max{ x
p+ (x˜− p) · 1{δ=0} , 1} · p
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. It is immediately obtained by using Proposition 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The results in the general case in proved as below.
First of all, we show that p ≤ x˜. Eq. (2.4) suggests that
p =
piF (x˜)E(x|x ≤ x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)E(x|x ≤ p)
piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)
=
pi
´ x˜
xL
xdF (x) + (1− pi) ´ p
xL
xdF (x)
piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)
≤ pi
´ x˜
xL
x˜dF (x) + (1− pi) ´ p
xL
pdF (x)
piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)
=
pix˜F (x˜) + (1− pi)pF (p)
piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p) ,
where the inequality strictly holds iff x > xL. Thus p ≤ pix˜F (x˜)+(1−pi)pF (p)piF (x˜)+(1−pi)F (p) . Multiplying
both side of this inequality with piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p) and rearranging then yields p ≤ x˜,
where the equality holds iff x˜ = xL(= p).
Secondly, Eq. (2.4) can be rewritten as
G(p, x˜, pi) ≡ pi
ˆ x˜
xL
xdF (x) + (1− pi)
ˆ p
xL
xdF (x)− pipF (x˜)− (1− pi)pF (p) = 0.
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Thus we have
Gp ≡ ∂G
∂p
= −[piF (x˜) + (1− pi)F (p)] < 0
Gx˜ ≡ ∂G
∂x˜
= pi(x˜− p)f(x˜) > 0
According to Implicit Function Theorem, we have
dp
dx˜
= −Gx˜
Gp
=> 0.
Thus we can denote the above result as p = PAS(x˜, pi), which is an increasing function
of x˜. Furthermore, since x˜ ≥ xL, we immediately have p ≥ xL. When x˜ = xL, Eq. (2.2)
is reduced as follows.
p =
´ p
xL
xdF (x)
F (p)
= E(x|x ≤ p),
which is a classic problem of adverse selection by Akerlof (1970) and the unique solution
is p = xL. As a result, PAS(x˜ = xL) = xL and thus p ≥ xL. So far we finish the proof
that xL ≤ p ≤ x˜, where both inequality strictly holds if x˜ > xL.
Moreover, we have
∂G
∂pi
= [
ˆ x˜
xL
xdF (x)− pF (x˜)]− [
ˆ p
xL
xdF (x)− pF (p)]
Define H(a; p) ≡ ´ axL xdF (x) − pF (a). Then we have ∂H∂a = (a − p)f(a) and thus
H(a; p) increases with a when a > p. Since x˜ > p, we have
Gpi ≡ ∂G
∂pi
= H(x˜; p)−H(p; p) > 0,
which in turn, by using Implicit Function Theorem again, implies that
dp
dpi
= −Gpi
Gp
> 0.
Denote p = PAS(x˜, pi). Thus p = PAS(x˜, pi) ≤ PAS(x˜, pi = 11) = E(x|x ≤ x˜) ≤ E(x|x ≤
xH) = µ(θ).
Finally, when pi = 0, Eq. (2.4) is reduced to
p =
´ p
xL
xdF (x)
F (p)
= E(x|x ≤ p),
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which has been discussed above in the case when x˜ = xL. The only solution is p =
PAS(x˜, pi = 0) = xL and CM totally collapses.
Now we prove the second part of Proposition 3.
When x
U∼ X = [xL, xH ], we have
F (x) =

0 if x < xL
x−xL
xH−xL if xL ≤ x ≤ xH
1 if x > xH
.
Substituting F (x) into Eq. (2.2) and making some algebraic manipulation yields Eq.
(2.3).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The results in the general case in proved as follows. For the ease of argument, we
list Eq. (2.4) and Eq. (2.3) as below.
m(1, α)r(x˜) =
κ
1− η
m(
1
α
, 1)x˜ =
p
η
In the above simultaneous equations, x˜ and α are endogenous variables while κ, p and
η are exogenous. To prove ∂x˜∂p > 0, we differentiate both sides of the above two equations.
Then we have  m2(1, α)r(x˜) m(1, α)r′(x˜)
−m1( 1α ,1)α2 x˜ m( 1α , 1)
 dαdp
dx˜
dp
 =
 0
1
η
 (#)
Since m1 > 0, m2 > 0 and r
′(x˜) > 0, Cramer rule immediately suggests that
dx˜
dp
=
det
 m2(1, α)r(x˜) 0
−m1( 1α ,1)α2 x˜ 1η

det
 m2(1, α)r(x˜) m(1, α)r′(x˜)
−m1( 1α ,1)α2 x˜ m( 1α , 1)
 > 0 and
dα
dp
=
det
 0 m(1, α)r′(x˜)
1
η m(
1
α , 1)

det
 m2(1, α)r(x˜) m(1, α)r′(x˜)
−m1( 1α ,1)α2 x˜ m( 1α , 1)
 < 0 (∗)
Following the same strategy delivers that dx˜dκ > 0 and
dx˜
dη < 0.
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Now we prove the second part of Lemma 2. It is immediately done with the assumption
x
U∼ X = [xL, xH ] and m(b, s) = λ ·min{b, s}.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We proceed with the strategy of guess-and-verify. Assume market co-existence can
be supported, i.e., x˜ ∈ (xL, xH), then we have
λ ·min{b, s}
b
(1− η)E(x|x ≥ x˜) = κ
λ ·min{b, s}
s
ηx˜ = p
s = pi · [1− F (x˜)]
p = ϕx˜+ (1− ϕ)xL
Additionally, we assume that s < b, i.e., α ≡ sb < 1, then the above equations suggest
that x˜ = ( 1−ϕλη−ϕ)xL. We now have to check whether the guess that α < 1 is valid. It then
is easy for us to check that α < 1 when κ ≤ κ. Moreover, we have to guarantee that
x˜ = ( 1−ϕλη−ϕ)xL ∈ (xL, xH), which is true if and only λη > ϕ and σ > σ̂.
Similarly, we assume x˜ ∈ (xL, xH), but α ≥ 1. Then we can show this guess is true if
and only λη > ϕ and σ > σ̂ and κ ∈ (κ, κ).
Finally, based on the above analysis, x˜ = xH would be the only equilibrium result if
κ ≥ κ when λη > ϕ and σ > σ̂, or, for all κ ∈ R+, we have λη ≤ ϕ and σ ≤ σ̂.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, based on Proposition 3, we have market co-existence both before and after
government intervention. Moreover, since κg = κ
′ < κb = κ, we know from Proposition 3
that x˜(κg) ≤ x˜(κb) and thus p(κg) ≤ p(κb). Additionally, the decrease of information cost
implies a more favorable extensive margin for sellers. Therefore, we know that
U(x˜(κg)) = p(κg) ≤ p(κb) = m(s(κb), b(κb))
s(κb)
ηx˜(κb) ≤ m(s(κg), b(κg))
s(κg)
ηx˜(κb) = U(x˜(κb)).
Since U(x) increases with x, there exists a cut-off point x̂ ∈ (x˜(κg), x˜(κb)) such
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that
U(x)
≤ p(κb) if x ≤ x̂≥ p(κb) if x ≥ x̂ .
2.6.2 Extension: Robustness Check
In our baseline model, we use random search to characterize search frictions in DM. Be-
sides, we assume liquidity shock, δ, only adopts two mass points, zero and one. Thus
buyers could infer only sellers with δ = 0 could show up in DM. We use this appendix
to undertake two pieces of robust check. First, we revisit the model with directed search
rather than random search in DM. That is, each buyer in DM only run submarket-x, where
sellers-(x, δ) would meet buyers. Secondly, we treat the general case on liquidity shock,
in which δ is continuously distributed over an interval, just like the asset payoff x. In the
general case, buyers can only detect asset payoff x with costly information acquisition, but
have idea on liquidity shock δ. Thus buyers in DM would instead launch optimal contract
to extract true value of δ for those sellers self-selecting into DM. Finally, we have so far
focused on an exchange economy, i.e., all of potential sellers is exogenous endowed with
one unit of asset at t = 0.
Directed Search
In direct search, each buyer with information investment only engage in certain submarket-
x. Correspondingly, seller-(x, δ) directly trade with buyers there. Since in equilibrium
buyers would be indifferent among different sub-markets in DM, the following equation
holds for all seller-(x, δ) self-selecting into DM.
m(b(x), s(x))
b(x)
(1− η)x = κ, (2.13)
which immediately implies that α(x) ≡ s(x)b(x) , the market tightness at submarket-x, in-
creases with x. In turn, the expected revenue of entering DM by seller-(x, δ), m(b(x),s(x))s(x) ηx
increases with x, just as that in random search. As a result, the property of cut-off point
on market participation is preserved in the case with directed search. Following the pro-
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cedure in Section 2 and 3, we have the following results on equilibrium choice of trading
venues with directed search.
Corollary 11. (Equilibrium Choice of Trading Venues) Denote κ′ ≡ λ(1−η)( 1−ϕλη−ϕ)xL,
κ ≡ λ(1−η)2 [( 1−ϕλη−ϕ)xL + xH ] and κ ≡ λ(1− η)xH .
1. (Choice of Trading Venues)
(a) For sellers with δ = 0, there exists a cut-off point x˜′ ∈ [xL, xH ] such that if
x ≥ x˜′, they would self-select into DM, and enter CM otherwise at t = 1.
(b) For sellers with δ = 1, if x < p, they would choose CM, and if x ≥ p, they
would participate in neither DM nor CM at t = 1, but instead wait to consume
at t = 2.
2. (Characterization of Cut-off Value x˜′)
(a) When λη > ϕ and σ > σˆ ≡ ( 1−λη1+λη−2ϕ)µ (i.e., λη > ϕ + (1 − ϕ) xLxH ), where
ϕ = ϕ(pi) ≡
√
pi√
pi+1
, we have κ′ < κ < κ and
x˜′ = min{xH , max{( 1− ϕ
λη − ϕ ) · xL,
κ
λ(1− η)}}
=

xH if κ > κ
κ
λ(1−η) if κ
′ < κ ≤ κ
( 1−ϕλη−ϕ )xL if κ ≤ κ′
.
p = ϕ(pi) · x˜′ + (1− ϕ(pi)) · xL.
(b) When λη ≤ ϕ(pi) or σ ≤ σˆ (i.e., λη ≤ ϕ+ (1− ϕ) xLxH ), we have
x˜ = xH for all κ ∈ R+.
Proof. Since m(b(x), s(x)) = λ · min{b(x), s(x)}, Eq. (2.13) suggests that, to recover
information investment, informed buyers in DM would only accept to trade with sellers
with x ≥ κλ(1−η) . Then following the proof strategy of Proposition 5 yields the desired
results.
This corollary implies the main results in the benchmark with random search are
still preserved in our robust check with directed search. We illustrate key results of this
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corollary in Figure 2.9. Two comments are made here. First of all, the patten of venue
choice is qualitatively the same between random and directed search. Secondly, x˜′ ≤ x˜,
i.e., the size of DM tends to smaller under directed search than that under random search.
As suggested in Section 4, a smaller DM would be save more social resources. Therefore
our result is complementary to the findings by Moen (1997) on efficiency obtained by
directed search.
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Figure 2.9: Choice of Trading Venues: Direct vs Random Search
Optimal Contract with a Continuum of δ
Now we return to random search with matching function m(b, s) = λ · min{b, s}. The
second line of model extension on switching from δ ∈ {0, 1} to δ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that
buyers can no longer infer the true value of δ. Now we assign all bargaining power to buyers
in DM and they could initiate optimal contract {q(x, δ), τ(x, δ)} after paying information
cost κ in DM. Given any x, q(x, δ) and τ(x, δ) denote the quantity of asset transferred to
buyers and the consumption paid to sellers respectively if sellers report his type of private
value as δ. Note that x is verifiable after buyers incurring information cost κ.
In the same spirit in the benchmark, there exists a cut-off value of κ, say κ′, above which
DM cannot not be supported whatever the contract buyers propose in DM. In contrast,
the equilibrium with market co-existence is not only sustainable, but also stable if κ < κ∗.
Moreover, there exists another cut-off point κ∗ < κ∗ such that b < s in equilibrium if
κ < κ∗. Since the co-existence of CM and DM is the most intriguing part, we assume
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κ < κ∗ holds. Moreover, to focus on the characterization of optimal contract by buyers
in DM, we assume κ < κ∗ < κ∗ throughout this subsection such that DM can not only
be supported, but also there are more buyers than sellers flowing into DM. We can prove
that the qualitative results shown below are still held if κ ∈ κ∗ < κ∗ (and 0 < b < s
correspondingly).
Denote U(x, δ) as the gain of seller-(x, δ) by enrolling in the contract by buyers in DM.
Now seller-(x, δ) makes her discrete choice among three alternatives.
max { p︸︷︷︸
CM
,
m(b, s)
s
· U(x, δ) + [1− m(b, s)
s
] · δx︸ ︷︷ ︸
DM
, δx︸︷︷︸
No−trade
}.
In this part, we focus on the most intriguing case, i.e., the co-existence between CM
and DM. Thanks to Revelation Principle, given any x, we could simply focus on buyer’s
direct mechanism in DM, which is formulated as below.
ΠB(x) ≡ max{q(x,δ)∈[0,1],τ(x,δ)∈[0,∞)}ZDM |x
{
ˆ
δ∈ZDM |x
[−τ(x, δ) + q(x, δ) · x]}
subject to
U(x, δ) ≡ Ux(δ; δ) = max
δ′∈ZDM |x
{Ux(δ; δ′)}
Ux(δ; δ
′) ≡ [1− q(x, δ′)] · δx+ τ(x, δ′) (IC)
m(b, s)
s
· U(x, δ) + [1− m(b, s)
s
] · δx ≥ U(p, δx) ≡max{p, δx} (IR).
Similar to standard mechanism design, both Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Indi-
vidual Rationality (IR) should be satisfied. What makes our setup challenging is that,
buyer’s mechanism design would affect ZDM , the content of seller-(x, δ) self-selecting into
the contracts in DM. Moreover, it is worth noting the outside option is type-dependent
and thus may involve in the so-called countervailing incentive a la Lewis and Sappington
(1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Jullien (2000).
The following lemma on seller’s choice of trading venues generalizes the results of
Proposition 2.
Lemma 6. (Seller’s Choice of Trading Venues) For any seller-(x, δ), given p in CM
and contract {q(x, δ), τ(x, δ)} in DM, there exists cut-off values δ(x) and δ(x) such that,
1. if δ ∈ [0, δ(x)], she sells her asset at CM;
2. if δ ∈ (δ(x), δ(x)], she sells her asset at DM;
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3. if δ ∈ (δ(x), 1], she chooses not to trade.
Proof. We rewrite the IR condition of this mechanism design as below.
U(x, δ) ≥ V (x, δ, p) ≡ δx+ 1
λ̂
max{p− δx, 0},
where λ̂ ≡ m(b,s)s and thus V (x, δ, p) decreases with δ when δx < p while increases
when δx > p. The non-monotone property of V stems from the fact that, relative to DM,
seller-(δ, x) have two outside options. One is sell at CM at price p while the other one
is pure autarky, i.e., participating in neither CM nor DM. When δx is low, the outside
option with CM is larger than that in with autarky. It is just opposite when δx is high
enough.
Secondly, given any x, Envelope Theorem suggests that
∂U(x, δ)
∂δ
= [1− q(x, δ)]x ≥ 0.
Combining these two observations yields the results in the lemma with
δ(x) = max{0, p− λ̂ · U(x, δ)
(1− λ̂) · x
}
δ(x) = min{1, U(x, δ)
x
}
Finally,a figure with δ in horizontal axis and U , V in vertical axis would help illustrate
our findings. Due to space concern, we omit it here.
Based on the above lemma, we reach the optimal contract in DM and in turn obtain
the explicit solution on (δ(x), δ(x)).
Proposition 8. (Optimal Contract Offered in DM) When δ
U∼ ∆ = [0, 1] and
m(b, s) = λ ·min{b, s} and κ is small enough, given any x in DM, buyer’s optimal contract
is in the form as take-it-or-leave-it in the following form.
{q∗(x, δ)) = 1, τ∗(x, δ) = τ(x)},
where
τ(x) =

p+x
2 if x ∈ [p, 2−λλ · p]
p
λ if x ∈ ( 2−λλ · p, 2·λ p]
x
2 if x ∈ ( 2λ · p, xH ]
.
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In turn, we have
δ(x) = max{0, p− λ · τ(x)
(1− λ) · x } =

1 if x ∈ [xL, p]
(1−λ2 )p−λ2 x
(1−λ)x if x ∈ (p, 2−λλ · p]
0 if x ∈ ( 2−λλ · p, 2λ · p]
0 if x ∈ ( 2λ · p, xH ]
.
δ(x) = min{1, τ(x)
x
} =

1 if x ∈ [xL, p]
p+x
2x if x ∈ (p, 2−λλ · p]
p
λx if x ∈ ( 2−λλ · p, 2λ · p]
1
2 if x ∈ ( 2λ · p, xH ]
.
Proof. The first part is proved as below.
To ease illustration while preserving the key insights, we have assumed that information
cost κ is low enough such that b > s is always true in equilibrium. In turn, we have
m(b,s)
s = λ ∈ (0, 1), a constant. This would help us focus on characterizing optimal
contract by buyers. We break down the proof into the following steps.
First of all, since sellers could always seller their assets at price p in CM and δ ∈ [0, 1],
buyers in DM would have no customers if U(x, δ) < p. Meanwhile, to recover information
cost, buyers in DM ex ante would never accept sellers with x < p.
Secondly, for seller-(x, δ) self-selecting into DM and is allowed to trade with buyers
there, denote δ˜(x) = min{ px , 1} = px . Since Then we can check that δ(x) ≤ δ˜(x) ≤ δ(x),
where δ(x) and δ(x) are characterized in the proof of Lemma 1. For each x, buyers launch
direct mechanism for two groups respectively. One is δ ∈ ∆1 = [δ(x), δ˜(x)] while the other
group is δ ∈ ∆2 = [δ˜(x), δ(x)]. On one hand, for each group, buyers make sure IR and
IC conditions are satisfied. On the other hand, buyers have to make sure sellers in group
∆1 ∪∆2 would have no incentive to deviate the other group. After all, even though x is
verifiable after buyers incur information cost, δ is still un-observable. As a result, incentive
compatibility of not deviating to another group has to be additionally taken into account.
In the next two pieces of analysis, we first solve the within-group contract and then go to
discussion of IC on across-group.
Buyer’s objective function for group ∆1 is
ΠB(x)|∆1 ≡ max{q(x,δ)∈[0,1],τ(x,δ)∈[0,∞)}{
ˆ δ˜(x)
δ(x)
[−τ(x, δ) + q(x, δ) · x]}
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Meanwhile, for group with δ ∈ ∆1, the outside option is simplified as V (x, δ, p) ≡
δx+ 1λmax{p−δx, 0} = pλ− ( 1λ−1)δx. That is, for sellers in this group, the outside option
decreases with δ. Following Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), among others, we define
Υ(x, δ) = U(x, δ)− V (x, δ, p). Envelope Theorem suggests
∂Υ
∂δ
= [
1
λ
− q(x, δ)] · x.
Thus
[1− q(x, δ)]δx+ τ(x, δ)− [ p
λ
− ( 1
λ
− 1)δx] =
ˆ δ
δ(x)
[
1
λ
− q(x, δ′)]xdδ′.
Expressing the above equation for τ(x, δ) and substituting it into the buyer’s objec-
tive function for group ∆1 mentioned above, we can easily prove that, for group ∆1,
q∗(x, δ)|∆1 = 1. Substituting it into the above equation suggests that τ∗(x, δ)|∆1 has
nothing to with δ and is thus denoted as τ∗(x)|∆1 .
Similarly, we can show that q∗(x, δ)|∆2 = 1 and τ∗(x, δ)|∆2 also has nothing to do with
δ and is thus denoted as τ∗(x)|∆2 . Finally, to make sure the IC condition of across-group
is satisfied, we have to make sure τ∗(x, δ)|∆1 = τ∗(x, δ)|∆1 ≡ τ(x)|∆1∪∆2 = τ(x). In sum,
given x > p and buyers and sellers are matched in DM, the optimal contract would take
the form as {q∗(x, δ) = 1, τ∗(x, δ) = τ(x)}. It is obvious that τ(x) ≤ x is always held.
In turn, we have U(x, δ) = τ(x) and thus
δ(x) = max{0, p− λ · τ(x)
(1− λ) · x }
δ(x) = min{1, τ(x)
x
} = τ(x)
x
.
As a recap, buyer’s profit function focusing on sellers with x is
ΠB(x) ≡ max{q(x,δ)∈[0,1],τ(x,δ)∈[0,∞)}ZDM |x
{
ˆ
δ∈ZDM |x
[−τ(x, δ) + q(x, δ) · x]}
Using the optimal contract and cut-off values just obtained above, ΠB(x) is refined as
below.
ΠB(x) = max
τ(x,δ)∈[0,x]
[x− τ(x)][G(δ(x))−G(δ(x))]
subject to
δ(x) = max{0, p− λ · τ(x)
(1− λ) · x }
δ(x) = min{1, τ(x)
x
} = τ(x)
x
,
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where G denotes the CDF of δ with support [0, 1]. If we further assume δ
U∼ ∆ = [0, 1],
then we obtain τ(x) as that in Proposition 5. In turn, we obtain δ(x) and δ(x) as in the
second part of this proposition. We are done.
We illustrate Proposition 5 in Figure 2.10 and 2.11 respectively the terms of trade by
buyers and choice of trading venues by sellers.
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Figure 2.10: (p, τ(x)): Assets Prices in CM and DM
Several remarks are made here. First of all, the optimal contract by buyers in DM
only focus on sellers with x > p. On one hand, p is always an outside option of any
seller-(x, δ) and thus buyers in DM would attract no sellers if τ(x, δ) < p. On the other
hand, buyer’s profit is x − τ(x, δ). To make the profit non-negative, it must that they
would trade with x > p and x can always be verifiable. Secondly, given price in CM p,
seller’s choice over CM, DM and autarky not depends on common value x, but also on
private value δ. Thirdly, we are still in the position of partial equilibrium since price in
CM is taken as given. Based on Proposition 7, p is solved in equilibrium as below.
p =
´ p
xL
xdF (x) +
´min{ 2−λλ ·p,xH}
p
xG
(
(1−λ2 )p−λ2 x
(1−λ)x
)
dF (x)
F (p) +
´min{ 2−λλ ·p,xH}
p
G
(
(1−λ2 )p−λ2 x
(1−λ)x
)
dF (x)
, (2.14)
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Figure 2.11: Seller’s Choice of Trading Venues
where F and G denotes the CDF of x and δ respectively. Moreover, we have implic-
itly assumed G(δ) is a uniform distribution. However, even though F (x) is a uniform
distribution, the above equation has no explicit solution on p.
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Chapter 3
A Search-Based Theory of The
Life-Cycle Pattern of Asset
Holding
3.1 Introduction
The vast majority of financial assets, such as corporate bonds, US federal funds and
mortgage-backed securities, are typically traded in decentralized markets. As docu-
mented by Harris (2003), Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2005, DGP thereafter) and
Duffie (2012), decentralized markets, which are sometimes called over-the-counter
markets (OTC), are mainly characterized with search frictions and bilateral bar-
gaining.1 Liquidity mis-allocation emerges since it takes time for buyers and sellers
to be matched with each other for the trading surplus.2
All of the literature on asset search assumes an infinite horizon environment,
which in turn contributes to tractability. Moreover, as shown by Storesletten, Telmer
and Yaron (2004), Chambers and Schlagenhauf (2003), and Chang and Hong (2012),
1Not only for financial assets, it is also true that non-financial durable goods, such as used
aircraft, are also traded with search frictions. See Gavazza (2011) for details.
2There may exist more fundamental reasons than just search frictions. For example, as suggested
by Wasmer and Weil (2004), imperfections in labor and credit markets may stem from moral
hazard or adverse selection. For simplicity, we throughout this paper sticks to search friction as a
convenient reduced form rather than assuming any information asymmetries.
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investment on financial assets, including stocks and bonds, is hump-shaped over
one’s life. Motivated by the empirical regularity, we investigate the implications of
search frictions for the life cycle as well as for the aggregate distribution of investor’s
asset holdings. Based on the model, we further address the effect of search friction
on asset mis-allocation in terms of both cross section and time series. We fully
characterize not only the stationary distribution, but also the transitional dynamics
of asset holding. More importantly, we obtain analytic results for the life cycle of
asset holdings by each cohort. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to analytically characterize the life-cycle pattern of asset trading.
The model developed in this paper has several pieces of testable implications.
First of all, the stationary size distribution of asset holding follows a logarithmic
pattern. Secondly, the life cycle of asset holding by each cohort conforms to a
geometric distribution while the size distribution of asset holding in each cross-
section follows a logarithmic pattern. Thirdly, the average growth rate of asset
holding is irrelevant to the size of current asset holdings. Meanwhile, the volatility
of growth rate of asset holding decreases with the size of current asset holdings.
That is, we reach the results on Gibrat’s law on asset trading in OTC.3
This paper is mostly related to DGP (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009).
The former considers asset trading by risk-neutral investors in OTC with two types
of preference (low and high) and strict restriction on asset holding (zero or one unit
of asset). The latter uses quasi-linear utility to model general types of preference
and relaxes the assumption on asset indivisibility. There are several key differences
and connections between these two works and this paper. First of all, DGP (2005)
considers only two types of preference and asset holdings are assumed to be either
zero or one unit. In contrast, our paper allows general types of preference and
investors could accumulate any countable units of assets. Secondly, DGP (2005)
focuses on steady state while our paper takes in account both stationary equilibrium
and transitional dynamics. It is true that Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) already
proposes a tractable model to admit asset divisibility, transitional dynamics and
3See Sutton (1997) and Klette and Kortum (2004), among other, for the detailed description of
Gibrat’s law for firm dynamics.
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general types of preference. As shown in Lagos and Rocheteau (2007), one of the
key limits in Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) is that, when there are only two types of
preference as in DGP (2005), there are only four mass points for the equilibrium size
of asset holdings.4 In contrast, we not only consider the general preference, but also
show that, even with only two types of preference, there are countably infinite types
for the size distribution of asset holdings. Thirdly, both DGP (2005) and Lagos and
Rocheteau (2009) address a closed system, i.e., investors always live in the financial
market to re-balance their asset holdings from time to time. As a result, our paper
complements to these two works by using birth-and-death process in firm dynamics
to model the implication of search friction for the life-cycle pattern of asset holding.
Finally, we incorporate into our model the empirical findings of fire-sale and fire-
purchase by Coval and Stafford (2007). These empirical features are absent in both
works.
The issues our paper addresses belong to the literature on asset search while the
modeling strategy originates from the literature on firm dynamics. Early works con-
sists of Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson and Pakes
(1995) among others. Recent research includes Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Cabral
and Mata (2003), Klette and Kortum (2004) and Luttmer (2007, 2011). The method-
ology our paper mainly adopts from the field of firm dynamics is stochastic process
of birth and death. That is, the modeling block of this paper essentially stems from
Klette and Kortum (2004) and Luttmer (2011).
The rest of this paper proceeds as below. Section 2 describes the environment
of asset trading in OTC. Section 3 formulates the dynamic system and pins down
the stationary equilibrium. Section 4 fully characterizes the non-stationary life-cycle
pattern of asset holding by each cohort of investors. It also offers analytic solutions
to transitional dynamics of the distribution of asset holdings. Section 5 investigates
the implication of search frictions for several dimensions of asset liquidity. Section
6 explores several pieces of model extension. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are
pooled in the Appendix.
4In general, as shown in Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), if investors have I ∈ N types of preference,
there would be I2 pieces of masses points in equilibrium for the size distribution of asset holdings.
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3.2 Environment
Time proceeds continuously from zero to infinity. There are two kinds of risk-neutral
agents in the economy: investors and market-makers (dealers). There is one kind of
non-depreciable and non-reproducible asset circulating in this exchange economy.5
We use s ∈ R++ to denote the fixed supply of this asset. Each unit of the asset
constantly delivers x units of fruits.
Every investor has a risk-free bank account, in which she can deposit her real
money balance with the interest rate r ∈ R++, the same as her discount rate. Addi-
tionally, investors in the financial market may be hit by preference shock, i.e., they
may switch between low-preference (L) and high-preference (H).6 Heterogeneity on
preference types may be due to investor’s heterogeneous financing cost or ability in
managing assets. Preference shock is assumed to be public information.7 Similar
to DGP (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), we specify investor’s preference
directly over their asset holding. We use xL and xH to denote the valuation of one
unit of asset by low-preference and high-preference investors respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume 0 < xL < xH = x.
All trade is assumed to be dealer-intermediated. There is no short sell. Without
loss of generality, investors with any preference type are allowed to hold any count-
able units of assets.8 Each unit of asset is randomly matched with dealer with an
independent Poisson process, which governs the amounts of assets investors hold. In
particular, dealers encounter each asset as buyers and sellers with Poisson rate λ−i
and λ+i respectively, where i ∈ {L,H} denotes the preference type of investors. See
5The asset could be treated as either stock or bond. I don’t distinguish them in the model.
6We analyze the case with general types of preference in the section on model extension.
7We focus on the effect of search friction on life cycle of asset trading and size distribution of
asset holding. Thus we assume there is no information asymmetry on the public or private values
of assets. Discussion on adverse selection of asset quality in OTC includes Guerreri, Shimer and
Wright (2010), Chiu and Koeppl (2011), Guerreri and Shimer (2012a,b) and Chang (2012). Zhang
(2012), on the other hand, considers liquidity mis-allocation in OTC due to private values on asset.
8Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) and Gaˆrleanu (2009) imposes no restriction on the amount of
asset holding. However, in equilibrium, there are only countable (actually finite) levels of asset
holdings.
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Figure 3.1: An Example on the Snapshot of Trading Structures for Investors
(Asset Sellers and Buyers) and Market Makers. Some investors have multiple
units of assets while the others have one unit.
Figure 3.1 for illustration of trading in certain snapshot of time. Complementing
to the cross-section illustration on asset trading in OTC, Figure 3.2 presents the
dynamics of asset trading as well as entry and exiting the financial market. In-
tuitively, low-preference investors desire to sell while high-preference ones to buy
assets. Moreover, to accommodate the empirical findings by Coval and Stafford
(2007), we allow the possibility of fire-purchase and fire-sale by low-preference and
high-preference investors respectively. In sum, the Poisson rate of selling and buying
one unit of assets by investor with type-i preference are n ·λ−i and n ·λ+i respectively,
where i ∈ {L,H}.9
Search intensity is exogenously given in the baseline. On one hand, investors
are interpreted to exit the market if she sells the last unit of her asset holdings.
On the other hand, potential investors can enter OTC by paying certain fixed cost
and then buying one unit of assets. In our baseline, the measure of market-makers
is exogenously given and normalized to be one. To keep the model under control,
we follow the assumption made in DGP (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009)
that market-makers never hold asset inventory. Market-makers manage to do so by
9See Morris (1998), among others, for the additive property of independent Poisson process.
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having access to immediate inter-dealer market.10
In the next two sections, we first address each investor’s value function and the
size distribution of asset holding in steady state. Then we switch to the discussion
on individual’s life cycle of asset trading. In the end, we characterize the transitional
dynamics on the size distribution of asset holdings.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Model Structure between DGP (2005) and This
Paper.
3.3 Steady State
3.3.1 Value Function
In our baseline model, investors have two states on preference, i.e., i(t) ∈ {L,H}.
Denote Wt as the current wealth in her risk-less bank account with interest rate
r > 0. Intuitively, high-preference investors would like to buy while low-preference
ones to sell. Correspondingly, we denote At the ask price at which high-type investors
buy from market-makers, Bt the bid price at which low-type investors sell to market-
makers in normal time. Moreover, we denote P fire-purchaset the price at which low-type
10Weill (2007) and Lagos, Rocheteau and Weill (2011) extend DGP (2005) and Lagos and Ro-
cheteau (2009) by considering the possibility of inventory by dealers.
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investors buy from market-makers due to fire purchase and P fire-salet the price at which
high-type investors sell to market-makers due to the shock of fire sale.11 Then the
value function of a investor-{i(t), nt,Wt} is formulated as below.
V (i(t), nt,Wt) = sup
C,n
Et
ˆ ∞
0
e−rτdCt+τ
subject to
dWt = rWtdt− dCt + nt(x− δ1{i(t)=L})dt− P˜tdnt
where Et denotes Ft-conditional expectation, Ct is a cumulative process on con-
sumption, nt ∈ N is a feasible process on asset holdings, ξn is the type process
induced by n, and at the time t of a trading event, P˜t ∈ {At, Bt, P fire-salet , P fire-purchaset }
is the trade price, which depends on the type of counterparty. There are triple state
variables {i, n,W}. For notational ease, we use Vi(n,W ) for V (i, n,W ) throughout
the rest of the paper. Then we obtain the following value functions in steady state.12
rVL(n,W ) = n · xL + nλ−L · [VL(n− 1,W +B)− VL(n,W )] + nλ+L · [VL(n+ 1,W − P fire−purchase)− VL(n,W )]
+λu · [VH(n,W )− VL(n,W )] + ∂VL(n,W )
∂W
· rW
rVH(n,W ) = n · xH + nλ+H · [VH(n+ 1,W −A)− VH(n,W )] + nλ−H · [VH(n− 1,W + P fire−sale)− VH(n,W )]
−λd · [VH(n,W )− VL(n,W )] +
∂VH(n,W )
∂W
· rW
First of all, when low-preference and high-preference investors have the oppor-
tunity to be matched with dealers to sell and buy their asset, it is a mutually
beneficially process. Following the standard way in search literature, we use Nash
bargaining to split trading surplus between both parties. In particular, assume bar-
gaining power of market-makers and investors is z ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − z respectively.
Denote M as the price prevalent in the inter-dealer market. Then bid-price B and
ask-price A are determined as below.
B(n,W ) ∈ argmax
B≥0
[VL(n− 1,W +B)− VL(n,W )]1−z[M −B]z
A(n,W ) ∈ argmax
A≥0
[VH(n+ 1,W −A)− VH(n,W )]1−z[A−M ]z
11See Coval and Stafford (2007) for empirical document on fire-sale and fire-purchase.
12See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) or the appendix of DGP (2005), among others, for the deriving
strategies on value functions with continuous-time setup.
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Secondly, investors suffer loss when the negative shocks, i.e., shocks on fire-sale or
fire-purchase, knocks the door. There are multiple ways to determine P fire−purchase
and P fire−sale. For the ease of expression and calculation, we simply assume that
dealers makes zero profit and investors incur loss when they are matched in the
presence of negative shock.13 That is,
P fire-purchaset = P
fire-sale = M.
Finally, assume asset price in the inter-dealer market is determined by
M ∈ argmax
M′≥0
{
∞∑
n=1
[VL(n−1,W+B)−VL(n,W )+M−B]·µnL} ·{
∞∑
n=1
[VH(n+1,W−A)−VH(n,W )+A−M ]·dµnH}1−,
where µni denotes the measure of type-i agents with n units of assets at time t,
i ∈ {L,H}, n ∈ N while  denotes the bargaining power of buyer-side.
To make it tractable for us to obtain analytic results on the size distribution of
asset holding, we make the following restrictions on {λ+L , λ−L , λ+H , λ−H}.
Assumption 4. θ ≡ λ
+
L
λ−L
=
λ+H
λ−H
∈ (0, 1)
Moreover, we make the following assumption as a sufficient condition to make
Proposition 1 hold.
Assumption 5. 0 < z < 1− θ.
Proposition 9. (Value Function and Bid-Ask Spread)
1. For investors with preference-type i ∈ {L,H}, n units of financial assets and
W units of liquid assets, the value function is the following form.
Vi(n,W ) = vi · n+W,
13We can check that other forms of specification would not change the results qualitatively. For
example, we could set P fire−purchase = vH and P fire−sale = vL, in which dealers make positive
profits while investors suffer more.
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where
vH − vL = xH − xL
r + λu + λd + (1− )[λ−H − λ+H(1− z)] + [λ−L (1− z)− λ+L ]
> 0
vL =
xL
r
+ {[λ−L (1− z)− λ+L ] + λu} ·
vH − vL
r
∈ (xL
r
, vH)
vH =
xH
r
− {(1− )[λ−H − λ+H(1− z)] + λd} ·
vH − vL
r
∈ (vL, xH
r
)
2. The bid and ask prices, the spread and asset price of the inter-dealer market
are obtained as below.
B(n,W ) = vL + (1− z)(vH − vL) ∈ (vL, A)
A(n,W ) = vH − (1− z)(1− )(vH − vL) ∈ (B, vH)
Spread ≡ A−B = z · (vH − vL)
M = vL + (1− )vH ∈ (A,B)
Two pieces of comments are made here. First of all, according to Proposition 1,
even though there is no information asymmetry as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
the bid-ask spread still emerges in the presence of search frictions (λ+L , λ
−
L , λ
+
H , λ
−
H <
∞), heterogeneity in preference types (xH 6= xL) and positive bargaining power of
dealers (z > 0). Secondly, notice that similar analytic results are also obtained in
DGP (2005). Thus another key message of this proposition is that, even removing
the restriction on asset holdings, we could still have very neat and intuitive results
for the effects of search friction on bid-ask spreads.
3.3.2 Free Entry of New Investors into Financial Markets
The market participants makes the following decision on entering financial markets.
On one hand, if they does not participate in the market, then given their real money
balance m˜, the value function in steady state is characterized by
rUNOT (W˜ ) =
∂UNOT (W˜ )
∂W˜
rW˜ .
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On the other hand, if they choose to enter the market, then
rU iIN (W˜ ) = −κiηi + ηi[Vi(1, W˜ )− U iIN (W˜ )] +
∂U iIN (W˜ )
∂W˜
rW˜ for i ∈ {L,H}
In equilibrium, we have UNOT (W˜ ) = UHIN (W˜ ) = U
L
IN (W˜ ) for any W˜ ∈ R. Thus
κi = Vi(1, W˜ ) − U iIN (W˜ ) for i ∈ {L,H}. The entry rate {ηL, ηH} is not pinned down
here. Instead, it would be determined using other conditions to be shown in the
next sub-section.
3.3.3 Distribution of Asset Holding in Steady State
Denote µni (t) as the measure of type-i agents with n units of assets at time t, where
i ∈ {L,H}, n ∈ N and t ∈ R+. Denote µentryi (t) as the measure of investors newly
entering the financial markets at t. For simplicity, each new-entry investor starts
with one unit of asset.
Corresponding to Figure 3.2, the dynamics on µni (t) is formulated as below.
dµnL(t)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−L · µn+1L (t)− n(λ−L + λ+L ) · µnL(t) + (n− 1)λ+L · µn−1L (t)
+λd · µnH(t)− λu · µnL(t) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−L · µn+1L (t)− n(λ−L + λ+L ) · µnL(t)
+λd · µnH(t)− λu · µnL(t) + µentryL (t) · ηL(t) when n = 1
dµnH(t)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−H · µn+1H (t)− n(λ+H + λ−H) · µnH(t) + (n− 1)λ+H · µn−1H (t)
−λd · µnH(t) + λu · µnL(t) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−H · µn+1H (t)− n(λ+H + λ−H) · µnH(t)
−λd · µnH(t) + λu · µnL(t) + µentryH (t) · ηH(t) when n = 1
Taking dµnL(t)/dt with n ≥ 2 for example, the first and the third items denote
the inflow from investors with the same preference type while the second one the
outflow to investors with the same preference type. Meanwhile, the fourth and the
fifth items are the inflow and outflow due to preference shocks.
The stability of the dynamic system requires outflow be equal to inflow, i.e., for
i ∈ {L,H} and t ∈ R+,
µentryi (t)ηi(t) = λ
−
i µ
1
i (t).
Then the total measure of sellers and buyers are constant over time. That is, the
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total population µ(t) ≡ µL(t) + µH(t) ≡
∑+∞
n=1 µ
n
L(t) +
∑+∞
n=1 µ
n
H(t) is constant, which
is to be determined. WLOG, we normalize such that µentryL (t) = µ
entry
H (t) = 1 for all
t ∈ R+.
Additionally, the market clearing condition is formulated as below.
+∞∑
n=1
λ−Lnµ
n
L(t) +
+∞∑
n=1
λ−Hnµ
n
H(t) =
+∞∑
n=1
λ+Hnµ
n
H(t) +
+∞∑
n=1
λ+Lnµ
n
L(t) +
∑
i∈{L,H}
µentryi (t)ηi(t) (3.1)
+∞∑
n=1
nµnL(t) +
+∞∑
n=1
nµnH(t) = s (3.2)
where s denotes the total amount of assets circulating in the economy. On one
hand, Eq. (3.1) states that, since dealers are assumed to never hold no inventory, the
amount of assets investors sell to dealers (left-hand side) must equal to that dealers
sell to investors (right-hand side). Eq. (3.2), on the other hand, requires that at
each point the aggregate demand of assets by investors in OTC must be equal to
the fixed supply.
In steady state, dµni (t)/dt = 0 for all i ∈ {L,H} and n ∈ N. In turn, we reach
Proposition 1.
Proposition 10. We formulate the distribution of asset holding in steady state as
well as the Gibrat’s law for asset holding as below.
1. (Stationary Size Distribution of Asset Holding) The size distribution
of asset holding conforms to a logarithmic distribution with parameter θ, i.e.,
µni =
µ1i · θn−1
n
for i ∈ {L,H} and n ∈ N.
where µ1L = s(1 − θ)piL, µ1H = (λuλd ) · µ1L = s(1 − θ)piH , piL ≡
λd
λu+λd
, piH ≡ λuλu+λd ,
and the total population of investors in the economy is
µ ≡
+∞∑
n=1
(µnL + µ
n
H) =
s(1− θ)
θ
· ln( 1
1− θ ).
Moreover, the endogenous entry rate is
ηL = λ
−
Lµ
1
L = s(1− θ)λ−LpiL.
ηH = λ
−
Hµ
1
H = s(1− θ)λ−HpiH
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2. (Gibrat’s Law) The average growth rate of asset holding is independent of
investor’s size while the volatility of growth rate decreases with the size of
asset holdings, i.e., for i ∈ {L,H}, we have
E
[
dni(t)/dt
ni(t)
]
= λ+i − λ−i
V ar
[
dni(t)/dt
ni(t)
]
=
λ+i + λ
−
i
ni(t)
Based on the proposition, for i ∈ {L,H} and n ∈ N, the probability distribution,
Mni ≡ µ
n
i
µ
, and the total probability,Mn ≡MnL +MnH , are immediately obtained as
below.
MnL =
piL · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
, MnH =
piH · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
, Mn = θ
n
n · ln( 11−θ )
for n ∈ N.
and the probability of both types is
ML ≡
+∞∑
n=1
MnL = piL, MH ≡
+∞∑
n=1
MnH = piH ,
We illustrate the (truncated) probability distribution of asset holding in Figure
3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The Size Distribution of Asset Holdings and Its Decomposition in
Steady State (parameter values: λu/λd = 2 and θ = 0.9.)
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3.4 Transition Dynamics
The previous section mainly focuses on the stationary distribution of asset holdings
in each cross section. This section advances to the analysis on non-stationary life-
cycle pattern of each cohort. Let pni (t;n0) denote the probability that certain investor
with i-type preference has n units of asset holdings at time t given that she has n0
units at time 0. In contrast to the dynamics on the aggregate size distribution of asset
holding in Section 3.3, by definition there is no new entry into each cohort. More
specifically, the associated dynamics associated with the (in-truncated) probability
of investors is formulated as below.
dpnL(t;n0)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−L · pn+1L (t;n0)− n(λ−L + λ+L ) · pnL(t;n0) + (n− 1)λ+L · pn−1L (t;n0)
+λd · pnH(t;n0)− λu · pnL(t;n0) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−L · pn+1L (t;n0)− n(λ−L + λ+L ) · pnL(t;n0) + λd · pnH(t;n0)− λu · pnL(t;n0) when n = 1
(n+ 1)λ−L · pn+1L (t;n0) when n = 0
dpnH(t;n0)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−H · pn+1H (t;n0)− n(λ+H + λ−H) · pnH(t;n0) + (n− 1)λ+H · pn−1H (t;n0)
−λdpnH(t;n0) + λu · pnL(t;n0) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−H · pn+1H (t;n0)− n(λ+H + λ−H) · pnH(t;n0)− λd · pnH(t;n0) + λu · pnL(t;n0) when n = 1
(n+ 1)λ−H · pn+1H (t;n0) when n = 0
and by definition we have
+∞∑
n=1
pnH(t;n0) +
+∞∑
n=0
pnL(t;n0) = 1.
Then we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 11. (Life Cycle of Asset Holding)
1. If we set the boundary conditions for both types as below.
p1L(0, n0 = 1) = piL ≡
λd
λu + λd
, p1H(0, n0 = 1) = piH ≡
λu
λu + λd
,
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then we have
p0L(t;n0 = 1) =
piLλ
−
L · [1− e−(λ
−
L−λ+L )t]
λ−L − λ+L · e−(λ
−
L−λ+L )t
=
piL · [1− e−(1−θ)λ−L t]
1− θ · e−(1−θ)λ−L t
p1L(t;n0 = 1) = [piL − p0L(t;n0 = 1)] · [1− σ(t)]
pnL(t;n0 = 1) = p
n−1
L (t;n0 = 1) · σ(t) for n ∈ N \ {1}
pnH(t;n0 = 1) = (
λu
λd
) · pnL(t;n0 = 1) for n ∈ N ∪ {0}
pn(t;n0 = 1) ≡ pnH(t;n0 = 1) + pnL(t;n0 = 1) =
pnL(t;n0 = 1)
piL
for n ∈ N
where σ(t) ≡ (λ
+
L
λ−L
) · p0L(t;n0 = 1) = piL·θ·[1−e
−(1−θ)λ−
L
t
]
1−θ·e−(1−θ)λ
−
L
t
. Furthermore, at time
t, conditioning on still staying in OTC, the (truncated) size distribution of
investors with preference type i from the zero-cohort conforms to a geometric
distribution as below.
pni (t;n0 = 1)
1− p0i (t;n0 = 1)
= [1− σ(t)]σ(t)n−1, for n ∈ N.
and thus it also holds for the aggregate level pn(t;n0 = 1).
2. If we remove the restriction on the boundary condition for investors with either
preference, but instead assume that λ−L = λ
−
H ≡ λ− and λ+L = λ+H ≡ λ+ = θλ−,
and p1(0, n0 = 1) = 1, then pn(t;n0 = 1), the life-cycle evolution of both type,
is formulated as below.
p0(t;n0 = 1) =
λ− · [1− e−(λ−−λ+)t]
λ− − λ+ · e−(λ−−λ+)t =
[1− e−(1−θ)λ−t]
1− θ · e−(1−θ)λ−t
p1(t;n0 = 1) = [1− p0(t;n0 = 1)] · [1− σ(t)]
pn(t;n0 = 1) = p
n−1(t;n0 = 1) · σ(t) for n ∈ N \ {1},
where now σ(t) in this case is adjusted to σ(t) ≡ (λ+
λ− )·p0(t;n0 = 1) = θ[1−e
−(1−θ)λ−t]
1−θ·e−(1−θ)λ−t .
Moreover, the (truncated) size distribution of investors with n units of asset
holding from the zero-cohort has a geometric distribution as in the first case.
The key differences between these two results lie in their assumption. In the first
case, we have strong assumption on the initial condition for both types of investors,
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and obtain the life-cycle pattern of asset holding for not only the aggregate level,
but also for each type. In contrast, the second case relaxes the above restriction but
instead only imposes assumption on the aggregate level. Then the analytic results
still applies to the aggregate level, but the dynamics for either types of investors are
typically unavailable.
Based on either case in the above proposition, we use Figure 3.4 to present the
transitional dynamics of asset holdings by investors in the same cohort at t = 0.
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Figure 3.4: Transitional Dynamics of Asset Holdings by Investors of Each Co-
hort
Moreover, notice that ηHηH+ηL =
(
λ
−
H
λ
−
L
)·(λuλd )
(
λ
−
H
λ
−
L
)·(λuλd )+1
. If we additionally assume λ−H = λ
−
L ,
then ηH
ηH+ηL
= piH and thus the above transitional dynamics within one cohort also
characterize the evolution of new entrants in the same cohort. [More comments here:
to be completed.]
Finally, the above proposition immediately helps to reach the following result.
Corollary 12. (Expected Length of Trading in OTC)
E(Ti) =
ln(
λ−i
λ−i −λ+i
)
λ+i
=
ln( 11−θ )
λ+i
.
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Intuitively, when θ = λ
+
λ− ∈ (0, 1) decreases, on average it takes less time for
investors to sell out all of their assets and then exit the financial markets.
3.4.1 Preference Shock
With the same notations as before, we use Mni (t) to denote the proportion of in-
vestors with preference type i ∈ {L,H} and holding n units of assets at time t.
Then dynamics on Mni (t) is characterized as below.
dMnL(t)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−L · Mn+1L (t)− n(λ−L + λ+L ) · MnL(t) + (n− 1)λ+L · Mn−1L (t)
+λd · MnH(t)− λu · MnL(t) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−L · Mn+1L (t)− nλ+L · MnL(t) + λd · MnH(t)− λu · MnL(t) when n = 1
dMnH(t)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−H · Mn+1H (t)− n(λ+H + λ−H) · MnH(t) + (n− 1)λ+H · Mn−1H (t)
−λd · MnH(t) + λu · MnL(t) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−H · Mn+1H (t)− nλ+H · MnH(t)− λd · MnH(t) + λu · MnL(t) when n = 1
Then we get to the following explicit solution on the transitional dynamics due
to preference shock.
Proposition 12. (Dynamics by Preference Shock) Assume that we’ve been in
the position of steady state by t = 0−, i.e.,
MnL(t) =
piL · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
, MnH(t) =
piH · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
for n ∈ N.
Then, suddenly the proportion of low-preference investors increases, i.e.,ML(t) ≡∑+∞
n=1MnL(t)(t) goes up fromML(0−) = piL to anyML(0) ∈ (piL, 1]. Then the dynam-
ics of {Mni (t)}t∈R++i∈{L,H},n∈N is characterized as follows.
MnL(t) =
ML(t) · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
, MnH(t) =
MH(t) · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
for n ∈ Nand t ∈ R++,
where
ML(t) ≡ [1− e−(λu+λd)t] · piL + e−(λu+λd)t · ML(0)
MH(t) ≡ [1− e−(λu+λd)t] · piH + e−(λu+λd)t · MH(0)
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As a result, {MnL(t)}t∈R++ decreases while {MnL(t)}t∈R++ increases over time with
lim
t→∞M
n
L(t) =MnL, lim
t→∞M
n
H(t) =MnL.
Figure 3.5 shows the transitional dynamics due to preference shock on asset
holdings.
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Figure 3.5: Transitional Dynamics of Asset Holdings Due to Preference Shock;
Parameter values are to be added.
The dynamics of {µni (t)}t∈R++i∈{L,H},n∈N is immediately obtained as below.
µni (t) =
Mni (t)
µ
for n ∈ Nand t ∈ R++
where µ ≡ s(1−θ)θ · ln( 11−θ ).
3.4.2 Redistributing Asset Holdings by Lessening Inequal-
ity
We are also in the position of dynamics system on {Mni (t)}t∈R++i∈{L,H},n∈N. In addition
to preference shock, another interesting departure from the stationary distribution
is about redistributing asset holdings. One example is formulated as below.
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Assume that we’ve been in the position of steady state by t = 0−, i.e.,
MnL =
piL · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
, MnH =
piH · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
for n ∈ N.
If we redistribute the asset holdings such that at t = 0, we have M1L(0) = piL
and M1H(0) = piH , i.e., there is no inequality on asset holdings within each group
i ∈ {L,H}. Then the dynamics of {Mni (t)}t∈R++i∈{L,H},n∈N is characterized as in the
following proposition.
Proposition 13. (Dynamics by Redistribution of Asset Holding) If all in-
vestors are endowed with only unit of assets, then the dynamics shown in Section
4.2 has the following solutions,
MnL(t) = piL · qn(t), MnH(t) = piH · qn(t) for n ∈ N,
where qn(t) is presented as below. {qn(t)}t∈R+n∈N adopts the solution as below.
qn(t) = qn +
+∞∑
m=1
Anme
−mλ+L t
= qn +
+∞∑
k=0
[
(−θλ−L t)k
k!
f(n, k)] for n∈ N and t ∈ R+
where qn ≡ θnn·ln( 1
1−θ )
, and f(n, k) ≡∑+∞m=1Anm ·mk satisfies the following recursive
conditions.
f(n, 0) =

1− qn when n = 1
−qn when n ∈ N \ {1}
f(n, k) =

−n+1θ f(n+ 1, k − 1) + nf(n, k − 1) when n = 1 and k ∈ N
−n+1θ f(n+ 1, k − 1) + nf(n, k − 1) +
∑n−1
j=1 f(j, k) when n ∈ N \ {1} and k ∈ N
Using the proposition equips us to reach that
lim
t→∞M
n
i (t) =Mni for all n ∈ N and i ∈ {L,H}.
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3.5 Asset Liquidity
In addition to bid-ask spread already characterized in Section 2, measurement of
asset liquidity also includes the trading volume, trading turnover and liquidity mis-
allocation.
3.5.1 Trading Volume and Turnover
By definition, the trading volume and the turnover of asset trading are given as
below respectively.
V(t) ≡
+∞∑
n=1
λ−Lnµ
n
L(t) +
+∞∑
n=1
λ−Hnµ
n
H(t)
T (t) ≡ V(t)
s
Then we reach the following corollary by Proposition 1.
Corollary 13. (Trading Volume and Turnover) Given any (µ1L(t), µ
1
H(t)), we
have
V(t) = [µ1L(t)λ−L + µ1H(t)λ−H ] · (
s
1− θ )
T (t) = µ
1
L(t)λ
−
L + µ
1
H(t)λ
−
H
1− θ
In turn, the steady state is formulated as
V = µ[λ−L
+∞∑
n=1
nMnL + λ−H
+∞∑
n=1
nMnH ] = s · (λ−LpiL + λ−HpiH)
T = V
s
= λ−LpiL + λ
−
HpiH .
Based on the corollary, we know that the trading volume is positively propor-
tional to s, the total amounts of assets. Besides, both trading volume and turnover
increases with {λ−L , λ−H}. The intuition is that, when λ−L , λ−H increases, more old
investors exit and more new investors enter the financial market.
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3.5.2 Liquidity Mis-allocation on Asset Holdings
Steady State
The measurement of asset mis-allocation is defined as below.
∆SS ≡
∑+∞
n=1[(xH − xL) · n · µnL]
xH · s = (
xH − xL
xH
) · ( λd
λu + λd
) =
∆x
xH
· piL.
where the numerator denotes the mis-allocation value of assets held by low-
preference investors, the denominator denotes the aggregate value of the assets in
the exchange economy.
Transitional Dynamics
First of all, if we are the position of Section 4.2, i.e., investors are subject to unex-
pected preference shock, then the rate of liquidity mis-allocation is
∆(t) ≡
∑+∞
n=1[(xH − xL) · n · µnL(t)]
xH · s =
∑+∞
n=1[(xH − xL) · n · µ · MnL(t)]
xH · s = (
xH − xL
xH
)·ML(t),
where ML(t) ≡ [1− e−(λu+λd)t] · piL + e−(λu+λd)t · ML(0). Then we have lim
t→∞∆(t) =
∆SS ≡ (xH−xLxH ) · piL.
Secondly, if investors suffer the shock on redistribution of asset holding, as illus-
trated in Section 4.3, then the rate of liquidity mis-allocation is
∆(t) ≡
∑+∞
n=1[(xH − xL) · n · µnL(t)]
xH · s =
∑+∞
n=1[(xH − xL) · n · µ · MnL(t)]
xH · s ,
whereMnL(t) = piL ·qn(t) and qn(t) is characterized in Section 4.3. Again, we have
lim
t→∞∆(t) = ∆
SS ≡ (xH−xLxH ) · piL.
3.6 Model Extension
This section is devoted to several pieces of extension for the benchmark developed so
far. First of all, motivated by Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), we endogenize investor’s
search intensity. Secondly, we switch from the high-or-low preference to a general
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case. Finally, we take into account the endogenous entry decision by market-makers
into OTC.
3.6.1 Endogenous Search Intensity
In the spirit of DGP (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), we use this part
to endogenize investor’s search intensity in a tractable way. More specifically, we
assume both types of investors have access to a search technology such that the
trading intensity is modified from {λ−i , λ+i } to {γ−i ≡ λ−i Ωi(ei, n), γ+i ≡ λ+i Ωi(ei, n)}
where ei ∈ R+denotes the effort of investor with type-i preference. We assume the
coefficient of endogenous search intensity, Ω(e, n), has the following property: i)
Ω strictly increases with (e, n) and is homogeneous of degree one with respect to
(e, n), ii) Ω is strictly concave in e, and iii) Ω(0, n) = 1 . Then the value functions
of Section 3.1 is adjusted as below.
rVL(n,W ) = max {
eL∈R+
n · xL − eL + nγ−L · [VL(n− 1,W +B)− VL(n,W )]
+nγ+L · [VL(n+ 1,W − P fp)− VL(n,W )]
+λu · [VH(n,W )− VL(n,W )] + ∂VH(n,W )
∂W
· rW}
rVH(n,W ) = max {
eH∈R+
n · xH − eH + nγ+H · [VH(n+ 1,W −A)− VH(n,W )]
+nγ−H · [VH(n− 1,W + P fs)− VH(n,W )]
−λd · [VH(n,W )− VL(n,W )] + ∂VH(n,W )
∂W
· rW}
where the bid and ask prices as well as those of fire-sale and fire-purchase are
determined in a similar way as in Section 3.1. The we characterize the endogenous
search intensity in the following corollary.
Corollary 14. (Endogenous Choice of Search Intensity) For i ∈ {L,H}, there
exists vi ∈ R+ and σi ≥ 1 such that Vi(n,W ) = n · vi +W , γ
−
i
n·λ−i
=
γ+i
n·λ+i
= σi, where
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{vi, σi}i∈{L,H} are jointly characterized as below.
rvL = xL − hL(σL) + σL · [λ−L (1− z)− λ+L ](1− )(vH − vL)}+ λu(vH − vL)
rvH = xH − hH(σH)− σH · [λ−L − λ+L (1− z)](vH − vL)} − λd(vH − vL)
h′L(σL) = [λ
−
L (1− z)− λ+L ](1− )(vH − vL)
σH = 1
where hi(·) ≡ ω−1i (·) and ω(·) ≡ Ω(·, 1).
Based on the corollary, the equilibrium matching frequency {γ−i , γ+i }i∈{L,H} are
obtained in turn. Then we could easily rewrite the whole story of Sections 3 and 4.
3.6.2 General Types on Preference
For the ease of illustration, we follow DGP (2005) to consider only two types of
preference over the same assets: high and low. Motivated by Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009), we extend our baseline model by allowing for general types of preference.
More specifically, we now assume investors could have I ∈ N types of preference. For
investors with preference-type i, her valuation on one unit of asset is denoted as xi.
Investors may subject to preference shock with Poisson rate δ > 0. Conditioning on
a preference shock, investors, currently with preference i, will switch to preference
j with probability piij > 0. For simplicity, we assume the preference shock are iid
distributed across investors and over time. Thus we use pij to denote piij for all
i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, · · · , I}.14 By definition, we always have ∑Ii=1 pii = 1. Without loss of
generality, we assume {xi}i∈I is an increasing sequence.
Based on the above setup, given the idiosyncratic state variables (i, n,W ), the
corresponding value function is correspondingly adjusted as below.
rVi(n,W ) = n · xi + nλ−i · [Vi(n− 1,W +Bi)− Vi(n,W )] + nλ+i · [Vi(n+ 1,W −Ai)− Vi(n,W )]
+δ ·
I∑
j=1
pij [Vj(n,W )− Vi(n,W )] + ∂Vi(n,W )
∂W
· rW
14In the baseline model with two types of preference, δ = λu+λd, piL =
λd
λu+λd
, and piH =
λu
λu+λd
.
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In the spirit of Proposition 1, we guess it always holds with general types of
preference that Vi(n,W ) = n · vi + W with {vi}i∈I being an increasing sequence,
all of which would be verified later. Moreover, there exists a unique i∗ ∈ I such
that vi∗ ≤ M < vi∗+1. Define the low-preference and high-preference subgroups
respectively as IL = {1, · · · , i∗}, IH = {i∗ + 1, · · · , I} such that IL ∩ IH = ∅ and
IL ∪ IH = I. Then we know that investors with preference i ∈ IL are eager to sell.
That is, λ−i and λ
+
i denote positive and negative shocks respectively. The scenario
is just opposite for investors with preference i ∈ IL. Then the bid and ask prices are
determined as below.
Ai(n,W ) = argmax
A≥0
[Vi(n+ 1,W −A)− Vi(n,W )]1−z[A−M ]z for i ∈ IH
Bj(n,W ) = argmax
B≥0
[Vj(n− 1,W +B)− Vj(n,W )]1−z[M −B]z for j ∈ IL.
Besides, the prices of fire-sale and fire-purchase are given as follows.
P fire−salei = P
fire−purchase
j = M for i ∈ IH and j ∈ IL.
Moreover, as in the baseline model, we pin down the price in the inter-dealer
market, M , in the following way.
M ∈ argmax
M′≥0
{
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈IL
[Vj(n−1,W+B)−Vj(n,W )+M−B]·µnj }·{
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈IH
[Vi(n+1,W−A)−Vi(n,W )+A−M ]·dµni }1−,
Finally, by modifying Assumption 1, we make the following assumption in this
section for general types of preference.
Assumption 6. λ+i = λ
+
j ≡ λ+, λ+i = λ+j ≡ λ+ = θ ·λ−, for all i, j ∈ I, where θ ∈ (0, 1)
is close enough to 1.
Using the proof strategy of Proposition 1 immediately reaches the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 15. (Value Function and Bid-Ask Prices) Under Assumption 3,
1. For investors with preference-type i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, · · · , I}, n units of financial
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assets and W units of liquid assets, the value function is the following form.
Vi(n,W ) = vi · n+W,
where, given (M, i∗), {vi}i∈I is determined as below.
vi =
yi + δ · v
r + δ + κi
,
and,
κi ≡

(1− z)λ− − λ+ if i ∈ IL
λ− − (1− z)λ+ if i ∈ IH
yj ≡ xj + κj ·M
v ≡
∑
j∈I
pijvj =
∑
j∈I(
pijyj
r+δ+κj
)
1− δ ·∑j∈I( pijr+δ+κj )
i∗ = arg{i′ ∈ I : vi′ ≤M < vi′+1}
2. {vi}i∈I is an increasing sequence.
3. (M, i∗) are jointly determined the following restrictions
M =  · ( y1 + δ · v
r + δ + κ1
) + (1− ) · ( yI + δ · v
r + δ + κI
)
i∗ = arg{i′ ∈ I : yi′ + δ · v
r + δ + κi′
≤M < yi′+1 + δ · v
r + δ = κi′+1
}
4. The bid and ask prices are formulated as below.
Bi(n,W ) = Bi ≡ (1− z)M + zvi for i ∈ IL
Aj(n,W ) = Aj ≡ (1− z)M + zvj for j ∈ IH
We close this part by solving the distribution of asset holdings with general types
of preference. For all preference i ∈ I, the dynamics of µni (t) is formulated as below.
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dµni (t)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ−i · µn+1i (t)− n(λ−i + λ+i ) · µni (t) + (n− 1)λ+i · µn−1i (t)
+δ · pii
∑
j 6=i µ
n
j (t)− δ(1− pii) · µni (t) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ−i · µn+1i (t)− n(λ−i + λ+i ) · µni (t) + µentryi (t) · ηi(t)
δ · pii
∑
j 6=i µ
n
j (t)− δ(1− pii) · µni (t) when n = 1
Taking the scenario with n ≥ 2 for example. Comparing with the dynamics in
the case with two types of preference, there is nothing new with the first three items.
They are the inflow and outflow of investors with the same preference types. The
fourth item denotes the inflow because of the preference shock from other types of
investors with the same units of asset holding. The fifth item is the outflow due to
the preference shock to the current investor. In steady, dµni (t)/dt = 0 for all i ∈ I
and n ∈ N. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 16. (Stationary Size Distribution of Asset Holdings) For all
(i, n) ∈ I× N, we have
Mni ≡
µni∑
i∈I
∑
n∈N µ
n
i
=
pii · θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
,
and thus
Mn =
∑
i∈I
Mni =
θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
Mi =
∑
n∈N
Mni = pii
Similar to the results of Proposition 2, the size distribution of asset holdings is
still analytically tractable even with general types of preference. Meanwhile, we still
preserve the pattern of logarithmic distribution even though restriction on {0, 1}-
asset holding is removed.
3.6.3 Free Entry of Market-makers
We could endogenize the trading frequency as what Lagos and Rocheteau (2009)
does. Denote κ > 0 as the fixed cost to become a dealer in OTC. Denote λ+i · ϕ(·)
and λ−i · ϕ(·) as the matching intensity in OTC. Then the free entry condition of
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dealers in either the seller or buyer side is written as below, which in turn pins down
{µdB, µdS}.
∞∑
n=1
MnL ·
nλ−Lϕ(µ
d
S)
µdS
(M −B) = κ =
∞∑
n=1
MnH ·
nλ+Hϕ(µ
d
B)
µdB
(A−M)
where Mni = piiθ
n−1
n·ln( 1
1−θ ))
, i ∈ {L,H}. Moreover, based on Proposition 1, {M −
B,A−M} are accordingly adjusted as below.
M −B = (1− )(vH − vL)
A−M = (vH − vL)
and
vH−vL = xH − xL
r + λu + λd + {(1− )[λ−H · ϕ(µdS)− λ+H(1− z) · ϕ(µdB)] + [λ−L (1− z) · ϕ(µdS)− λ+L · ϕ(µdB)]}
.
Then {µdB, µdS} can be easily pinned down and in turn we can recover the en-
dogenous trading intensity.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper uses the birth-and-death process in the literature of firm dynamics to
analytically characterize the non-stationary life-cycle asset trading in OTC, which
involves in search frictions and bargaining. Although the indivisibility restriction on
asset holding in DGP (2005) is removed, we still manage to obtain explicit solutions
on the value functions, bid and ask prices and the size distribution of asset holding
in both steady state and transitional dynamics. The mis-allocation rate of asset
liquidity is shown to be related to the speed of preference shock as well as to that
of trading intensity. Moreover, we fully characterize the life-cycle pattern of asset
holding by each cohort of investors.
Our model has several pieces of testable implications. First of all, the stationary
size distribution of asset holding follows a logarithmic pattern. Secondly, the life
cycle of asset holding by each cohort conforms to a geometric distribution while the
size distribution of asset holding in each cross-section follows a logarithmic pattern.
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Thirdly, the average growth rate of asset holding is irrelevant to the size of current
asset holdings. Meanwhile, the volatility of growth rate of asset holding decreases
with the size of current asset holdings. That is, we reach the results on Gibrat’s law
on asset trading in OTC.
Throughout this paper we mainly focus on the implication of search frictions for
life cycle as well as the size distribution of asset holdings. Thus we have deliberately
assumed away information frictions from the context. However, OTC is sometimes
called opaque market.15 It is not only due to search frictions and bargaining, but
also because of information frictions. Therefore it could fruitful to introduce into
the model adverse selection on asset quality or information asymmetry on investor’s
private evaluation of the same assets. Additionally, the framework developed in
our paper produces several pieces of testable implications. Empirical tests on these
predictions could be put in our research agenda in the near future.
3.8 Appendix : Omitted Proofs in the Context
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Conjecture that, there exits pairwise values (vL, vH) such that, for i = L,H, we
have
Vi(n,W ) = vi · n+W.
In turn, given (M, vL, vH), the bid price(s) B(n,W ) could be simplified as below.
B(n,W ) = argmax[VL(n− 1,W +B)− VL(n,W )]1−z[M −B]z
= argmax[B − vL]1−z[M −B]z
= zvL + (1− z)M.
Similarly, the ask prices A(n,W ) could be solved as
A(n,W ) = zvH + (1− z)M.
15See Zhu (2012) among others for the discussion on opaqueness of OTC.
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As a result, we have
Spread = B −A = z(vH − vL)
Using the conjecture that Vi(n,W ) = vi · n + W again for the formula on how to
determine M , the inter-dealer market price, and then we have
M = v1 + (1− )vH .
Substituting the above formula on M into B(n,W ) and A(n,W ) yields that
B = vL + (1− z)(vH − vL)
A = vH − (1− z)(1− )(vH − vL)
Substituting all of the above-mentioned results into the original value functions for
investors with preference L and H yields the following simultaneous equations.
rvL = xL + λ
−
L (1− z)(vH − vL)− λ+L (M − vL) + λu(vH − vL)
rvH = xH + λ
+
H(1− z)(1− )(vH − vL)− λ−H(vH −M)− λd(vH − vL)
Taking difference between the above two equations yields
{r + λu + λd + (1− )[λ−H − λ+H(1− z)] + [λ−L (1− z)− λ+L ]}(vH − vL) = xH − xL
and thus
vH − vL = xH − xL
r + λu + λd + (1− )[λ−H − λ+H(1− z)] + [λ−L (1− z)− λ+L ]
.
Using Assumption 2 immediately implies that vH−vL > 0. Moreover, substituting the
above results into either of the simultaneous equations could recover vH and vL. Finally,
using Assumptions 1 and 2 together suggests that vH <
xH
r and vL >
xL
r .
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For the first part.
We have dµni (t)/dt = 0 in steady state and thus all time scripts are removed. Then
the dynamic system in Section 3.3 is simplified as below.
λd · µnH = λu · µnL,
and for i ∈ {L,H}, we have
(n+ 1)λ−i µ
n+1
i − n(λ−i + λ+i )µni + (n− 1)λ+i µn−1i = 0 for n ∈ N/{1}
(n+ 1)λ−i µ
n+1
i − n(λ−i + λ+i )µni + µentryi ηL = 0 for n = 1
As a result, we have
(n+ 1)λ−i µ
n+1
i = nλ
+
i µ
n
i for n ∈ N/{1}
λ−i µ
n
i = µ
entry
i ηL for n = 1
Thus we have
µni =
µ1i θ
n−1
n
(#).
Using Assumption 1 simplifies Eq. (3.1) as
(1− θ)λ−L
+∞∑
n=1
nµnL(t) + (1− θ)λ−H
+∞∑
n=1
nµnH(t) =
∑
i∈{L,H}
ηi(t)
Additionally, combining Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2) suggests that
+∞∑
n=1
nµnL(t) =
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)− s(1− θ)λ−H
(1− θ)(λ−L − λ−H)
+∞∑
n=1
nµnH(t) =
s(1− θ)λ−L −
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
(1− θ)(λ−L − λ−H)
To make sure the above two equations well-defined, we must have s ∈ (
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
(1−θ)λ−L
,
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
(1−θ)λ−H
)
hold in equilibrium. We use guess-and-verify to show that the above internal restrictions
is always held in equilibrium.
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Substituting (#) into the above equations yields
µ1L = s(1− θ)piL, and µ1H = s(1− θ)piH ,
where piL ≡ λdλu+λd and piH = 1−piL. In turn, the total measure of asset holders in the
economy is
µ ≡
+∞∑
n=1
(µnL + µ
n
H) = (1 +
λu
λd
) · µ1L ·
+∞∑
n=1
(
θn−1
n
) =
s(1− θ)
θ
· ln( 1
1− θ )
Moreover, since we normalize that µentryL = µ
entry
H = 1, the endogenous entry rate is
pinned down as below.
ηL = λ
−
Lµ
1
L = s(1− θ)λ−LpiL.
ηH = λ
−
Hµ
1
H = s(1− θ)λ−HpiH
Finally, we could check that s ∈ (
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
(1−θ)λ−L
,
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
(1−θ)λ−H
) is satisfied indeed.
For the second part.
According to the dynamic system in Section 3.3,
ni(t+ ε) =

ni(t) + 1 w.p. λ
+
i ni(t)ε
ni(t)− 1 w.p. λ−i ni(t)ε
ni(t) o.w.
As result, we have
E[
dni(t)/dt
ni(t)
] = lim
ε→0
E[ni(t+ ε)− ni(t)]
ε · ni(t) = λ
+
i − λ−i
Similarly, we have
V ar[
dni(t)/dt
ni(t)
] =
λ+i + λ
−
i
ni(t)
.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The first case:
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Given our initial conditions, we guess that in the dynamic transition path, we always
have
pnH(t;n0 = 1) = (
λu
λd
) · pnL(t;n0 = 1) for n ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Since it is always held that
∞∑
n=0
pnH(t;n0 = 1) +
∞∑
n=0
pnL(t;n0 = 1) = 1.
Combining the above two conditions suggests that
∞∑
n=0
pnL(t;n0 = 1) =
λd
λu + λd
= piL.
Now, suggested by Klette and Kortum (2004), we define probability-generating func-
tion as below.
GL(α, t) =
∞∑
n=0
pnL(t) · αn.
Then we have
∂GL(α, t)
∂α
=
∞∑
n=1
n · pnL(t) · αn−1
∂GL(α, t)
∂t
=
dp0L(t)
dt
+
∞∑
n=1
dpnL(t)
dt
· αn
Combining the above two equations with the dynamic system in Section 4.1 suggests
that GL(α, t) satisfies the following partial-differential equation (PDE).
∂GL(α, t)
∂t
= [λ+L · α2 − (λ−L + λ+L ) · α+ λ−L ] ·
∂GL(α, t)
∂α
.
Following Narendra and Richter-Dyn (1974), we set up the initial condition as in
Proposition 3. By definition of GL(α, t), we have
GL(α, 0;n0) =
∞∑
n=0
pnL(t;n0) · αn = piL · αn.
Combining this initial condition with the above PDE produces the analytic solution
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on GL(α, t) as below.
GL(α, t;n0) =
∞∑
n=0
pnL(t;n0) · αn = [
λ−L (α− 1)e−(λ
−
L−λ+L )t − (λ+Lα− λ−L )
λ+L (α− 1)e−(λ
−
L−λ+L )t − (λ+Lα− λ−L )
]n0 .
Then, the Taylor series expansion of GL(α, t;n0) around α = 0 yields pnL(t;n0) as below.
pnL(t;n0) =
1
n!
∂nGL(α, t;n0)
∂αn
|α=0, for n ∈ N
p0L(t;n0) = GL(0, t;n0)
In particular, when n0 = 1, we reach the results on {pnL(t;n0)}n∈N∪{0} in Proposition 3.
As a result, {pnH(t;n0)}n∈N∪{0} is by recovered by revoking the relationship of pnH(t;n0 =
1) = (λuλd ) · pnL(t;n0 = 1) for all n ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Finally, at time t, conditioning on still staying in OTC, the (truncated) size distri-
bution of investors with preference type i from the zero-cohort conforms to a geometric
distribution as below.
pnL(t;n0 = 1)
1− p0L(t;n0 = 1)
= [1− σ(t)]σ(t)n−1, for i ∈ {L,H} and n ∈ N.
The second case:
Since λ−L = λ
−
H = λ
− and λ+L = λ
+
H = λ
+, combining the dynamics of pnL(t;n0) and
pnH(t;n0) yields the dynamics for p
n(t;n0) = p
n
L(t;n0) + p
n
H(t;n0) as below.
dpn(t;n0)/dt =

(n+ 1)λ− · pn+1(t;n0)− n(λ− + λ+) · pn(t;n0) + (n− 1)λ+ · pn−1(t;n0) whenn ∈ N \ {1}
(n+ 1)λ− · pn+1(t;n0)− n(λ− + λ+) · pn(t;n0) when n = 1
(n+ 1)λ− · pn+1(t;n0) when n = 0
Then we can solve pn(t;n0) by resorting to the procedure proposed in the first case for
solving pnL(t;n0).
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Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Given the initial asset holding as n0 = 1, define FL(t, n0) as the CDF of investors
with preference type L exiting OTC before time t. Then we have
E[TL] =
ˆ +∞
0
t · dFL(t;n0) =
ˆ +∞
0
[1− FL(t;n0)]dt,
where the second equation is obtained by using integration by parts.
Notice that FL(t;n0) = p
0
L(t;n0)/
∑∞
n=0 p
n
L(t;n0) due to law of large numbers. Using
the analytic results of p0L(t;n0) in Proposition 3 yields
E[TL] =
ˆ +∞
0
[p0L(t;n0 = 1)/
∞∑
n=0
pnL(t;n0)]dt =
ln(
λ−L
λ−L−λ+L
)
λ+L
.
We can then get E[TH ] in a similar way. Finally, since
λ+L
λ−L
=
λ+H
λ−H
= θ, we can also
express E[Ti] in terms of θ.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Given the initial condition, we guess that, for all (t, n) ∈ R+×N, dynamic system
in Section 4.2 is simplified as below.
dMnL(t)/dt = λd · MnH(t)− λu · MnL(t)
dMnH(t)/dt = −λd · MnH(t) + λu · MnL(t)
and
(n+ 1)λ−i · Mn+1i (t)− n(λ−i + λ+i ) · Mni (t) + (n− 1)λ+i · Mn−1i (t) = 0 whenn ∈ N \ {1} (A1)
(n+ 1)λ−i · Mn+1i (t)− nλ+i · MnL(t) = 0 whenn = 1 (A2)
Denote Mi(t) =
∑∞
n=1Mni (t). Then the above simplified dynamic system implies
dML(t)/dt = λd · MH(t)− λu · ML(t)
dMH(t)/dt = −λd · MH(t) + λu · ML(t)
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Combining the above two equations yields that
dML(t)/dt+ dMH(t)/dt = 0,
and thus MH(t) = 1−ML(t). In turn, we have
dML(t)/dt = λd · [1−ML(t)]− λu · ML(t) = λd − (λu + λd) · ML(t)
Then the ordinary differential equation (ODE) onML(t) admits the solution as below.
ML(t) ≡ [1− e−(λu+λd)t] · piL + e−(λu+λd)t · ML(0),
and in turn,
MH(t) = 1−ML(t) = [1− e−(λu+λd)t] · piH + e−(λu+λd)t · MH(0).
Finally, by using equations (A1) and (A2) and following the procedure of Proposition
1, we can obtain that
Mni (t)/Mi(t) =
θn
n · ln( 11−θ )
.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The dynamic system in Section 4.2 is essentially an infinite-dimensional linear
dynamic system. Given the initial condition, we follow Bryson and Ho (1975) to get the
solutions in the form shown in this proposition.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. First, by definition, the trading volume at each time t is,
V(t) ≡
+∞∑
n=1
λ−Lnµ
n
L(t) +
+∞∑
n=1
λ−Hnµ
n
H(t)
= λ−L
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)− s(1− θ)λ−H
(1− θ)(λ−L − λ−H)
+ λ−H
s(1− θ)λ−L −
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
(1− θ)(λ−L − λ−H)
=
∑
i∈{L,H} ηi(t)
1− θ = [µ
1
L(t)λ
−
L + µ
1
H(t)λ
−
H ] · (
s
1− θ ).
where the second equation is derived by using Proposition 1.
Secondly, the turnover of the asset is defined as below.
T (t) = V(t)
s
= (
µ
s
) · [λ−L
+∞∑
n=1
nMnL(t) + λ−H
+∞∑
n=1
nMnH(t)]
= (
1− θ
θ
) · ln( 1
1− θ ). · [λ
−
L
+∞∑
n=1
nMnL(t) + λ−H
+∞∑
n=1
nMnH(t)]
=
µ1L(t)λ
−
L + µ
1
H(t)λ
−
H
1− θ .
Finally, in steady state, we have
V = µ[λ−L
+∞∑
n=1
nMnL + λ−H
+∞∑
n=1
nMnH ] = s · (λ−LpiL + λ−HpiH)
T = V
s
= λ−LpiL + λ
−
HpiH .
Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. First of all, in spirit of Proposition 1, we guess and then would later verify that,
there exits vi ∈ R+ such that Vi(n,W ) = n·vi+W . Secondly, since Ω(e, n) is homogeneous
of degree one in (e, n), we have γ−i = λ
−
i Ωi(ei, n) = λ
−
i n · Ωi( ein , 1) ≡ λ−i n · ωi( ein ), where
ω(·) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. Denoting hi(·) ≡ ω−1i (·), we
have ei = n · hi( γ
−
i
n·λ−i
) = n · hi( γ
+
i
n·λ+i
). Since γ−i ≡ λ−i Ωi(ei, n), γ+i ≡ λ+i Ωi(ei, n), we
have
γ−i
λ−i
=
γ+i
λ+i
. Substituting ei into the original value functions yields the following two
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conditions.
rvL = max
σ′L≥1
{xL − hL(σ′L) + σ′L[λ−L (1− z)− λ+L ](1− )(vH − vL)}+ λu(vH − vL)}
rvH = max
σ′H≥1
{xH − hH(σ′H)− σ′H [λ−L − λ+L (1− z)](vH − vL)} − λd(vH − vL)}
First order condition on {σL, σH} are in turn obtained as below.
h′L(σL) = [λ
−
L (1− z)− λ+L ](1− )(vH − vL)
σH = 1
The corner solution on σH is reached because of Assumption 1. Pooling the the above
condition finishes the proof of this corollary.
Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. Again, we use guess-and-verify for the form of value functions, i.e., we guess that
Vi(n,W ) = n · vi +W.
Substituting it into the original value function in Section 6.2, we know that {v1, · · · , vI ; i∗,M}
are jointly determined as below.
rvi = xi + κi(M − vi) + δ ·
I∑
j=1
pij(vj − vi)
M = v1 + (1− )vI
i∗ = arg
i∈I
{vi∗ ≤M < vi∗+1}
where
κi ≡

(1− z)λ−i − λ+i if i ∈ IL
λ−i − (1− z)λ+i if i ∈ IH
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By Assumption 3, κi can be rewritten as below.
κi ≡

(1− z)λ− − λ+ if i ∈ IL
λ− − (1− z)λ+ if i ∈ IH
Given (M, i∗), {vi}i∈I can be solved as below.
vi =
yi + δ · v
r + δ − κi ,
where
yj ≡ xj + κj ·M
v ≡
∑
j∈I
pijvj =
∑
j∈I(
pijyj
r+δ+κ)
1− δ ·∑j∈I( pijr+δ+κj ) .
Due to Assumption 3, θ is close enough to one and thus κi is close enough to κj , for all
i ∈ IL and j ∈ IH . Besides, we already know that {xi}i∈I, then the result that vi = yi+δ·vr+δ−κi
immediately suggests that vi > vi−1 holds for all i ∈ I.
Since M = v1 + (1− )vI , we have
M =  · ( y1 + δ · v
r + δ + κ1
) + (1− ) · ( yI + δ · v
r + δ + κI
).
Moreover, substituting vi into the definition of i
∗ yields
i∗ = arg{i′ ∈ I : yi′ + δ · v
r + δ + κi′
≤M < yi′+1 + δ · v
r + δ + κi′+1
}.
Combining the above two equation pins down (M, i∗), which in turn can be used to
recover {vi}i∈I.
Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. We have dµni (t)/dt = 0 in steady state and thus all time scripts are removed. Then
for for all i ∈ Ithe dynamic system in Section 3.3 is simplified as below.
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pii ·
∑
j 6=i
µnj = (1− pii) · µni for n ∈ N,
and
(n+ 1)λ−i µ
n+1
i − n(λ−i + λ+i )µni + (n− 1)λ+i µn−1i = 0 for n ∈ N/{1}
(n+ 1)λ−i µ
n+1
i − n(λ−i + λ+i )µni + µentryi ηL = 0 for n = 1
The first equation immediately implies that
µni = piiµ
n,
where µn ≡∑∞j=1 µnj .
The second equation suggests that
(n+ 1)λ−i µ
n+1
i = nλ
+
i µ
n
i for n ∈ N/{1}
λ−i µ
n
i = µ
entry
i ηL for n = 1
Thus we have
µni =
µ1i · θn−1
n
.
Then we are done by following the argument in Proposition 1, which considers the
scenario with two types of investor preference.
147
Bibliography
[1] Afonso, Gara. ”Liquidity and Congestion.” Journal of Financial Intermedi-
ation 20, no. 3 (2011): 324-360.
[2] Afonso, Gara, and Ricardo Lagos. ”Trade Dynamics in the Market for
Federal Funds.” FRB of New York Staff Report 549 (2012a).
[3] Afonso, Gara, and Ricardo Lagos.”An Empirical Study of Trade Dynamics
in the Fed Funds Market.” FRB of New York Staff Report 550 (2012b).
[4] Akerlof, George. ”The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970): 488-500.
[5] Andolfatto, David. ”Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search.” The Amer-
ican Economic Review (1996): 112-132.
[6] Andolfatto, David, Alex Berentsen, and Christopher Waller. ”Optimal
Disclosure Policy and Undue Diligence.” Journal of Economic Theory (2013).
[7] Azariadis, Costas, and Leo Kaas. ”Capital Misallocation and Aggregate
Factor Productivity.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series
(2012).
[8] Bai, Yan, Jose´-Vı´ctor Rı´os-Rull and Kjetil Storesletten. ”Demand
Shocks that Look Like Productivity Shocks.” University of Rochester, Uni-
versity of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota (2012).
148
[9] Bethune, Zach, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Peter Rupert. ”Unemploy-
ment and Household Unsecured Debt.”University of California, Santa Barbara
and Irvine, mimeo (2013).
[10] Biais, Bruno, and Richard C. Green. ”The Microstructure of the Bond
Market in the 20th Century.” mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University, 2007.
[11] Bigio, Saki. ”Endogenous Liquidity and the Business Cycle.” Columbia Uni-
versity, mimeo (2013).
[12] Berger, David. ”Countercyclical Restructuring and Jobless Recoveries.”
Northwestern University, mimeo (2012).
[13] Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler. ”Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Busi-
ness Fluctuations.” The American Economic Review (1989): 14-31.
[14] Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist. ”The Finan-
cial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework.” Handbook of
Macroeconomics 1 (1999): 1341-1393.
[15] Blanco, Julio, and Gaston Navarro. ”Equilibrium Default and Slow Re-
coveries.” NYU, mimeo (2013).
[16] Bolton, Patrick, Tano Santos, and Jose A. Scheinkman. ”Outside and
Inside Liquidity.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126.1 (2011a): 259-321.
[17] Bolton, Patrick, Tano Santos, and Jose A. Scheinkman.”Cream Skim-
ming in Financial Markets.” No. w16804. National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 2011b.
[18] Brunnermeier, Markus K., and Lasse Heje Pedersen.”Market Liquidity
and Funding Liquidity.” Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 6 (2009): 2201-
2238.
[19] Buera, Francisco J., Joseph P. Kaboski, and Yongseok Shin. ”Finance
and Development: A Tale of Two Sectors.” The American Economic Review
101, no. 5 (2011): 1964-2002.
149
[20] Buera, Francisco J., and Benjamin Moll. ”Aggregate Implications of a
Credit Crunch.” Princeton and UCLA, mimeo (2013).
[21] Buera, Francisco J., Roberto Fattal-Jaef, and Yongseok Shin.
”Anatomy of a Credit Crunch: from Capital to Labor Markets.” UCLA, IMF,
Washington University in St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
mimeo (2013).
[22] Cabral, Lu´ıs MB, and Jose´ Mata. ”On the Evolution of the Firm Size
Distribution: Facts and Theory.”American Economic Review 93, no. 4 (2003):
1075-1090.
[23] Carlstrom, Charles T., and Timothy S. Fuerst. ”Agency Costs, Net
Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Anal-
ysis.” The American Economic Review (1997): 893-910.
[24] Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos, Michael Graber, and Klaus Waelde. ”Unem-
ployment and Vacancies Dynamics with Imperfect Financial Markets.” Uni-
versity of Essex, UCL and University of Mainz, mimeo (2013).
[25] Chambers, Matthew, and Don E. Schlagenhauf. ”Household Portfolio
Allocations, Life Cycle Effects and Anticipated Inflation.” mimeo (2003).
[26] Chang, Briana. ”Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion in Decentralized
Markets.” mimeo (2012).
[27] Chang, Yongsung, Jay H. Hong, and Marios Karabarbounis. ”Life Cy-
cle Uncertainty and Portfolio Choice Puzzles.” University of Rochester, mimeo
(2012).
[28] Chari, Varadarajan V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan.
”Business Cycle Accounting.” Econometrica 75, no. 3 (2007): 781-836.
[29] Chiu, Jonathan, and Thorsten V. Koeppl. ”Trading Dynamics with Ad-
verse Selection and Search: Market freeze, Intervention and Recovery.”working
paper, Bank of Canada and Queen’s University (2011).
150
[30] Cooley, Thomas F., and Vincenzo Quadrini. ”Financial Markets and Firm
Dynamics.” American Economic Review (2001): 1286-1310.
[31] Coval, Joshua, and Erik Stafford. ”Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in
Equity Markets.” Journal of Financial Economics 86, no. 2 (2007): 479-512.
[32] Cui, Wei. ”Delayed Capital Reallocation.”University College London, mimeo
(2013).
[33] Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmstro¨m.”Financial Crises
and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision.” working paper, Yale
School of Management, 2010.
[34] Davis, Steven J., R. Jason Faberman, and John C. Haltiwanger. ”Re-
cruiting Intensity during and after the Great Recession: National and Industry
Evidence.” No. w17782. National Bureau of Economic Research (2012).
[35] Davis, Steven J., R. Jason Faberman, and John C. Haltiwanger.
”The Establishment-Level Behavior of Vacancies and Hiring.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 128, no. 2 (2013): 581-622.
[36] Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig. ”Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity.” The Journal of Political Economy (1983): 401-419.
[37] Dixit, Robert K., and Robert S. Pindyck. Investment under Uncertainty.
Princeton University Press, 1994.
[38] Dong, Feng. ”Asset Exchange with Search Frictions and Costly Information
Acquisition.” Washington University in St. Louis, mimeo (2013).
[39] Dong, Feng, and Yi Wen. ”Unemployment under Optimal Exit Strat-
egy.” Washington University and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, work-
in-progress mimeo (2013).
[40] Duffie, Darrell. Dark Markets: Asset Pricing and Information Transmission
in Over-the-Counter Markets. Princeton University Press, 2012.
151
[41] Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Gaˆrleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. ”Over-
the-Counter Markets.” Econometrica 73, no. 6 (2005): 1815-1847.
[42] Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Gaˆrleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. ”Val-
uation in Over-the-Counter Markets.” Review of Financial Studies 20, no. 6
(2007): 1865-1900.
[43] Eisfeldt, Andrea L. ”Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets.” The Journal
of Finance 59, no. 1 (2004): 1-30.
[44] Farhi, Emmanuel, and Jean Tirole. ”Information, Tranching and Liquid-
ity.” Unpublished working paper. Harvard University (2012).
[45] Feldhu¨tter, Peter. ”The Same Bond at Different Prices: Identifying Search
Frictions and Selling Pressures.” Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 4 (2012):
1155-1206.
[46] Gale, Douglas, and Tanju Yorulmazer. ”Liquidity Hoarding.” Theoretical
Economics 8, no. 2 (2013): 291-324.
[47] Garin, Julio. ”Borrowing Constraints, Collateral Fluctuations, and the Labor
Market.” University of Georgia, mimeo (2013).
[48] Gaˆrleanu, Nicolae. ”Portfolio Choice and Pricing in Illiquid Markets.” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 144, no. 2 (2009): 532-564.
[49] Gavazza, Alessandro. ”The Role of Trading Frictions in Real Asset Mar-
kets.” The American Economic Review 101, no. 4 (2011): 1106-1143.
[50] Glosten, Lawrence R., and Paul R. Milgrom. ”Bid, Ask and Transaction
Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed traders.” Journal
of Financial Economics 14, no. 1 (1985): 71-100.
[51] Gomme, Paul, and Peter Rupert. ”Theory, Measurement and Calibration
of Macroeconomic Models.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54, no. 2 (2007):
460-497.
152
[52] Guerrieri, Veronica, Robert Shimer, and Randall Wright. ”Adverse
Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium.” Econometrica 78, no. 6 (2010):
1823-1862.
[53] Guerrieri, Veronica, and Robert Shimer. ”Dynamic Adverse Selection: A
Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality.” mimeo (2012a).
[54] Guerrieri, Veronica, and Robert Shimer. ”Markets with Multidimensional
Private Information.” mimeo (2012b).
[55] Hagedorn, Marcus, Fatih Karahan, Iourii Manovskii, and Kurt Mit-
man. ”Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession:
the Role of Macro Effects.” Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania (2013).
[56] Harris, Larry. Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practi-
tioners. Oxford University Press, USA, 2003.
[57] Heider, Florian, Marie Hoerova, and Cornelia Holthausen. ”Liquidity
Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads: The Role of Counterparty Risk.”
European Banking Center Discussion Paper 2009 (2008).
[58] Hobijn, Bart, and Aysegu¨l Sahin. ”Beveridge Curve Shifts across Countries
since the Great Recession.” Federal Bank of San Francisco Working Paper
2012-24 (2012).
[59] Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. ”Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds, and the Real Sector.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 3
(1997): 663-691.
[60] Hopenhayn, Hugo. ”Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilib-
rium.” Econometrica (1992): 1127-1150.
[61] Hopenhayn, Hugo. ”On the Measure of Distortions.” UCLA, mimeo (2013).
[62] Hosios, Arthur J. ”On the Efficiency of Matching and related Models of
Search and Unemployment.”The Review of Economic Studies 57, no. 2 (1990):
279-298.
153
[63] Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Peter J. Klenow. ”Misallocation and Manufactur-
ing TFP in China and India.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 4
(2009): 1403-1448.
[64] Jaimovich, Nir, and Henry E. Siu. ”The Trend is the Cycle: Job Polar-
ization and Jobless Recoveries.” No. w18334. National Bureau of Economic
Research (2012).
[65] Jermann, Urban, and Vincenzo Quadrini. ”Macroeconomic Effects of
Financial Shocks.” The American Economic Review 102, no. 1 (2012): 238-
271.
[66] Jovanovic, Boyan. ”Selection and the Evolution of Industry.” Econometrica
(1982): 649-670.
[67] Jullien, Bruno. ”Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models.”
Journal of Economic Theory 93, no. 1 (2000): 1-47.
[68] Kaas, Leo, and Philipp Kircher. ”Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional
Labor Market.” University of Konstanz and University of Edinburgh, mimeo
(2013).
[69] Kehrig, Matthias. ”The Cyclicality of Productivity Dispersion.” University
of Texas at Austin, mimeo (2011).
[70] Khan, Aubhik, and Julia K. Thomas. ”Credit Shocks and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations in an Economy with Production Heterogeneity.” Journal of Political
Economy, forthcoming (2013).
[71] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright. ”On Money as a Medium of
Exchange.” The Journal of Political Economy (1989): 927-954.
[72] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright. ”A Search-theoretic Approach
to Monetary Economics.” The American Economic Review (1993): 63-77.
[73] Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore. ”Credit Cycles.” The Journal of
Political Economy 105, no. 2 (1997): 211-248.
154
[74] Klette, Tor Jakob, and Samuel Kortum. ”Innovating Firms and Aggregate
Innovation.” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 5 (2004): 986-1018.
[75] Krusell, Per, and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. ”Income and Wealth Hetero-
geneity in the Macroeconomy.” Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 5 (1998):
867-896.
[76] Kurlat, Pablo. ”Lemons Markets and the Transmission of Aggregate Shocks.”
The American Economic Review 103, no. 4 (2013): 1463-1489.
[77] Kyle, Albert S. ”Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.” Econometrica
(1985): 1315-1335.
[78] Lagos, Ricardo. ”A Model of TFP.” The Review of Economic Studies 73, no.
4 (2006): 983-1007.
[79] Lagos, Ricardo, and Guillaume Rocheteau. ”Inflation, output and wel-
fare.” International Economic Review 46, no. 2 (2005): 495-522.
[80] Lagos, Ricardo, and Guillaume Rocheteau. ”Search in Asset Markets:
Market structure, liquidity, and welfare.” The American Economic Review 97,
no. 2 (2007): 198-202.
[81] Lagos, Ricardo, and Guillaume Rocheteau. ”Liquidity in Asset Markets
with Search Frictions.” Econometrica 77, no. 2 (2009): 403-426.
[82] Lagos, Ricardo, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill.
”Crises and Liquidity in Over-the-Counter Markets.” Journal of Economic
Theory (2011).
[83] Lagos, Ricardo, and Randall Wright. ”A Unified Framework for Monetary
Theory and Policy Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 113, no. 3 (2005).
[84] Levine, Ross. ”Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence,” in P. Aghion
and S. Durlauf, eds., Handbook of Economic Growth, (Elsevier, 2005), 865-
934.
155
[85] Lewis, Tracy R., and David EM Sappington. ”Countervailing Incentives
in Agency Problems.” Journal of Economic Theory 49, no. 2 (1989): 294-313.
[86] Liu, Zheng, Jianjun Miao, and Tao Zha. ”Land Prices and Unemploy-
ment.” No. w19382. National Bureau of Economic Research (2013).
[87] Liu, Zheng, and Pengfei Wang. ”Credit Constraints and Self-Fulfilling
Business Cycles.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcom-
ing (2011).
[88] Lucas Jr, Robert E. ”On the Size Distribution of Business Firms.” The Bell
Journal of Economics (1978): 508-523.
[89] Luttmer, Erzo GJ. ”Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 1103-1144.
[90] Luttmer, Erzo GJ. ”On the Mechanics of Firm Growth.” The Review of
Economic Studies 78, no. 3 (2011): 1042-1068.
[91] Maggi, Giovanni, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. ”On Countervailing In-
centives.” Journal of Economic Theory 66, no. 1 (1995): 238-263.
[92] Malherbe, Fre´de´ric. ”Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Dry-Ups.” The Journal of Fi-
nance (2013).
[93] Melitz, Marc J. ”The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and
Aggregate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica 71, no. 6 (2003): 1695-1725.
[94] Menzio, Guido, and Shouyong Shi. ”Block Recursive Equilibria for
Stochastic Models of Search on the Job.” Journal of Economic Theory 145,
no. 4 (2010): 1453-1494.
[95] Menzio, Guido, and Shouyong Shi. ”Efficient Search on the Job and the
Business Cycle.” Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 3 (2011): 468-510.
[96] Merz, Monika. ”Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 36, no. 2 (1995): 269-300.
156
[97] Miao, Jianjun. ”A Search Model of Centralized and Decentralized Trade.”
Review of Economic dynamics 9, no. 1 (2006): 68-92.
[98] Miao, Jianjun, Pengfei Wang, and Lifang Xu. ”Stock Market Bubbles
and Unemployment.” Boston University and Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology, mimeo (2013).
[99] Michaillat, Pascal. ”Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in
Bad Times.” The American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (2012): 1721-1750.
[100] Moen, Espen R. ”Competitive Search Equilibrium.” Journal of Political
Economy 105, no. 2 (1997): 385-411.
[101] Moll, Benjamin. ”Productivity Losses from Financial Frictions: Can Self-
financing Undo Capital Misallocation?” Princeton University, mimeo (2012).
[102] Monacelli, Tommaso, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Antonella Trigari. ”Fi-
nancial Markets and Unemployment.” No. w17389. National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2011.
[103] Moscarini, Giuseppe, and Fabien Postel-Vinay. ”The Contribution of
Large and Small Employers to Job Creation in Times of High and Low Un-
employment.” The American Economic Review 102, no. 6 (2012): 2509-2539.
[104] Mortensen, Dale T. ”The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative Bargain-
ing Game.” In The economics of information and uncertainty, pp. 233-258.
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
[105] Mortensen, Dale T. Wage Dispersion: Why are Similar Workers Paid Dif-
ferently. MIT Press (2005).
[106] Mukoyama, Toshihiko, Christina Patterson, and Aysegu¨l Sahin. ”Job
Search Behavior over the Business Cycle.” University of Virginia, Federal Re-
serve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mimeo (2013).
[107] Norris, James R. Markov Chains. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
157
[108] Nosal, Ed, and Guillaume Rocheteau. Money, Payments, and Liquidity.
MIT press, 2011.
[109] Pagnotta, Emiliano, and Thomas Philippon. ”Competing on Speed.”
mimeo (2012).
[110] Petrongolo, Barbara, and Christopher A. Pissarides. ”Looking into the
Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function.” Journal of Economic Liter-
ature 39, no. 2 (2001): 390-431.
[111] Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas. ”TFP during a Credit Crunch.”Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory (2013).
[112] Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas, and Etienne Wasmer. ”The Cyclical Volatil-
ity of Labor Markets under Frictional Financial Markets.”American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 5, no. 1 (2013): 193-221.
[113] Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT press,
2000.
[114] Restuccia, Diego, and Richard Rogerson. ”Policy Distortions and Aggre-
gate Productivity with Heterogeneous Establishments.” Review of Economic
Dynamics 11, no. 4 (2008): 707-720.
[115] Restuccia, Diego, Dennis Tao Yang, and Xiaodong Zhu. ”Agriculture
and Aggregate Productivity: A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis.” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 55, no. 2 (2008): 234-250.
[116] Rust, John, and George Hall. ”Middlemen versus Market Makers: A The-
ory of Competitive Exchange.” Journal of Political Economy 111.2 (2003):
353-403.
[117] Schaal, Edouard. ”Uncertainty, Productivity and Unemployment in the
Great Recession.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, mimeo (2012).
[118] Shimer, Robert. ”Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market. ” MIT, mimeo
(1996).
158
[119] Shimer, Robert. ”Labor Markets and Business Cycles.”Princeton University
Press (2010).
[120] Storesletten, Kjetil, Christopher I. Telmer, and Amir Yaron. ”Con-
sumption and Risk Sharing over the Life Cycle.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 51, no. 3 (2004): 609-633.
[121] Sutton, John. ”Gibrat’s Legacy.” Journal of economic Literature 35, no. 1
(1997): 40-59.
[122] Tirole, Jean. ”Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can
Restore Market Functioning.” The American Economic Review 102, no. 1
(2012): 29-59.
[123] Trejos, Alberto, and Randall Wright. ”Search, Bargaining, Money, and
Prices.” Journal of Political Economy (1995): 118-141.
[124] Trejos, Alberto, and Randall Wright. ”Money and Finance: An Integrated
Approach.” mimeo (2012).
[125] Vayanos, Dimitri, and Tan Wang. ”Search and Endogenous Concentration
of Liquidity in Asset Markets.” Journal of Economic Theory 136, no. 1 (2007):
66-104.
[126] Wasmer, Etienne, and Philippe Weil. ”The Macroeconomics of Labor and
Credit Market Imperfections.” The American Economic Review (2004): 944-
963.
[127] Wang, Pengfei, and Yi Wen. ”Hayashi meets Kiyotaki and Moore: A The-
ory of Capital Adjustment Costs.” Review of Economic Dynamics 15, no. 2
(2012): 207-225.
[128] Wang, Pengfei, and Yi Wen. ”Financial Development and Long-Run
Volatility Trends.” Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St. Louis, mimeo (2013).
159
[129] Wasmer, Etienne, and Philippe Weil. ”The Macroeconomics of Labor and
Credit Market Imperfections.” American Economic Review (2004): 944-963.
[130] Weill, Pierre-Olivier. ”Leaning against the Wind.” The Review of Economic
Studies 74, no. 4 (2007): 1329-1354.
[131] Wiczer, David. ”Long-term Unemployment: Attached and Mismatched?.”
University of Minnesota, mimeo (2012).
[132] Williamson, Stephen D. ”Financial Intermediary, Business Failures, and
Real Business Cycles.” The Journal of Political Economy 95, no. 6 (1987):
1196-1216.
[133] Williamson, Stephen, and Randall Wright. ”New Monetarist Economics:
Methods,” St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Review 92, 265-302, (2010).
[134] Williamson, Stephen, and Randall Wright. ”New Monetarist Economics:
Models.” in Handbook of Monetary Economics vol. 3A, B. Friedman and M.
Woodford, eds., Elsevier, 2011.
[135] Zhang, Shengxing. ”Liquidity Mis-allocation in an Over-The-Counter Mar-
ket.” New York University, mimeo (2012).
[136] Zhu, Haoxiang. ”Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-Counter Mar-
kets.” Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 4 (2012): 1255-1285.
160
